jj4  tl(t  Wpnlngifa;  ^ 


^  PRINCETON,  N.  J.  4t 


Presented   by  o^^)<(S  CJOY^C-S-V  Co  We- C?!^ 

BR  45  .B76  v. 8 

Figgis,  John  Neville,  1866- 

1919. 
The  will  to  freedom 


THE  BROSS  LIBRARY 

VOLUME    VIII 


THE  BROSS  LIBRARY 

The  Problem  of  the  Old  Testament,  by 
James  Orr,  D.D.     (Brass  Prize,  1Q05.) 

The  Mythical  Interpretation  of  the  Gos- 
pels, by  Thomas  James  Thorburn,  D.D., 
LX,.D.     (Bross  Prize,  1915.) 

Faith    Justified    by    Process,    by   H.   W. 

Wright,  Ph.D. 

The  Will  to  Freedom,  or  the  Gospel  of 
Nietzsche  and  the  Gospel  of  Christ,  by 

John     Neville     Figgis,     D.D.,     Litt.D, 

The  Bible:     Its    Origin   and    Nature,   by 

Marcus  Dods,  D.D. 

The  Bible  of  Nature,  by  J.  Arthur  Thom- 
son, M.A. 

The  Religions  of  Modern  Syria  and  Pales- 
tine, by  Frederick  Jones  Bliss,  Ph.D. 

The  Sources  of  Religious  Insight,  by  JOSIAH 
Royce,  Ph.D.,  LL.D. 


^ 


THE  BROSS  LECTURES    .    .    1915        ,  ,,  , 


THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

OR, 

THE  GOSPEL  OF  NIETZSCHE  AND 
THE  GOSPEL  OF  CHRIST 

BEING  THE    BROSS    LECTURES   DELIVERED   IN 
LAKE  FOREST  COLLEGE,  ILLINOIS 


> 


BY 

JOHN  NEVILLE  FIGGIS,  D.D.,  Litt.D. 

OF   THE    COMMUNITY   OF   THE    RESURRECTION 
HOKORARY  FELLOW  OF  S.  CATHARINE's   COLLEGE,   CAMBRWGE 


NEW  YORK 

CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS 

1917 


Copyright,  1917,  by 
THE   TRUSTEES    OF   LAKE   FOREST   UNIVERSITY 


m 


Published  April,  1917 


TO 
JOHN  ERIC  SIDNEY  GREEN 


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THE  BROSS  FOUNDATION  ix 

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X  THE  BROSS  FOUNDATION 

of  apologetics  and  systematic  theology  in 
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THE  BROSS  FOUNDATION  xi 

time  by  the  trustees  of  Lake  Forest  Uni- 
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Marcus  Dods,  D.D.,  professor  of  exeget- 


xii  THE  BROSS  FOUNDATION 

ical  theology  in  New  College,  Edinburgh. 
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Syria.  These  lectures  were  published  in 
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sity. These  lectures  were  pubhshed  in 
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The  sixth  course  of  lectures,  on  "The  Will 
to  Freedom,  or  the  Gospel  of  Nietzsche  and 


THE  BROSS  FOUNDATION  xiii 

the  Gospel  of  Christ/'  was  dehvered  in 
May,  1915,  by  the  Reverend  John  Neville 
Figgis,  D.D.,  Litt.D.,  of  the  House  of  the 
Resurrection,  Mirfield,  England.  These 
lectures  are  presented  in  this  volume. 
John  Scholte  Nollen, 
President  of  Lake  Forest  College, 

Lake  Forest,  Illinois, 
June,  1916. 


tt- 


PREFACE 

These  lectures  were  delivered  at  Lake 
Forest  College  in  May,  1915.  Since  then 
I  have  rewritten  the  text  and  added  many 
notes.  Even  so,  this  book  is  not  a  com- 
plete treatment  of  Nietzsche.  So  much 
lias  been  written  about  him  that  that  may 
not  seem  needful. 

I  would  beg  the  reader  to  bear  in  mind 
this  fact :  The  author's  interest  in  Nietzsche 
is  not  due  to  the  war,  nor  does  it  date 
from  1914.  To  what  extent  Nietzsche  is  a 
creator  as  well  as  a  prophet  of  the  mod- 
ern German  mind  I  have  not  discussed. 
Speaking  in  a  neutral  country,  I  could  not 
do  that.  Nor  do  I  propose  to  discuss  it 
now.  The  reader  will  find  much  help 
from  Mr.  Santayana's  brilliant  and  witty 
work  on  Egotism  in  German  Philosophy, 
This  I  had  not  read  until  these  lectures 


xvi  PREFACE 

were  in  print.  I  am  glad  to  find  that  Mr. 
Santayana  in  no  way  identifies  the  views  of 
Nietzsche  and  Max  Stirner.  On  the  grounds 
given  in  the  fourth  lecture  and  elsewhere, 
I  cannot  agree  with  Doctor  E-ashdall  in 
Conscience  and  Christ,  who  treats  the  doc- 
trine of  Nietzsche  as  an  ethic  of  pure  self- 
ishness. For  the  same  reason  I  think  the 
refutation  of  what  he  quotes  from  Mr. 
Moore  inadequate.  Both  statements  would 
be  correct  as  applied  to  Max  Stirner. 
Nietzsche  did  not  teach  egotism,  but  the 
sacrifice  of  immediate  desire  to  an  ideal  of 
nobility.  This  may  not  prevent  the  fact 
that  many  of  his  self-styled  disciples  preach 
the  baser  doctrine.  That  was  true  also  of 
Epicurus. 

On  one  other  point  misconception  has 
been  caused.  Nietzsche  disliked  Germans, 
and  was  opposed  to  the  doctrine  of 
"Deutschland  tiber  AUes."  This  fact  has 
been  employed  in  an  incorrect  argument 
by  certain  followers  of  Nietzsche  in  this 
country.      Their   zeal   for   their  master  is 


PREFACE  xvii 

greater  than  their  discernment.  They  write 
as  though  the  anti-Prussian  sympathies  of 
Nietzsche's  later  years  are  conclusive  evi- 
dence that  modern  Germany  was  not  influ- 
enced by  him.  This  is  to  throw  dust  in 
the  eyes  of  the  public.  Nietzsche  disliked 
Treitschke,  yet  each  may  have  contributed 
to  the  same  result.  Bernhardi  heads  his 
book  with  a  tag  "from  the  master."  Last 
year  a  German  pamphlet  was  published 
"^proving  that  Hindenburg  expressed  all  that 
was  vital  in  the  idea  of  the  Superman,  I 
do  not  say  that  the  author  is  right.  Yet 
he  would  not  have  written  as  he  did,  were 
not  Nietzsche  a  power  in  his  nation.  Long 
before  the  war  I  heard  it  said  that  what 
was  driving  the  Germans  to  war  was  Nietz- 
scheanism.  The  irrelevance  of  Nietzsche's 
personal  liking  to  the  topic  of  his  influence 
on  German  ideals  is  best  stated  in  the 
preface  to  Doctor  Stewart's  book  on  the 
subject.  The  dependence  of  Nietzsche  on 
German  thought  and  his  place  in  ''the  suc- 
cession" are  developed  by  Mr.  Santayana. 


xviii  PREFACE 

Without  subscribing  to  all  that  either 
writer  says,  I  can  refer  the  inquirer  to  these 
two  books,  both  of  them  interesting,  though 
very  different. 

The  text,  so  far  as  possible,  is  untainted. 
I  owe  thanks  to  the  publishers  for  per- 
mission to  use  the  excellent  English  trans- 
lations. Nietzsche's  letters  and  post- 
humous works  are  too  little  known  in 
this  country.  I  have,  therefore,  made 
considerable  citations  from  them  in  the 
"notes."  They  elucidate  the  argument  of 
my  lectures  better  than  his  full-dress  works. 

The  preparation  and  delivery  of  this 
course  was  a  joy  to  me.  To  the  authori- 
ties of  Lake  Forest  College  and  to  many 
friends  there  I  here  render  my  thanks  for 
their  great  kindness,  and  for  the  high 
honour  they  have  done  me. 

To  the  Reverend  Hubert  Northcote 
thanks  are  also  due.  He  has  been  through 
all  the  proofs,  and  saved  me  from  many 
'  errors. 

MiKFiELD,  November  27,  1916. 


CONTENTS 

I.  Friedrich  Nietzsche:   The  Man 

II.  The  Gospel  of  Nietzsche  . 

III.  Nietzsche  and  Christianity    . 

IV.  Nietzsche's  Originality 

V.    The  Charm  of  Nietzsche  . 


PAGE 
1 

58 
102 
159 
213 


VI.    The  Danger  and  the  Significance  of 

Nietzsche 266 

Index 317 


FRIEDRICH  NIETZSCHE:   THE   MAN 

It  is  related  of  Archbishop  Benson  that 
when  he  first  made  acquaintance  with  Lon- 
don society  he  asked  in  his  bewilderment: 
"What  do  these  people  believe?"  If  he 
were  alive  to-day  he  would  suffer  a  like 
astonishment,  but  his  question  would  rather 
take  the  form:  "What  don't  these  people 
believe?"  So  strange  is  the  welter  of 
creeds  and  sects,  of  religions  and  irrelig- 
ious, moralists  and  immoralists,  mystics, 
rationaUsts,  and  reaUsts,  and  even  Chris- 
tians, that  it  is  hard  to  guess  what  nos- 
trum may  be  dominant  with  your  next- 
door  neighbour.  It  may  be  a  dietetic 
evangel,  it  may  be  an  atheistic  apocalypse. 
One  phenomenon,  not  the  least  notable  of 
our  day,  is  the  rejection  by  large  numbers  of 
all  the  values,  which  even  in  the  broadest 


2  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

sense  could  be  called  Christian.  It  is  not 
of  Christianity  as  a  creed,  but  Christianity 
as  a  way  that  I  speak.  Christianity  in- 
volves many  other  elements,  but  it  is,  as  we 
observe  it,  a  way  of  life.  It  selects  and  sets 
its  value  on  certain  kinds  of  character.  It 
is  the  most  developed,  though  by  no  means 
the  only  form  of  the  philosophy  of  Love. 
We  now  know  that  it  gathered  up  into  itself 
many  tendencies  at  work  in  systems  pre- 
viously existing.  The  words  Homo  sum, 
humani  nihil  a  me  alienum  puto  were  written 
by  a  Pagan  playwright  a  century  and  a  half 
before  the  foundation  of  Christianity.  Yet 
they  found  their  full  significance  therein, 
and  were,  like  many  presuppositions  of  the 
great  Roman  jurists,  ultimately  destructive 
of  the  slave-basis  of  the  ancient  world. 
Many  of  these  Christian  values,  at  least  the 
stress  laid  on  common  fellowship  and  un- 
selfishness, are  preserved,  with  what  degree 
of  legitimacy  we  need  not  inquire,  by  many 
who  reject  the  Christian  faith.  The  Re- 
ligion of  Humanity  as  set  forth  by  Auguste 


FRIEDRICH  NIETZSCHE:  THE  MAN         3 

Comte  is  agnostic  in  its  attitude  to  the 
other  world,  but  its  conception  of  duty  as 
between  man  and  man  is  not  very  different 
from  the  Christian.  Adam  Smith  wrote  a 
book,  less  famous  than  the  Wealth  of  Na- 
tions, designed  to  show  the  origin  of  all 
morality  in  sympathy.  Modern  altruism  in 
its  varied  forms  may  be  traced  not  obscurely 
to  Christian  influence,  although  even  ethi- 
cally it  is  not  identical  therewith. 

A  short  while  back  it  was  assumed  that, 
apart  from  all  questions  of  the  supernatural, 
the  Christian  ideal  was  the  highest  known 
to  man.  John  Stuart  Mill  declared  in  his 
Essays  on  Religion  that  we  have  no  better 
criterion  of  conduct  than  that  of  Kving  so 
that  Christ  should  approve  our  hves.  So 
long  as  that  represented  anything  hke  a 
general  sentiment  it  was  possible  to  main- 
tain that  the  wide-spread  attack  on  Chris- 
tian dogma  need  have  no  effect  on  morals. 
If  such  a  charge  was  made  by  Christians  it 
was  hotly  resented.  Men  like  Huxley  or 
Matthew  Arnold  would  have  scorned  as 


4  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

narrow-minded  any  one  who  had  said  that 
by  knocking  the  bottom  out  of  faith  in  the 
supernatural  they  were  undermining  mo- 
rahty.  When  Tennyson  did  say  it,  in  "The 
Promise  of  May/'  the  late  Lord  Queens- 
berry  protested  at  the  first  night  and  made 
a  scene  at  the  Globe  Theatre. 

Nous  avons  change  tout  cela.  On  all  hands 
we  hear  preached  a  revival  of  Paganism. 
Christianity  as  an  ethical  ideal  is  con- 
temned. Formerly  Christians  were  charged 
with  hypocrisy  because  they  fell  short  of 
the  ideal.  The  charge  was  false,  although 
the  fact  was  true.  We  do  fail,  fail  miser- 
ably, to  come  up  to  our  ideal,  and  always 
shall,  so  long  as  it  remains  an  ideal.  Now- 
adays the  Christian  is  attacked  not  because 
he  fails,  but  in  so  far  as  he  succeeds.  Our 
Lord  himseE  is  scorned,  not  because  he  is 
not  the  revealer  of  Love,  but  because  he  is. 
Hardly  a  single  specifically  Christian  value 
is  left  as  it  was.  These  attacks  come  from 
many  angles.  In  these  lectures  on  the  foun- 
dation of  Governor  Bross  I  am  to  invite 


FRIEDRICH  NIETZSCHE:  THE  MAN         5 

your  attention  to  one  such  assailant.  Re- 
cently the  name  of  Friedrich  Nietzsche  has 
become  widely  known.  For  some  years  a 
cult  of  him,  almost  like  a  rehgion,  has  been 
proceeding.  It  is  nearly  twenty  years  ago 
since  his  danger  and  his  charm  became  clear 
to  me.  For  long,  indeed,  he  was  ignored 
by  official  representatives  either  of  apology 
or  philosophy.  Now,  however,  his  name  is 
so  commonly  familiar,  that  your  complaint 
is  Uke  to  be  of  the  other  order.  So  I  must 
crave  your  pardon  if  the  topic  seems  trite. 
At  least  it  is  germane  to  the  scheme  of  the 
Governor  Bross  Lectures,  as  propounded. 

This  poet-prophet,  so  strange  and  beputi- 
ful,  has  laid  a  spell  on  many  in  our  time. 
It  may  not  be  aimless  toil  to  try  to  give 
some  notion  of  what  he  wanted;  and  in  the 
hght  of  that  blazing  criticism  to  see  how  it 
stands  with  Christianity,  as  a  house  of  hfe 
for  men.  The  task  is  not  easy.  Nietzsche 
made  a  virtue  of  inconsistency,  and  never 
continued  in  one  stay.     Any  presentment  of 


6  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

him  may  be  pronounced  unfair  by  an  ad- 
mirer. Moreover,  the  critic  may  even  find 
chapter  and  verse  for  his  complaint;  since 
Nietzsche  expressed  most  opinions  during 
the  course  of  his  Ufe.  Even  of  his  later 
Zarathustra  period  it  is  not  easy  to  make 
a  harmony.  Probably  no  two  people  to  the 
end  of  time  will  be  in  precise  agreement  as 
to  the  significance  of  the  Uhermensch} 

For  Christians  yet  another  difficulty 
arises.  One  is  tempted  to  give  up  all  effort 
to  understand  a  writer,  of  whom  a  passage 
like  the  following  is  typical: 

"The  Christian  Church  is  to  me  the 
greatest  of  all  imaginable  corruptions;  it 
has  had  the  will  to  the  ultimate  corrup- 
tion that  is  possible.  The  Christian 
Church  has  left  nothing  untouched  with 
its  depravity,  it  has  made  a  worthlessness 
out  of  every  value,  a  He  out  of  every 
truth,  a  baseness  of  soul  out  of  every 
straightforwardness."  ^ 

^  One  writer,  Belart,  traces  eight  varieties  in  Nietzsche's  own 
work. 
^Antichrist,  §  G2. 


FKIEDRICH  NIETZSCHE:  THE  MAN  7 

Nietzsche  put  Voltaire's  name  at  the  head 
of  one  book — Human,  All  Too  Human — 
and  concludes  his  Ecce  Homo  with  the 
words  Ecrasez  Vinfame,  Yet  we  cannot 
withstand  Nietzsche  unless  we  take  the 
trouble  to  understand  him.  Besides  he  is 
worth  it.  True,  madness  overcame  him 
before  he  was  forty-five.  On  this  account 
some  would  dismiss  him  without  more  ado 
and  say  that  his  books  are  all  ravings. 
But  this  would  not  be  wise.  Even  if  we 
do  not  like  him,  we  cannot  deny  him  an 
influence — in  some  ways  an  increasing  in- 
fluence. I  think,  indeed,  that  they  are 
wrong  who  deny  all  traces  of  insanity  in  his 
writings.  Doubtless,  too,  had  Nietzsche 
fought  on  the  Christian  side,  this  insanity 
would  be  deemed  good  ground  for  neglect- 
ing his  apologetic — even  by  those  same 
superior  persons  who  are  all  for  treating  it 
as  irrelevant  now.  Still,  there  must  be 
something  of  importance  in  a  writer  who  is 
having  so  profound  an  influence  on  the  cul- 
tivated world.  We  must  take  account  of 
him,  whether  we  Kke  it  or  not.     Nietzsche 


8  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

knew  this.  He  said  in  one  of  his  letters 
that  the  world  might  attack  or  despise,  but 
could  not  ignore  him. 

Besides,  he  had  a  way  with  him.  Bitter 
though  he  be,  violent,  one-sided,  blasphe- 
mous, perverse,  vain,  he  never  commits  the 
unpardonable  sin — ^he  is  never  dull.  The 
thousand  and  one  facets  in  which  flashes 
the  jewel  of  his  mind  throw  hght  and  colour 
on  many  dark  paths.  The  passion  of  his 
flaming  soul,  his  sincerity,  his  sense  of 
beauty,  his  eloquence,  the  courage  of  his 
struggles  with  ill  health,  the  pathos  of  that 
lonely  soul  craving  for  sympathy,  his  deep 
psychological  insight  and  sense  of  pro- 
phetic mission — ^all  these  give  him  a  spell 
which  is  hard  to  resist.  His  teaching  in 
some  respects,  not  all,  we  may  deplore. 
His  picture  of  our  holy  religion  is  a  carica- 
ture with  hardly  an  element  of  likeness. 
His  system,  so  far  as  he  has  a  system,  may 
seem  childish.  Yet  Nietzsche  remains.  We 
shall  always  return  to  him;  and  the  Alpine 
clearness   of   the   atmosphere   he   breathes 


FRIEDRICH  NIETZSCHE:  THE  MAN  9 

braces,  like  his  own  Engadin.  His  opinions 
may  be  what  you  will,  but  Friedrich  Nietz- 
sche, the  man,  we  love  and  shall  go  on  lov- 
ing, even  when  he  hits  us  hardest.  He  said 
himsetf  that  in  controversy  we  should  be 
severe  towards  opinions,  but  tender  towards 
the  individual.  That  may  well  form  our 
maxim  in  dealing  with  Friedrich  Nietzsche. 
Friedrich  Nietzsche,  indeed,  we  must  get 
at.  No  thinker  was  ever  more  personal 
than  Nietzsche — ^not  even  Saint  Paul.^ 
He  said  somewhere  that  he  felt  every  ex- 
perience more  deeply  than  other  men;  and 
that  all  the  theories  set  forth  in  Zarathustra 
were  expressive  of  something  in  his  life. 
Moreover,  "Nietzsche  is  'la  sincerite 
meme,'"  says  a  hostile  French  critic  (M. 
Pallares,  p.  345).  These  words  are  the  more 
noteworthy  that  M.  Pallares  leans  unduly 

*  "Auch  Tolstoi,  auch  Bjomson,  auch  Ibsen,  Strindberg,  Zola 
gingen  nicht  so  vollig  auf  in  ihrem  Werk,  waren  nicht  so  ganz  wie 
er,  Entwicklung,  Kampf,  Flam  me  geworden."  (Meyer,  Nietzsche y 
sein  Leben  und  seine  Werhe,  688.) 

In  regard  to  reading  his  book,  Morgenrothe,  he  writes  to  his 
sister:  "Such  alles  heraus,  was  Dir  verrath,  was  im  Grunde 
Dein  Bruder  am  meisten  braucht,  am  meisten  nothig  hat,  was 
er  will,  und  was  er  nicht  will.  Lies  dazu  namentlich  das  fiinfte 
Buch,  wo  vieles  zwischen  den  Zeilen  steht.     Wohin  alles  bei  mir 


10  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

to  the  severe  in  dealing  with  Nietzsche. 
Let  us  then  to-day  concern  ourselves  with 
some  attempt  to  picture  Nietzsche  the  man. 

Friedrich  Nietzsche  was  born  at  Rocken 
in  1844.  He  lost  his  reason  early  in  1889 
and  died  in  1900.  Thus,  he  was  but  a 
child  at  the  great  age  of  the  revolutions. 
As  a  young  man  at  college  he  saw  the 
dawn  of  Prussian  predominance  in  1866. 
During  the  war  that  made  the  new  German 
Empire  he  was  a  youthful  professor  at 
Basle  and  no  longer  a  German  subject. 
The  present  Kaiser  had  begun  his  reign 
just  before  the  catastrophe  which  engulfed 
Nietzsche.  He  had  PoUsh  blood  in  him.^ 
This  was  a  source  of  pride.  He  deemed 
himself  the  descendant  of  the  Pohsh  Counts 

noch  strebt,  ist  nicht  mit  einem  Worte  zu  sagen — und  hatte  ich 
das  Wort;  ich  wiirde  es  nicht  sagen.  "  (July,  1881.  Brieje,  V,  2, 
458.) 

C/.,  also:  "Mitunter  ist  mir,  ich  hatte  genug  erlebt  fiir  sechzig 
Jahre."     (July,  1874.     Briefe,  V,  298.) 

And  again:  "Jedes  Wort  meines  Zarathustra  ist  ja  siegreicher 
Hohn  und  mehr  als  Hohn  iiber  die  Ideale  dieser  Zeit;  und  fast 
hinter  jedem  Wort  steht  ein  personliches  Erlebniss,  eine  Selbst- 
liberwindung  ersten  Ranges.     {Briefe,  V,  540.) 

^This  affiliation  has  been  doubted,  but  it  seems  now  to  be 
established. 


FRIEDRICH  NIETZSCHE:  THE  MAN        11 

Nietzki.  Two  strains  of  purely  German 
blood,  that  of  his  mother  and  one  grand- 
mother, prevented  him  being  as  much  of  a 
Pole  as  he  would  have  liked.  Yet  he  was 
often  pleased  when  on  his  frequent  travels 
people  took  him  for  a  Pole  and  no  German. 
He  described  himself  as  coming  of  a  long 
hne  of  Lutheran  pastors.  That  gave  him 
his  exhaustless  interest  in  Christianity. 
He  hated  it  too  much  ever  to  leave  it  alone. 
We  find  him  apologising  to  his  friend, 
Peter  Gast,  for  the  result  of  his  Christian 
ancestry.^ 

Nietzsche's  father  was  a  distinguished 
Lutheran  pastor,  who  died  when  the  chil- 
dren were  very  young.  Friedrich  lamented 
this  all  his  life.  Frau  Pastorin  Nietzsche 
took  the  boy  and  girl,  Friedrich  and  Eliza- 

^This  was  in  1881.  The  letter  is  worth  citing:  "Mir  fielein, 
lieber  Freund,  dass  Ihnen  an  meinem  Buche  die  bestandige  inner- 
liche  Auseinandersetzung  mit  dem  Christenthume  fremd,  ja  pein- 
lich  sein  muss;  es  ist  aber  doch  das  beste  Stuck  idealen  Lebens, 
welches  ich  wirklich  kennen  gelernt  habe;  von  Kindesbeinen  an 
bin  ich  ihm  nachgegangen;  in  viele  Winkel,  und  ich  glaube,  ich 
bin  nie  in  meinem  Herzen  gegen  dasselbe  gemein  gewesen.  Zu- 
letzt  bin  ich  der  Nachkommer  ganzer  Geschlechter  von  Christ- 
lichen  Geisthchen — vergeben  Sie  mir  diese  Beschranktheit." 
{Brieje,  IV,  69.) 


U  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

beth,  to  Naumburg.  Nietzsche  was  only 
five  years  old  at  this  time.  He  was  brought 
up  by  his  pious  and  Puritan  mother  amid 
a  circle  of  relatives.  The  training  of  his 
mother  was  Spartan  and  the  mitigations 
were  the  work  of  their  grandmother,  Frau 
Oehler.  The  circle  was  pious,  eminently 
respectable,  and  of  local  importance. 
Nietzsche  had  a  reverence  for  his  mother 
which  he  never  lost.  When  his  stroke  came 
in  1889  the  old  lady  hurried  to  Turin,  and 
insisted  that  she  would  tend  him.  There 
was,  however,  little  intimacy  of  thought, 
and  in  this  Friedrich  missed  his  father's 
friendship.^  Brother  and  sister  were  all  in 
all  to  each  other.  Pleasant  is  the  picture 
of  their  child  life  given  in  the  earlier  pages 
of  her  book  by  Frau  Forster-Nietzsche. 
That  biography  is  one  of  our  chief  means 
of  understanding  Nietzsche.  Yet  it  must 
be  read  with  caution.  It  is  a  very  clever 
piece  of  apologetic  writing.     It  needs  to  be 


•  Frau  Nietzsche  was  a  violent  adversary  of  the  Wagner  con- 
nection. 


FRIEDRICH  NIETZSCHE:  THE  MAN       13 

checked  by  Nietzsche's  own  letters  and 
other  writings  hke  that  of  Doctor  Paul 
Deussen,  his  schoolfellow.^  Naumburg  was 
a  small  provincial  town,  and  the  circle  in 
which  the  Nietzsche  family  moved  was 
eminently  pious.  What  all  this  meant  in 
the  fifties  and  sixties  we  can  imagine.  The 
boy  disliked  all  vulgarity.  At  the  local 
gymnasium  he  made  few  friends.  But  he 
was  passionate  in  his  attachments.  He 
was  an  ardent  scholar,  and  by  this  means 
won  a  place  at  the  great  institution  of 
Pforta.  Pforta  was  a  place  of  reixown  or- 
ganised apparently  somewhat  like  an  Eng- 
lish public  school,  with  the  elder  boys  in 
authority  over  the  younger.  It  prided  it- 
self on  moulding  life  as  a  whole,  and  not 
being  a  mere  teaching  place.  Many  of  the 
most  distinguished  men  in  Germany  had 
been  educated  there.  Nietzsche's  letters 
and  the  recollections  of  Doctor  Deussen 
give  the  impression  of  a  strenuous  and  in- 


^  Deussen,  Erinnerungen   an   Nietzsche,    and  also  Frau  Lou- 
Andreas-Salome,  Nietzsche  in  seinen  Werken. 


14  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

terestmg  life — with  the  friendships  and 
quarrels  of  boyhood.  Nietzsche  had  always 
a  certain  distinction  of  manner.  Yet  here 
and  throughout  his  early  life  he  was  in- 
tensely human.  It  is  an  error  to  think  of 
him  as  a  recluse  misanthrope.  He  was 
praised  for  all  things,  except  mathematics. 
Towards  the  close  of  his  time  he  got  into 
one  serious  scrape,  drunkenness,  and  his 
letters  to  his  mother  on  the  subject  are 
touching  and  natural.  Like  other  youths 
of  Hterary  tastes,  he  started  a  small  essay 
club — the  membership  began  with  three — 
not  all  at  the  same  school.  The  rules  were 
elaborate  and  heroic.  All  were  to  send  in 
essays  or  some  other  composition — music 
was  included.  One  member  elected  each 
year  was  to  act  as  critic.  The  ideal,  as  in 
most  such  cases,  was  too  high  for  mortal 
schoolboys.  It  soon  broke  down.  One 
story  tells  his  courage.  Round  the  fire  the 
boys  were  talking  of  the  story  of  Scsevola. 
One  of  them  said  he  could  not  under- 
stand how  any  one  could  do  such  a  thing. 


FRIEDRICH  NIETZSCHE:  THE  MAN        15 

knowing  what  he  was  about.  Immediately 
Nietzsche  put  his  hand  in  the  fire,  and 
kept  it  there  until  he  was  pulled  ofiF  by  the 
monitor.  Pforta  left  its  mark  on  him. 
He  had  much  es'prit  de  corps.  We  can 
hardly  be  wrong  in  tracing  to  a  memory 
of  this  school  that  passage  about  the  need 
of  a  severe  school  at  the  close  of  The  Will 
to  Power,  Even  in  his  last  illness  he  fre- 
quently spoke  of  the  school.^ 

From  Pforta  he  proceeded  to  the  Uni- 
versity of  Bonn.  There  he  was  not  very 
happy.  True,  he  found  one  professor  whom 
ever  after  he  honoured,  Ritschl;  and  made 
at  least  one  intimate  friend.  He  joined  the 
students'  union,  the  Franconia,  and  fought 
the  inevitable  duel.  But  he  did  not  enjoy 
undergraduate  camaraderie  and  complained 
that  many  of  his  fellow-students  were 
common.  Partly  because  he  had  spent  too 
much,   he    transferred  himself  to  Leipzig, 

^  There  seems  to  be  no  ground  for  supposing  that  Nietzsche  was 
unhappy  at  Pforta  or  that  he  did  not  get  on.  Deussen's  memoirs 
belie  this  view.  There  is  a  hfeUke  account  of  the  "restoration 
of  the  status  quo"  after  a  quarrel. 


16  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

whither  had  gone  his  revered  Professor 
Friedrich  Wilhelm  Ritsehl.  This  great 
classical  philologist  was  one  chief  intellec- 
tual influence.  But  the  star  of  Schopen- 
hauer had  now  risen  for  Nietzsche.  We 
hear  much  of  his  enthusiasm  for  the  master, 
and  of  the  value  of  redemptive  pessimism.^ 
In  Leipzig  a  greater  intimacy  began.  A 
sister  of  Wagner  was  Uving  there.  Nietz- 
sche, a  passionate  lover  of  music  and 
already  of  Wagner,  was  invited  to  meet 
the  great  man,  who  was  at  Leipzig  incognito 
for  a  brief  visit.  Wagner  took  to  Nietzsche 
at  once.  Thus  began  that  friendship  which 
was  the  most  important  personal  influence 
in  his  life. 

After  Leipzig,  Nietzsche  went  for  a  year's 
service  in  the  cavalry.  Much  as  he  loved 
reading,  Nietzsche  was  never  a  mere  book- 
worm.    The  early  Nietzsche  and  his  friend 

^ "  Wer  mir  Schopenhauer  durch  Griinde  widerlegen  will,  dem 
raune  ich  in's  Ohr:  'Aber,  lieber  Mann,  Weltanschauungen  werden 
weder  durch  Logik  geschaffen  noch  vernichtet.  Ich  fUhle  mich 
heimisch  in  diesem  Dunstkreis,  Du  in  jenem.  Lass  mir  doch 
meine  eigne  Nase,  wie  ich  Dir  die  Deinige  nicht  nehmen  werde/  " 
Nietzsche  to  Deussen.     (Deussen,  Er inner ung en,  40.) 

His  anti-intellectuaUst  standpoint  makes  itself  clear  thus  early. 


FRIEDRICH  NIETZSCHE:  THE  MAN       17 

Erwin  Rohde  had  seemed  to  the  others  like 
young  Greek  gods  when  they  came  in 
flushed  from  a  ride.  Nietzsche  entered 
with  zest  into  his  mihtary  hfe,  and  gives 
in  his  letters  vivid  pictures  of  it.  Soon  he 
became  noted  as  the  best  rider  in  the  regi- 
ment. Here  he  had  a  serious  accident. 
The  muscles  of  his  heart  were  injured.  Af- 
ter a  time  of  severe  illness  he  was  discharged. 
His  year  of  service  came  to  an  abrupt  end- 
ing.^ His  health  never  entirely  recovered. 
This  event  may  be  taken  as  the  beginning 
of  that  long  agony  which  ended  with  his 
madness.  Eyesight,  ill-cared  for  at  school, 
would  appear  to  have  had  much  to  do  with 
his  continual  headaches  and  his  subsequent 
insanity.  So  much  is  clear  from  what  his 
sister  says,  but  it  is  probably  not  correct 
to  follow  Doctor  Gould  in  his  book.  Bio- 
graphic Clinics,     The  whole  trouble  is  there 

*  "Sie  glauben,  lieber  Freund,  es  nicht  was  fiir  ein  tJberschuss 
von  Leiden  mir  das  Leben  abgeworfen  hat  in  alien  Zeiten  von 
friiher  Kindheit  an.  Aber  ich  bin  ein  Soldat;  und  dieser  Soldat 
ist  zu  guter  Letzt  noch  der  Vater  Zarathustras  geworden ! " 
The  impressions  of  that  year  were  lasting,  as  this  passage  shews. 
(Nietzsche  to  Peter  Gast,  IV,  150.) 


18  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

put  down  to  the  eyes.  Every  other  cause  is 
either  denied  or  minimised. 

In  the  year  1866  we  find  Nietzsche 
warmly  patriotic  and  German  in  his  sym- 
pathies, high  in  the  praise  of  Bismarck  and 
the  government.  This  time  at  least  he 
was  pro-Prussian.^ 

Not  long  after,  when  Nietzsche  was  back 
at  Leipzig  studying  for  his  doctorate,  his 
old  preceptor,  who  had  early  discerned 
his  merit,  secured  him  a  post  at  Basle  as 
Professor  Extraordinary  of  Philology. 
Nietzsche  was  only  twenty-five,  and  al- 
though he  said  he  would  have  preferred 
to  wait,  signs  of  this  are  not  obvious  in 
the  hilarious,  mystifying  letters  he  wrote 
to  his  sister,  just  before  the  announcement. 

*  See  his  letter  to  Freiherr  von  Gersdorfif  (Brief  e,  I,  17) .  "  Aber 
stolz  miissen  wir  sein  eine  solche  Armee  zu  haben,  ja  sogar — ^hor- 
ribile  dictu — eine  solche  Regierung  zu  besitzen,  die  das  nationale 
Programm  nicht  bloss  auf  dem  Papier  hat,  sondern  mit  der  gross- 
ten  Energie,  mit  ungeheurem  Aufwand  an  Geld  und  Blut,  sogar 
gegeniiber  dem  franzbsischen  grossen  Versucher  Louis  le  diable 
aufrecht  erhalt.  .  .  . 

"Ein  Krieg  gegen  Frankreich  muss  ja  eine  Gesinnungseinheit  in 
Deutschland  hervorrufen;  und  wenn  die  Bevolkerungen  eins  sind 
dann  mag  sich  Herr  von  Beust  sammt  alien  mittelstaatlichen  Fiir- 
sten  einbalsamiren  lassen.     Denn  ihre  Zeit  ist  vorbei." 


FRIEDRICH  NIETZSCHE:  THE  MAN       19 

Nietzsche  was  well  aware  of  what  he  owed 
to  Ritschl,  and  the  correspondence  between 
the  two  is  a  model  for  an  intimacy  between 
the  pupil  and  the  tutor,  when  the  former 
grows  up  and  breaks  away,  as  he  must. 
It  is  an  error  to  think  of  Nietzsche  as  a 
disagreeable  rebel  without  reverence.  His 
life  was  spent  in  enthusiasms,  which  he 
afterwards  outgrew.  No  man  ever  hved 
who  felt  more  the  need  of  worship.  That 
is  part  of  the  tragedy  of  his  career.  Hav- 
ing given  up  God,  he  spent  the  rest  of  his 
existence  in  making  idols  and  then  break- 
ing them — Schopenhauer,  Wagner,  and  the 
rest — till  he  settled  down  at  last  to  the 
Ubermensch  and  the  Eternal  return.  Al- 
ways naif — ^he  was  the  antithesis  of  Henri 
Beyle  (Stendhal),  his  great  admiration — ^he 
was  earnest  and  almost  boyish  in  his  en- 
thusiasms. Later  he  found  the  feet  of  clay 
in  his  idol,  and  turned  in  fury  to  smash  it, 
crying  out  against  himself  and  his  former 
god,  and  the  universe,  because  he  had  al- 
lowed himself  to  be  deceived.     But  he  was 


20  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

not  irreverent  by  nature.  That  is  a  super- 
ficial interpretation,  due  to  Nietzsche's 
command  of  picturesque  blasphemy. 

The  Basle  appointment  forced  him  to 
give  up  his  nationality  and  become  Swiss. 
Hence  when  the  Franco-Prussian  War  came 
in  1870  Nietzsche  could  offer  no  more 
than  the  care  of  the  wounded.^  Full  of 
sympathy,  he  did  all  that  he  could,  until 
he  fell  ill.  This  period  is  noteworthy,  for 
Nietzsche  received  then  the  first  impres- 
sions of  the  principle  which  governs  his 
later  teaching,  the  Will  to  Power.  Busied 
with  the  sick,  driven  nearly  wild  with  sym- 
pathy, he  caught  sight  of  a  troop  of  Prus- 


*  The  following  passage  shews  how  far  removed  Nietzsche  was 
at  this  time  from  his  later  dislike  of  all  things  German: 

"Nun  winken  neue  Pflichten;  und  wenn  Eins  uns  auch  im 
Frieden  bleiben  mag  aus  jenem  wilden  Kriegsspiel,  so  ist  es  der 
heldenmiithige  und  zugleich  besonnene  Geist  den  ich  zu  meiner 
Uberraschung  gleichsam  als  eine  schone  unerwartete  Entdeckung, 
in  unserm  Heere  frisch  und  kraf tig,  in  alter  germanischer  Gesund- 
heit  gefunden  habe.  Darauf  lasst  sich  bauen;  wir  diirfen  wieder 
hoffen;  unsre  deutsche  Mission  ist  noch  nicht  vorbei.  Ich  bin 
muthiger  als  je:  denn  noch  ist  nicht  AUes  unter  franzdsisch- 
jiidischer  Verflachung  und  'Eleganz,'  und  unter  dem  gierigen 
Treiben  der  'Jetzzeit'  zu  Grunde  gegangen.  Es  giebt  noch  Tap- 
ferkeit,  und  zwar  deutsche  Tapferkeit,  die  etwas  innerlich  an- 
deres  ist  als  der  'Elan'  unserer  Nachbarn."     {Letters,  I,  110.) 


FRIEDRICH  NIETZSCHE:  THE  MAN       21 

sian  horse  coming  thundering  down  a  hill 
into  the  village.  Their  splendour  of  aspect, 
strong,  courageous,  and  efficient,  at  once 
impressed  him.  He  saw  that  suffering  and 
sympathy  with  it  were  not,  as  he  had 
thought  a  la  Schopenhauer,  the  profound- 
est  things  in  life.  It  was  this  power  greater 
than  pain  which  made  pain  irrelevant — 
that  was  the  reality.  Life  began  to  pre- 
sent itself  as  a  struggle  for  power.  This  is 
his  first  move  away  from  Schopenhauer  and 
pessimism. 

Nietzsche  recovered,  though  not  fully. 
He  went  back  to  Basle  and  tried  to  go 
through  his  duties  before  he  was  well. 
From  this  extra  strain  he  never  really  re- 
covered. Yet  he  had  much  to  help  him. 
Basle  had  welcomed  him  with  open  arms. 
Quickly  was  he  made  an  ordinary  professor, 
with  a  heightened  salary.  As  a  teacher  he 
had  and  must  have  had  enthusiastic  pupils 
— ^they  never  had  a  better  teacher,  it  was 
said.  Friends  were  not  lacking.  True, 
Nietzsche   was   greatly   bored   by   general 


22  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

society,  and  found  himself,  as  an  eligible 
bachelor,  more  pushed  against  than  push- 
ing. Gradually  he  withdrew,  and  fre- 
quented only  his  chosen  circle — Fischer  and 
Overbeck,  the  historical  theologian,  who  was 
later  on  to  hurry  to  Basle  on  surmise  of 
his  illness;  and  Burckhardt,  the  great  his- 
torian of  the  Renaissance.  No  man  could 
complain  who  lived  with  such  men  and 
was  loved  by  them.  Wagner  was  a  yet 
more  potent  star.  Nietzsche  occupied 
much  of  his  spare  time  with  visits  to  Trieb- 
schen,  where  Wagner  and  Frau  Cosima 
lived.  The  latter  is  probably  the  only 
woman  who  greatly  influenced  Nietzsche. 
Even  in  later  years  he  acknowledged  his 
debt  to  her.  To  them  is  owing  his  dehut 
as  a  writer.  Nietzsche  came  before  the 
world  with  the  Birth  of  Tragedy.  The  book 
is  really  a  Wagnerite  tract:  it  starts  with 
that  distinction  of  which  he  afterwards 
made  so  much,  the  distinction  between 
ApoUinian  and  Dionysian  art,  the  former  se- 
rene, contemplative,  intellectual;  the  latter 


FRIEDRICH  NIETZSCHE:  THE  MAN       23 

ecstatic,  emotional,  compelling.  The  dis- 
tinction is  not  unlike  that  between  classi- 
cal and  romantic  art,  if  we  use  the  terms 
for  two  modes  of  art,  not  for  definitely  his- 
torical movements.  The  conclusion  of  the 
book  points  to  Wagner,  though  it  does  not 
name  him,  as  the  man  who  is  to  recover  the 
true  tragic  altitude.  This  was  to  Nietzsche 
the  valuable  thing  in  Hellenism,  not  the 
philosophic  or  Socratic  development  which 
aheady  he  treats  as  decadence.  The  real 
Nietzsche  begins  to  shew  himself  in  other 
efforts.  David  Strauss,  the  author  of  the 
famous  Leben  Jesu,  had  just  then  "taken 
the  town"  with  his  book  on  The  Old  Faith 
and  the  New,  In  this  work  Strauss  gives 
up  every  vestige  of  supernatural  faith,  ac- 
cepts evolution  in  a  materialist  form,  and 
tries  to  shew  that  somehow  or  other  all 
things  are  for  the  best  in  the  best  of  all 
possible  worlds,  if  the  ideals  of  the  present 
cultivated  classes  remain  intact,  and  the 
movement  to  secure  the  rights  of  labour  be 
checked.     Strauss's   attitude   in   some   re- 


24  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

spects  is  not  unlike  that  of  Nietzsche,  who 
never  could  endure  any  attempt  at  improv- 
ing the  status  of  the  labourer.  Nietzsche 
was  in  this  case  (as  also  in  that  of  Hart- 
mann,  who  comes  in  for  a  share  of  the 
trouncing)  at  least  as  greatly  irritated  by 
the  signs  of  likeness  as  he  was  by  those  of 
difference.  In  the  first  of  the  Essays  Out 
of  Season  he  fell  with  fury  on  this  book, 
written,  he  says,  solely  for  that  contempt- 
ible product  of  the  modern  world,  the  cul- 
ture-Philistine, of  which  Strauss  and  von 
Hartmann  were  the  two  capital  examples. 
Nietzsche's  strictures  are  largely  justified  by 
the  smug  and  banal  optimism  with  which 
the  book  closes.  Probably  what  excited 
Nietzsche's  ire  most  would  be  a  passage 
such  as  the  following: 

"Ever  remember  that  thou  art  human, 
not  merely  a  natural  production;  ever 
remember  that  all  others  are  human  also, 
and  with  all  individual  differences  the 
same  as  thou,  having  the  same  needs  and 


FRIEDRICH  NIETZSCHE:  THE  MAN       25 

claims  as  thyself;  this  is  the  sum  and 
substance  of  morality. 

''Ever  remember  that  thou  and  every- 
thing thou  beholdest  within  and  around 
thee,  all  that  befalls  thee  and  others  is 
no  disjointed  fragment,  no  wild  chaos  of 
atoms  or  casualties,  but  that  it  all  springs 
according  to  eternal  laws,  from  the  one 
primal  source  of  all  life,  all  reason,  and 
all  good;  this  is  the  essence  of  religion."^ 

Doctor  Richard  Meyer  is  hardly  wrong  in 
speaking  of  the  danger  of  a  cheap  ideal  of 
culture — comfort  raised  to  a  dogma. ^  This 
danger  was  not  and  is  not  confined  to  Ger- 
many. The  importance  of  this  book  and 
The  Birth  of  Tragedy  is  high.  Nietzsche  had 
now  declared  war  on  the  academic  scholar- 
ship of  the  day;  he  had  asserted  the  superi- 
ority of  art  and  philosophy  to  science,  the 
essentially   secondary   position   of   science, 

1  The  Old  Faith  and  the  New,  David  Frederic  Strauss,  II,  55. 

2  "Diese  Bibel  der  liberalen  Bourgeoisie  drohte  das  billige  Ideal 
eines  gesattigten  Bildungsoptimismus  zum  Dogma  zu  erheben." 
(Meyer,  Nietzsche,  260.) 


26  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

needful  or  we  could  not  bake  our  bread  or 
heat  our  houses — ^but  a  slave  in  the  house 
of  life,  as  compared  with  its  Divine  Mis- 
tresses, art  and  philosophy  and  religion,  so 
far  as  that  is  possible.  Thus  he  had  already 
begun  his  anti-intellectualist  propaganda. 
Secondly,  Nietzsche  had  shewn  the  hoUow- 
ness  of  the  Prussian  triumph  in  1870-1. 
Already  he  has  flung  his  cap  for  French  cul- 
ture, as  opposed  to  German.  Even  during 
the  war  he  had  expressed  himself  as  fearful 
of  its  results  to  Culture.  Culture  in  the 
highest  sense  is  the  one  thing  Nietzsche 
cared  for  and  strove  all  his  life  to  forward.-^ 
Now  more  than  ever  he  begins  to  feel  that 
Prussia  is  the  supreme  danger  to  Culture. 
He  mocks  at  the  Germans  for  their  enslave- 
ment to  French  culture,  and  for  their  in- 
abihty  to  produce  anything  of  their  own. 
His  great  hope  in  Wagner,  afterwards 
dashed,  was  just  this — ^that  he  would  be  the 

^  See  his  letter  home  in  December,  1870: 

"Fiir  den  jetzigen  deutschen  Eroberungskrieg  nehmen  meine 
Sympathien  allmahlich  ab.  Die  Zukunft  unsrer  deutschen  Cul- 
tur  scheint  mir  mehr  als  je  gefahrdet."     {Briefe,  V,  196.) 


FRIEDRICH  NIETZSCHE:  THE  MAN       27 

herald   of   a  new   German  and   European 
culture-epoch. 

This  essay  created  a  sensation.  It  is 
significant  of  Nietzsche's  tenderness  of 
heart  that  a  year  later,  when  Strauss  died, 
he  expressed  a  fear  lest  he  had  caused  him 
any  pain.^  Thirdly,  the  attitude  indicated 
by  the  title  Unzeitgemdsse  Betrachtungen 
(Essays  Out  of  Season)  is  significant.  Nietz- 
sche now  took  up  that  pose  which  he 
never  relinquished,  of  being  the  prophet, 
denouncing  the  evils  of  his  day,  antago- 
nistic to  all  its  dominating  currents.  This 
was  true  only  in  part.  Much  of  Nietzsche 
is,  as  has  been  pointed  out,  merely  a  trans- 
lation into  his  own  idiom  of  the  ideals  of 
Bismarckian  success.  A  great  deal  else  is 
merely  the  last  movement  of  the  Romantic 
symphony,  for  greatly  as  Nietzsche  despised 


^  Apparently  the  Basle  folk  thought  Nietzsche  had  done  Strauss 
some  damage.  "Gestern  hat  man  in  Ludwigsburg  David  Strauss 
begraben.  Ich  hoffe  sehr  dass  ich  ihm  die  letzte  Lebenszeit  nicht 
erschwert  habe,  und  dass  er  ohne  etwas  von  mir  zu  wissen  ge- 
storben  ist.  Es  greift  mich  etwas  an."  Nietzsche  to  Freiherr 
von  Gersdorff,  Briefe,  I,  175.  (C/.  Spitteler,  Meine  Beziehungen 
zu  Nietzsche,  14.) 


28  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

the  Romantics  of  the  nineteenth  century, 
he  was  himseK  of  that  company. 

High-water  mark  of  early  achievement  is 
reached  in  his  next  essay — on  the  use  and 
abuse  of  history.  Rarely  has  he  written 
better.  Every  student  of  history  ought  to 
be  made  to  read  it,  lest  he  suffer  from  a 
"proud  stomach."  The  same  is  true  of  all 
whose  notion  of  culture  is  largely  mingled 
with  "the  passion  of  the  past."  Nietzsche 
himself  did  not  heed  his  own  warnings  suffi- 
ciently, or  he  would  have  been  a  less  ardent 
neo-Pagan.  Anyhow,  his  words  are  wise. 
He  points  out  the  danger  of  a  culture  mainly 
historical.  It  produces  a  race  of  epigoni, 
"pensioners  on  the  past,"  always  looking 
back.  As  he  says  elsewhere,  the  historian 
begins  by  looking  backward,  he  ends  by 
thinking  backward.  Nietzsche  in  this  es- 
say is  prophetic.  More  and  more  must 
culture  look  to  the  future,  if  it  is  to  have 
any  appeal.  Less  and  less  can  it  be  made 
up  of  mere  historical  sentiment.  This  is 
true  of  every  branch  of  culture,  including 


FRIEDRICH  NIETZSCHE:  THE  MAN        29 

religion.  True,  the  wise  man  will  not  dis- 
card history,  nor  suppose  with  the  vulgar 
that  anything  beautiful  and  noble  in  life 
can  be  reproduced  afresh  for  every  age. 
We  get  to  be  more  not  less  able  to  enjoy 
the  atmosphere  of  a  great  epoch,  whether 
Elizabethan  England  or  the  France  of  Louis 
Quatorze.  But  we  must  beware — and  espe- 
cially so  if  we  are  sensible  of  their  attrac- 
tions— of  becoming  enslaved  to  the  past,  or 
choked  in  inherited  tradition,  so  that  we 
cannot  move  forward.  Mere  memory,  even 
when  ht  by  imagination  and  taste,  is  no 
safe  guide  for  life — or  rather  it  is  too  safe, 
and  leads  only  down  ancient  lanes,  when  we 
ought  to  be  seeking  new  stars.  Christians, 
and  more  especially  ourselves,  need  to  take 
these  warnings  deeply  to  heart.  Some  of 
the  worst  failures  are  due  to  this  excess  of 
sentiment  for  one  particular  age. 

Nietzsche  projected  a  dozen  essays  in  this 
series.  Two  more  were  all  that  he  wrote. 
One  is  entitled  "Schopenhauer  as  Educa- 
tor," although  it  is  mainly  occupied  with 


30  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

Nietzsche.  The  other  is  on  Richard  Wag- 
ner at  Bayreuth.  He  had  already  outgrown 
the  theories  of  these  two  men  of  genius. 
These  essays  were  his  last  tribute  to  them 
and  were  personal. 

Wagner  had  become  stronger  in  his  reac- 
tions upon  Nietzsche.  The  latter  described 
vividly  the  scene  at  Triebschen  before  the 
final  departure  for  Bayreuth.  Nietzsche 
felt  this  removal  deeply;  he  had  been  a  sort 
of  ''tame  cat"  about  the  house,  always  gave 
presents  to  the  children,  went  when  he 
would  for  Christmas,  and  was  treated  al- 
most as  a  son  of  the  house  both  by  Wagner 
and  his  cultivated  consort,  the  daughter  of 
Liszt.  This  sort  of  intercourse  perforce 
came  to  an  end  when  the  Wagners  went  to 
live  so  far  off.  Really  this  change  coincides 
with  a  change  on  Nietzsche's  part.  He 
looked  to  Wagner  to  lead  all  good  Euro- 
peans into  the  promised  land  of  a  new  cul- 
ture. This  hope  grew  faint.  Bayreuth, 
the  more  Nietzsche  saw  of  it,  pleased  him 
the  less.     Wagner  became  fashionable  and 


FRIEDRICH  NIETZSCHE:  THE  MAN       31 

things  grew  worse.  What  he  wanted, 
Nietzsche  said,  was  mere  idolaters — ^he  was 
a  critic.  Nietzsche  wrote  a  pamphlet  to  fur- 
ther the  cause  of  the  music  of  the  future, 
but  the  Wagner  committee  would  not  print 
it.  Rumour  said,  also,  that  Wagner  had 
said  hard  things  of  a  musical  piece  of 
Nietzsche's,  and  that  was  a  cause  of  sever- 
ance.^ Wagner  was  surrounded  more  and 
more  by  a  sort  of  court,  and  even  had  both 
willed  it,  the  old  easy  intimacy  was  not  pos- 
sible. Triebschen  was  a  private  home  in  the 
country;  Bayreuth  was  the  metropolis  of 
the  kingdom  of  culture.  Bayreuth  at  the 
beginning  had  seen  a  small  band  of  disci- 

1  Nietzsche,  though  a  passionate  musician,  does  not  seem  to 
have  been  at  the  pains  to  learn  the  rules.  In  prose  he  worked  at 
style  and  knew  its  difficulty;  not  so  in  music.  He  sent  one  piece 
to  Hans  von  Billow.  The  reply  is  worth  quoting,  for  it  shews 
even  so  early  an  insight  into  those  elements  which  brought  the 
great  mind  to  ruin  later  on : 

"Abgesehen  vom  psychologischen  Interesse — denn  in  Ihrem 
musikalischen  Fieberprodukte  ist  ein  ungewohnlicher,  bei  aller 
Verirrung  distinguirter  Geist  zu  spiiren — hat  Ihre  Meditation 
vom  musikalischen  Standpunkte  aus  nm*  den  Werth  eines  Ver- 
brechens  in  der  moralischen  Welt.  Vom  apoUinischen  Elemente 
habe  ich  keine  Spur  entdecken  konnen,  und  das  dionysische  anlan- 
gend,  habe  ich,  offen  gestanden,  mehr  an  den  lendemain  eines 
Bacchanals  als  an  dieses  selbst  denken  miisseu."  Hans  von  Billow 
to  Nietzsche,  1872.     (Briefe,  III,  2,  350.) 


32  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

pies.  When  it  became  a  swell  mob,  and 
buzzed  with  the  compliments  of  Kings  and 
even  the  Emperor,  officials,  generals,  the 
aristocrats  and  the  plutocrats,  all  of  them 
nearly  as  distasteful  to  Nietzsche  as  the 
democrat,  it  was  more  than  an  artist- 
prophet  could  stand.  All  of  a  sudden  he 
bolted.  This  was  the  end.  Nietzsche  al- 
ways recognised  the  importance  of  Wagner. 
His  mastery  in  his  own  line  he  never  denied 
— only  that  line  had  ceased  to  approve  it- 
seK  to  Nietzsche.  Even  at  the  end  of  his 
working  life,  when  he  heard  Parsifal, 
Nietzsche  wrote  to  Peter  Gast,  saying  he 
thought  Wagner  had  never  done  anything 
better.  Probably  his  statement  is  true,  that 
the  gradual  adoption  of  at  least  sentimental 
reverence  for  Christianity  was  what  repelled 
Nietzsche.  Doctor  Paneth  relates  that 
Nietzsche  told  him  he  realised  their  entire 
estrangement  one  day,  when  Wagner  told 
him  of  his  increasing  admiration  for  the 
Eucharist.^     Nietzsche  said  that  his  early 

*  "Dann  erzahlte  er  mir  von  Richard  Wagner,  dem  er  ungemein 
nahe  stand,  und  von  dem  er  sich  dann  trennte,  als  jener  fromm 


FRIEDRICH  NIETZSCHE:  THE  MAN       33 

discipleship  was  due  to  this  belief,  that  Wag- 
ner was  a  great  anti-Christian  force;  and 
that  "we  Germans"  are  no  use  without  a 
good  stock  of  infidel  scorn.^  But  Nietzsche 
himself  had  changed.  In  the  early  days  of 
their  intimacy  he  was  an  enthusiastic  fol- 
lower of  Schopenhauer,  and  he  regarded 
Wagner  as  the  musical  exponent  of  redemp- 
tive pessimism.  Nietzsche  broke  more  and 
more  a  way  from  this  and  finally  rejected  it. 
It  is  not  quite  easy  to  determine  how  far 
the  Wagner  quarrel  was  a  cause,  and  how 
far  a  consequence,  of  this  change.  Prob- 
ably it  was  both.  Nietzsche  told  his  sister 
it  had  taken  him  six  years  of  agony  to  over- 


wurde,  und  einmal  von  den  Entziickungen  sprach  in  die  ihn  der 
Genuss  des  Abendmahls  versetzte."  (Doctor  Paneth  in  Leben, 
II.  482,  Dec.,  1883.) 

*  Also  Nietzsche  wrote  to  his  sister: 

**Im  Gegenteil  sie  wird  immer  fanatischer,  verworrener  Christ- 
lieberer  und  verdiisterter — wie  das  gesammte  Europa.  Die  Wag- 
nerei  ist  nur  ein  Einzelfall.  Wie  hat  sich,  alles  gegen  die  Jahre 
1869-72  verandert.  Damals  war  ich  Wagnerianer  wegen  des 
guten  Stiicks  Antichrist  das  Wagner  mit  seiner  Kunst  und  Art 
vertrat.  Ich  bin  der  Enttauschteste  aller  Wagnerianer,  denn  in 
dem  Augenblick  wo  es  anstandiger  als  je  war  Heide  zu  sein, 
wurde  Wagner  Christ.  Wir  Deutschen  (gesetzt  dass  wir  es  je 
mit  emsten  Dingen  ernst  genommen  haben)  sind  allesammt  Spot- 
ter und  Atheisten.     Wagner  war  es  auch."     {Briefe,  V,  777.) 


34  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

come  the  falsity  induced  by  the  spell  of 
Wagner.  He  also  said  that  Frau  Wagner 
was  the  most  cultivated  woman  he  had  ever 
met.  From  about  1878  the  friendship  be- 
came an  enmity.  Wagner  and  his  friends 
wrote  attacks  on  Nietzsche.  Nietzsche 
treated  Wagner  as  the  last  and  worst  of 
the  Romanticists — a  drop  back  into  Chris- 
tianity— a  corrupter  and  seducer — declar- 
ing him  essentially  an  actor.  Wagner  is  the 
Wizard  in  Zarathustra,  Finally,  he  wrote 
the  two  pamphlets,  The  Case  of  Wagner  and 
Nietzsche  versus  Wagner,  One  of  these  be- 
gins by  exalting  Bizet's  Carmen  as  the  true 
ideal  for  music.  Considering  the  former  re- 
lations, the  tone  and  taste  of  these  produc- 
tions are  hardly  to  be  excused,  even  by  the 
approach  of  insanity.^  Both  were  men  of 
genius,  both  were  irritable,  both  wanted  dis- 
ciples— and  a  breach  some  time  was  inevi- 
table. Nietzsche  said  Wagner  was  not  of 
the  same  rank  as  he.     The  truth  is  they 


^  "La  seule  chose  impardonable  sont  les  pamphlets  de  la  fin. 
(Pallares,  Le  CrSjpuscule  d'une  idole,  V.) 


FRIEDRICH  NIETZSCHE:  THE  MAN       35 

were  too  big  for  each  other. ^  Meanwhile 
the  health  of  Nietzsche  had  become  a  seri- 
ous question.  At  Basle  he  was  a  stimulat- 
ing teacher  and  did  good  work.  But  the 
place  did  not  suit  him.  Digestive  troubles 
of  great  severity  attacked  him  and  he  was 
prostrated  by  frequent  headaches.  All  this 
time  the  sense  of  his  mission  was  growing 
upon  him.  The  difficulties  with  Wagner 
and  the  general  perplexity  about  his  eth- 
ical and  philosophical  standpoint  reacted 
on  his  health.^  His  eyes  could  not  stand 
the  strain  of  incessant  reading.  Palliatives 
proved  vain.  He  tried  cures.  His  sister 
took  up  her  abode  and  kept  house  for  him. 
He  took  a  long  leave  of  absence  and  spent  a 

^  "Ich  bin  damals,  als  ich  Wagner  fand,  unbeschreiblich  gliick- 
lich  gewesen.  Ich  hatte  so  lange  nach  dem  Menschen  gesucht 
der  hoher  war  als  ich  und  der  mich  wirklich  ubersah.  In  Wagner 
glaubte  ich  ihn  gefunden  zu  haben.  Es  war  ein  Irrthum.  Jetzt 
darf  ich  mich  nicht  einmal  mit  ihm  vergleichen — ich  gehore  einem 
andern  Rang  an.  Im  tJbrigen  habe  ich  meine  Wagner-Schwar- 
merei  theurer  bezahlen  miissen.  .  .  .  Habe  ich  nicht  fast  sechs 
Jahre  gebraucht  um  mich  von  diesem  Schmerz  zu  erholen?" 
(V,  479,  1882.) 

2  "So  lange  ich  wirklich  Gelehrter  war,  war  ich  auch  gesund; 
aber  da  kam  die  nervenzerriittende  Musik  und  die  metaphy- 
sische  Philosophic  und  die  Sorge  um  tausend  Dinge,  die  mich 
nichts  angehen."     (To  Malwida  von  Meysenbug,  550,  1872.) 


36  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

winter  with  his  friend,  Malwida  von  Mey- 
senbug,  and  two  fated  others,  Paul  Ree 
and  Lou-Salome,  in  Sorrento.  All  was  in 
vain.  In  1879  he  was  forced  to  resign  his 
chair.  The  University  treated  him  very 
generously  in  the  matter  of  pension.  Dur- 
ing the  next  ten  years  he  Hved  during  the 
winter  in  the  Riviera,  and  in  the  summer  at 
Sils-Maria  in  the  Engadin.  The  first  few 
years  after  his  resignation  saw  Nietzsche  at 
his  lowest  ebb.  Even  to  himself  it  seemed 
doubtful  whether  he  would  live.  But  he  was 
resolved  not  to  be  beaten,  and  carried  on 
a  heroic  contest  against  all  weakness.  The 
Joyful  Wisdom  was  the  symbol  of  returning 
health.  From  1883  onward  until  the  final 
collapse  he  was  a  good  deal  better.  Gradu- 
ally he  grew  more  and  more  lonely,  and 
broke  with  all  his  friends  except  Peter  Gast. 
At  one  time  he  was  intimate  with  a  Jew, 
Doctor  Paul  Ree,  who  is  said  to  have  in- 
fluenced him  in  the  positivist  direction.  The 
work  Human,  All  Too  Human,  written  under 
that  influence  and  marking  his  estrange- 


FRIEDRICH  NIETZSCHE:  THE  MAN       37 

ment  from  Wagner,  is  the  least  attractive, 
either  in  style  or  outlook,  of  Nietzsche's 
works.  Ree  is  said  to  have  influenced  this 
work,  and  despite  the  denials  of  Madame 
Forster-Nietzsche,  he  probably  did.^  Dur- 
ing this  period  there  occurred  an  incident, 
which  would  have  been  ludicrous  if  it  were 
not  tragic.  Malwida  von  Meysenbug,  the 
author  of  the  Memoirs  of  an  Idealist^  a 
woman  of  engaging  charm  and  very  bad 
judgment,  thought  to  provide  for  this  most 
fastidious  of  men  a  youthful  amanuensis 
disciple.  A  young  Russian  girl  of  brilliant 
gifts,  Fraulein  Lou-Salome,  was  to  be  the 
mouthpiece  and  populariser  of  Nietzsche. 
After  a  few  months  of  enthusiasm,  Nietzsche 
came  to  see  that  the  scheme  was  hopeless. 
The  matter  was  complicated  by  Paul  Ree, 
with  whom  Nietzsche  very  nearly  fought  a 
duel.  It  led  to  an  estrangement  of  some 
length  between  brother  and  sister  (for  Eliza- 
beth had  concealed  certain  facts  so  as  to 


^  Madame  Forster  had  no  occasion  to  be  so  contemptuous. 
The  book  is  really  Nietzsche  at  low-water  mark. 


38  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

avoid  a  duel).  Much  paper  has  been  wasted 
on  this  topic,  and  we  need  not  discuss  it  at 
length.  This  much  should  be  said.  Frau 
Salome-Andreas  in  her  book  on  Nietzsche  is 
by  no  means  so  untrustworthy  a  portrait- 
painter  as  Frau  Forster  would  have  us  be- 
lieve. On  one  point,  the  importance  at- 
tached by  Nietzsche  to  the  doctrine  of  the 
Eternal  Return,  Frau  Lou-Salome  is  de- 
monstrably right,  as  against  the  sister.^ 

This  breach  was  short.  More  difficult 
was  the  situation  created  by  Elizabeth 
Nietzsche's  engagement  and  marriage. 
Nietzsche,  who  felt  any  marriage  on  her 
part  even  more  deeply  than  Macaulay  had 
done  in  a  like  case,  had  looked  for  Elizabeth 
to  be  always  his  nurse  and  companion.  It 
was  a  blow  to  his  pride  when  he  found 
that  she  was  betrothed,  and  that  to  an  anti- 

^  Doctor  Karl  Bernoulli's  two  large  volumes  on  Franz  Overbeck 
und  Friedrich  Nietzsche  are  avowedly  written  to  counteract  in 
many  respects  Madame  Forster-Nietzsche's  Life.  Into  all  the 
points  he  discusses  it  is  not  possible  to  enter,  especially  since 
owing  to  an  action  at  law  some  of  the  passages  have  been  blacked 
out.  But  on  this  Lou-Salome  incident  there  is  an  important  ac- 
count from  the  pen  of  Frau  Overbeck.  (I,  336-351.)  This  should 
be  read,  especially  for  its  criticism  of  Elizabeth  Nietzsche. 


FRIEDRICH  NIETZSCHE:  THE  MAN       39 

Semite.  The  amazing  bitterness  of  polities 
in  Germany  is  illustrated  by  the  fury  with 
which  Nietzsche,  no  lover  of  the  Jews, 
treated  this  alliance  with  opinions  which  he 
disliked.  Nietzsche  allowed  himself  to  be 
persuaded  into  a  sort  of  peace,  but  he  did 
not  attend  the  wedding.  What  still  more 
bewildered  him  was  his  sister's  going  oflf 
with  her  husband  to  help  found  a  new  com- 
munist colony  in  Paraguay.  Still,  he  took 
a  share  in  it  later. 

Deeper  and  deeper  grew  his  loneliness.^ 
At  Sils-Maria  he  now  and  then  met  some 
one  whom  he  liked — especially  an  invalid 


^ "  Ach,  wir  Einsamen  imd  Freien  im  Geist — wir  sehen  dass  wir 
fortwahrend  irgend  worin  anders  scheinen  als  wir  denken;  wah- 
rend  wir  nichts  als  Wahrheit  und  Ehrlichkeit  woUen,  ist  rings  um 
ims  ein  Netz  von  Missverstandnissen;  und  unser  heftiges  Begeh- 
ren  kann  es  nicht  verhindern,  dass  doch  auf  unserem  Thun  ein 
Dunst  von  falschen  Meinungen,  von  Anpassung  von  halben 
Zugestandnissen,  von  schonendem  Verschweigen,  von  irrthiimlicher 
Ausdeutung  liegen  bleibt.  Das  sammelt  eine  Yv^olke  von  Melan- 
cholic auf  unserer  Stirne;  denn  dass  das  Scheinen  Nothwendig- 
keit  ist,  hassen  wir  mehr  als  den  Tod;  und  eine  solche  andauernde 
Erbitterung  dariiber  macht  uns  vulkanisch  und  bedrohlich.  Von 
Zeit  zu  Zeit  rachen  wir  uns  fiir  unser  gewaltsames  Verbergen,  fiir 
unsere  erzwungene  Zuriickhaltung.  Wir  kommen  aus  unserer 
Hohle  heraus  mit  schrecklichen  Mienen,  unsere  Worte  und  Thaten 
sind  dann  Explosionen,  und  es  ist  moglich,  dass  wir  an  uns  selbst 
zu  Grunde  gehen.     So  gefahrlich  lebe  ich."     {Brief e,  V,  309.) 


40  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

Englishwoman.  Doctor  Paneth  has  left  a 
valuable  account  in  his  letters  of  visits  and 
talks  with  Nietzsche  in  the  Riviera.  Very 
early  he  discerned  that  Nietzsche  worked 
always  from  his  feehngs  outward.  Nietzsche 
welcomed  his  loneliness.  Glimpses  of  this 
are  seen  again  and  again  in  Zarathustra.  It 
was  to  him  the  sign  and  seal  of  his  greatness. 
He  declares  that  he  cannot  expect  friends 
any  more,  for  friendship  is  only  for  equals.^ 
Yet  all  along  he  resented  the  neglect  of  his 
books  in  Germany  and  the  lack  of  disciples. 
Injured  partly  by  sleeping  drugs,  Nietzsche 
became  more  and  more  difficult  of  ap- 
proach. When  he  met  his  old  friend,  Erwin 
Rohde,  in  Leipzig,  neither  was  gratified. 
Later  on  they  quarrelled  finally,  owing  to  a 

^This  was  written  in  1884.  "Lassen  sie  mich  nur  in  meiner 
Einsamkeit. 

"Es  war  zuletzt  eine  Eselei  von  mir  mich  'unter  die  Menschen' 
zu  begeben:  ich  musste  es  ja  voraus  wissen,  was  mir  da  begegnen 
wiirde. 

"Die  Hauptsache  aber  ist  die:  ich  habe  Dinge  auf  meiner 
Seele,  die  hundertmal  schwerer  zu  tragen  sind,  als  La  hetise 
humaine.  Es  ist  moglich,  dass  ich  fiir  alle  kommenden  Menschen 
ein  Verhangnis,  das  Verhangnis  bin, — und  es  ist  folgHch  sehr 
moglich,  dass  ich  eines  Tages  stumm  werde,  aus  Menschenliebe." 
(To  Malwida  von  Meysenbug,  Brief e.  III,  611.) 


FRIEDRICH  NIETZSCHE:  THE  MAN       41 

difference  over  the  merits  of  Hippolyte 
Taine.  Paul  Deussen  and  his  wife  went  to 
see  him  two  years  before  the  catastrophe. 
They  were  shocked  at  the  change  in  his  ap- 
pearance; Nietzsche  spoke  of  his  fears  of 
what  would  befall  him,  and  as  they  parted 
they  saw  the  tears  in  his  eyes.^  All  the 
while  there  grew  in  him  the  sense  of  mission. 
"I  am  at  the  summit  of  all  moralist  think- 
ing in  Europe,"^  he  wrote  to  his  sister. 
His  sense  of  Apocalyptic  vision  appears  in 
such  titles  as  The  Dawn  of  Day,  and  domi- 
nates Zarathustra.  He  believes  himself  in- 
spired as  no  one  has  been  for  thousands  of 
years. 

The  aphoristic  form  which  he  had  begun 
to  adopt  in  Human,  All  Too  Human,  was 
doubtless  an  imitation  of  La  Rochefoucauld. 

*  "  Hier  sprach  er  nochmals  die  diistern  Ahnimgen  aus,  welche 
sich  leider  so  bald  erfiillen  soUten.  Als  wir  Abschied  nahmen, 
standen  ihm  die  Thranen  in  den  Augen,  was  ich  fruher  nie  an 
ihm  gesehen  hatte."     (Deussen,  93,  1887.) 

2"Glaube  mir;  bei  mir  ist  jetzt  die  Spitze  alles  moralischen 
Nachdenkens  und  Arbeitens  in  Europa  und  noch  von  manchem 
Anderen.  Es  wird  vielleicht  einmal  noch  die  Zeit  kommen,  wo 
auch  die  Adler  scheu  zu  mir  aufblicken  miissen,  wie  auf  jenem 
Bilde  des  heiligen  Johannes,  das  wir  als  Kinder  so  sehr  liebten." 
{Briefe,  V,  469.) 


42  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

But  it  did  not  sell  his  books.  Finally,  he 
was  forced  to  publish  at  his  own  expense, 
or  even  to  print  privately.  His  life  was  pos- 
sible only  by  the  severest  economy.  From 
1883  onward  come  his  last  and  most  im- 
portant works.  They  express  his  conquest 
over  all  impeding  forces,  over  earlier  mas- 
ters, and  above  all  over  his  own  weakness. 
He  thinks  that  his  illness  even  has  helped 
him,  and  his  whole  philosophy  rests  on  the 
acceptance  of  what  comes  to  man — amor 
fatL  Zarathustra  puts  all  in  a  poetic  dra- 
matic form.  The  other  books.  The  Geneal- 
ogy of  Morals,  Beyond  Good  and  Evil,  The 
Case  of  Wagner,  are  to  be  read  as  commen- 
taries on  Zarathustra.  The  same  is  true  of 
those  works  which  appeared  after  Nietzsche 
had  ceased  all  writing.  The  Antichrist,  Ecce 
Homo,  and  the  Will  to  Power, 

Nietzsche  seemed  almost  well.  When 
better  he  worked  with  feverish  haste.  Signs 
of  insanity  are  not  hard  to  discern  in  his 
later  works,  and  increasing  megalomania. 
In  sending  Taine  one  of  his  works,  he  de- 


FRIEDRICH  NIETZSCHE;  THE  MAN       43 

scribes  it  as  the  most  marvellous  book  ever 
written,  and  declares  in  Ecce  Homo,  "I  am 
not  a  man,  I  am  dynamite."^  He  discovers 
Turin,  and  wonders  why  he  ever  spent  a 
winter  elsewhere.  His  power  of  boyish  en- 
thusiasm grows  greater,  if  possible.  He 
went  on  working  with  appalling  energy. 
What  he  produced  in  the  final  year  and  a 
half  is  prodigious.  The  last  publication. 
The  Case  of  Wagner,  was  his  ruin.  Wagner 
was  dead,  and  his  friends  resented,  not  un- 
naturally, this  ruthless  attack  on  an  old 
friend.  The  anti-Semites  attacked  him 
also.  Finally,  he  was  given  to  understand 
that  his  brother-in-law.  Doctor  Forster,  had 
turned  Elizabeth  against  him.     This  was 

*  "Diese  Wochen  in  Turin,  wo  ich  noch  bis  zum  5  Juni  bleibe, 
sind  mir  besser  gerathen  als  irgend  welche  Wochen  seit  Jahren, 
vor  allem  philosophischer.  Ich  habe  fast  jeden  Tag  eine,  zwei 
Stunden  jene  Energie  erreicht  um  meine  Gesammt-Conception 
von  Oben  nach  Unten  sehen  zu  konnen:  wo  die  uugeheure  Vielheit 
von  Problemen,  wie  in  Rehef  und  klar  in  den  Linien  unter  mir 
ausgebreitet  lag.  Dazu  gehort  ein  Maximum  von  Kraft,  auf 
welches  ich  kaum  mehr  bei  mir  gehofft  hatte."  (N.  to  Brandes, 
May,  1888,  III,  305.) 

"Das  Buch  das  in  Ihre  Hande  zu  legen  ich  mir  den  Muth 
nehme,  ist  vielleicht  das  wunderlichste  Buch  das  bisher  geschrie- 
ben  wurde — und  in  Hinsicht  auf  das  was  es  vorbereitet,  beinahe 
ein  Stuck  Schicksal."     (N.  to  Taine,  III,  204.) 


44  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

not  true,  but  Nietzsche  could  not  know 
that.  He  wrote  a  letter  attacking  his 
brother-in-law.  It  was  not  sent,  but  was 
found  among  his  papers.  He  said  that  he 
was  taking  more  and  more  chloral  without 
being  able  to  sleep;  and  would  ere  long  take 
so  much  that  he  would  lose  his  reason.  He 
did.  Shortly  after  this  he  had  a  stroke. 
Living  in  poor  rooms  among  strangers, 
means  were  not  taken  to  guard  him.  He 
began  writing  letters  of  which  the  insanity 
was  patent.  Fortunately  Professor  Over- 
beck  saw  what  was  the  matter  and  hurried 
to  Turin,  just  in  time  to  save  him.  He  had 
been  found  bereft  of  reason  in  the  streets. 
His  mother,  strong-minded  and  tender,  was 
resolved  to  keep  him  with  her,  but  it  was 
needful  for  him  first  to  go  to  an  asylum  at 
Jena.  He  became  well  enough  to  be  moved 
home,  and  Frau  Nietzsche  tended  him  till 
her  death  in  1897.  It  is  a  pathetic  picture, 
the  pious  Christian  lady,  old-fashioned  and 
tender,  spending  her  last  years  as  nurse  of 
the  son,  who  had  attacked  with  a  violence 


FRIEDRICH  NIETZSCHE:  THE  MAN       45 

before  unknown  everything  she  held  dear. 
It  is  the  irony  of  fate  that  such  care  as  he 
enjoyed  had  been  condemned  by  Nietzsche 
as  a  cockering  up  of  the  weak  and  useless. 
Madame  Forster-Nietzsche  had  returned  to 
Europe  on  her  husband's  death,  and  was 
able  to  have  her  brother  with  her  at  Weimar 
in  1897.  He  was  occasionally  conscious, 
and  not  unhappy.  He  died  in  1900,  nearly 
seventy  years  after  the  death,  under  condi- 
tions so  different  but  in  the  same  place,  of 
Goethe.  Now  the  Nietzsche- Archiv  is  one  of 
the  treasures  of  that  city,  which  means 
more  to  culture  than  the  millionaire-haunted 
hovels  of  modernity. 

Nietzsche's  story  is  full  of  pathos.  No 
one  had  deeper  feelings  than  Nietzsche.-^ 
Much  of  his  barbarity  in  philosophy  is  due 
to  his  fear  of  falling  a  prey  to  them.  All 
who  met  him  knew  him  as  amiable  and  very 
gentle,  and  he  had  a  distinction  in  all  his 
ways.     He  is  afraid  of  his  own  tenderness. 

^"11  fut  au  fond  du  coeur  un  tendre  et'un  pitoyable  en  depit  de 
ses  affectations  de  rondeur  militaire  et  de  ses  preferences  martiales 
affichees."     (Seillieres,  360.) 


46  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

"Never  give  way"  is  his  motto.  All  his 
teaching  is  a  self -conquest.  He  could  never 
be  quiet.  No  single  view  could  ever  hold 
him.  When  he  has  embraced  a  doctrine  or 
a  teacher,  he  begins  at  once  to  pass  beyond. 
His  loneliness  is  a  cross,  and  he  profits  by 
it  hke  a  cross.  This  innate  sense  of  mar- 
tyrdom must  be  the  true  ground  of  his 
signing  one  of  his  last  letters — The  Crucified 
One,  It  is  not  mere  satire.  Paul  Deussen, 
who  knew  him  from  a  boy,  says  he  would 
never  continue  in  one  stay — ^liis  preference 
for  becoming  over  being  as  a  philosophic 
category  he  fulfilled  all  his  life.^  Nietzsche 
creates  because  he  is  ever  destroying.  He  is 
one  of  those  natures  which  always  react 
against  their  surroundings.  He  was  indeed 
less  hostile  to  his  own  age  than  he  supposed, 

*  "Nietzsche  war  und  blieb  eine  im  tiefsten  Innern  unruliige, 
bestandlose  Natur,  welehe  es  nicht  ertrug  lange  bei  einer  Sache  zu 
bleiben.  Sein  '  Menschliches,  AUzumenschliches '  nebst  den  ver- 
schiedenen  Fortsetzungen  bis  zum  '  Zarathustra '  bin  geben  ein 
deutliches  Bild  dieses  rastlosen,  qualenden  Fortgetriebenwerdens, 
und  ich  weiss  nicht  ob  nicht,  wenn  ihm  Leben  und  Kraft  ver- 
gonnt  gewesen  ware,  die  Umwertung  aller  Werthe  eine  noch- 
mahge  Umwertung  wiirde  erfahren  haben."  (Deussen,  I,  80.) 
Cf.  also  Salome,  54. 


FRIEDRICH  NIETZSCHE:  THE  MAN       47 

for  in  some  ways  he  is  but  an  element  in  the 
Romantic  movement,  in  others  a  part  of  the 
reaction  against  the  Revolution;  and  his 
Will  to  Power  expresses  in  some  sort  the 
Bismarckian  triumph;^  and  that  in  spite  of 
himseK,  for  Nietzsche  thought  the  Prussians 
the  supreme  danger  to  culture.^  But  in  the 
main  Nietzsche's  ambition  was  to  be  unzeit- 
gemdsse.  So  far  as  the  prevailing  currents 
of  society  were  concerned,  he  fulfilled  it. 

He  had  been  a  pious  httle  boy.  At  his 
confirmation  at  school  he  was  greatly  im- 
pressed. But  he  gave  up  Christianity  ap- 
parently without  any  sense  of  trouble.^    He 

^  "In  both  these  authors  [Nietzsche  and  Hartmann],  compara- 
tively independent  as  they  are,  the  one  a  mystical  natural  phi- 
losopher, the  other  a  mystical  immoralist,  is  reflected  the  all- 
dominating  militarism  of  the  new  German  Empire.  Hartmann 
approaches  on  many  points  the  German  snobbish  national  feel- 
ing. Nietzsche  is  opposed  to  it  on  principle,  as  he  is  to  the  states- 
man who  has  piled  up  for  the  Germans  a  new  tower  of  Babel,  a 
monster  in  extent  of  territory  and  power  and  for  that  reason 
called  great,  but  something  of  Bismarck's  spirit  broods,  never- 
theless, over  the  works  of  both."     (Brandes,  53.) 

2  1870.  "Ich  halte  das  jetzige  Preussen  fiir  eine  der  Cultur 
hochst  gefahrliche  Macht."     {Breife,  I,  105.) 

"Moge  vor  und  ganz  alien  die  staatliche  Machtentfaltung 
Deutschlands  nicht  mit  zu  erheblichen  Opfern  der  Kultur  erkauft 
werden."  (N.  to  Ritschl,  ibid.,  IH,  122.) 

^  The  suggestion  of  such  trouble  may  be  seen  here: 

"Hier  scheiden  sich  nun  die  Wege  der  Menschen;    willst  Du 


48  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

read  as  a  student  Strauss's  Lehen  Jesu^  and 
asked,  if  one  gave  up  Christ,  how  should  a 
behef  in  God  be  retained  ?  ReHgion  dropped 
away  from  him  very  early.  That  cry, 
"God  is  dead!  God  is  dead!"  which  rings 
through  the  pages  of  Zarathustra  is  the  as- 
sumption of  all  Nietzsche's  writing.  Yet 
all  his  life  was  occupied  with  attempts  to 
found  a  new  religion.  One  critic  declares 
his  whole  doctrine  to  rest  on  a  kind  of  meta- 
physical Divinity — Power.^     Another  who 

Seelenruhe  und  Gluck  erstehen,  nun  so  glaube;  willst  Du  ein  Jiinger 
der  Wahrbeit  sein,  so  forsche."     (To  his  sister.  Brief e,  V,  114.) 

"1st  es  wirklich  so  schwer,  dass  alles  worin  man  erzogen  ist, 
was  allmahlich  sich  tief  eingewurzelt  hat,  was  in  den  Kreisen 
der  Verwandten  und  vieler  guten  Menschen  als  Wahrheit  gilt, 
was  ausserdem  auch  wirkUch  den  Menschen  trostet  und  erhebt, 
das  alles  einf  ach  anzunehmen,  ist  das  schwerer,  als  in  Kampf  mit 
Gewohnung,  in  der  Unsicherheit  des  selbststandigen  Gehens, 
unter  haufigen  Schwankungen  des  Gemuths,  ja  des  Gewissens, 
oft  trostlos,  aber  immer  mit  dem  einigen  Ziel  des  Wahren,  des 
Schonen,  des  Guten  neue  Bahnen  zu  gehen?"  (1865,  Brief e, 
V,  113.) 

^ "  Um  diese  Zeit  war  das  neue  Leben  Jesu  von  Strauss  erschie- 
nen.  Nietzsche  schaffte  es  sich  an  und  ich  folgte  seinem  Beispiele. 
In  unseren  Gesprachen  konnte  ich  nicht  umhin,  meine  Zustim- 
mung  auszudriicken.  Nietzsche  erwiderte:  'Die  Sache  hat  eine 
emste  Konsequenz;  wenn  Du  Christus  aufgiebst,  wirst  Du  auch 
Gott  aufgeben  miissen.'  "  (Deussen,  Erinnerungen  an  Friedrich 
Nietzsche,  20.) 

2  "Seine  ganze  Lehre  beruht  auf  einer  Art  metaphysicher 
Gottheit:  der  Macht."  (Caffi,  Nietzsches  Stellung  zu  Machia- 
vellis  Lehre,  28.) 


FRIEDRICH  NIETZSCHE:  THE  MAN       49 

knew  him  says  that  the  history  alike  of  his 
mind,  his  works,  and  his  illness  is  the  result 
of  an  effort  to  find  in  the  different  forms  of 
apotheosis  of  self  a  substitute  for  the  loss  of 
God.^  Nietzsche  himself  makes  Zarathus- 
tra  ask:  "'If  there  be  a  God,  how  could  I 
bear  not  to  be  one  ?  Therefore  there  is  no 
God."  Probably  his  early  religion  was 
mere  sentiment  and  fell  away  almost  with- 
out his  knowing  it.  Not  that  his  attitude 
was  determined  by  personal  bad  habits. 
Nietzsche's  life  shewed  not  only  great  hero- 
ism in  its  struggle  with  ill  health,  but  was, 
in  its  noble  simphcity  and  poverty  and  un- 
wearied interest  in  high  things,  an  example 
to  an  age  sunk  in  vulgar  money-making. 

Many  causes  combined  in  his  passion  of 
recoil  from  Christianity.  These  can  be  left 
till  the  topic  is  definitely  before  us.  One, 
however,  and  not  the  least  important,  may 
be  noted  here:  the  atmosphere  of  Naum- 

* "  Die  Moglichkelt  einen  Ersatz  f iir  den  verlorenen  Gott  in 
den  verschiedensten  Formen  der  Selbstvergottung  zu  finden,  das 
ist  die  Geschichte  seines  Geistes,  seiner  Werke,  seiner  Erkran- 
kung."     (Salome,  39.) 


50  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

burg.  He  writes  to  his  sister,  that  it  is  his 
pet  aversion,  the  httle  town  and  its  petty  in- 
terests, adding  that  they  two  did  not  really 
belong  there.^  Still  more  illuminating  is  a 
letter  written  to  his  mother.  It  was  des- 
patched in  a  fit  of  irritation.  Many  like 
letters  he  would  appear  to  have  posted  in 
the  waste-paper  basket.  Presumably,  it  is 
a  reply  to  something  that  had  been  said 
about  religion.  Nietzsche  tells  his  mother 
he  cannot  stand  the  atmosphere;  these  good 
Christians,  these  uncles  and  aunts,  whether 
in  Naumburg  or  not.  (Briefe,  V,  534-6.) 
We  can  imagine  the  situation.  The  circle 
of  respectable  old  ladies;  the  horror,  when 
the  young  man  from  college  takes  a  walk 
instead  of  going  to  church.  The  whisper- 
ings, the  inquiries  as  to  whether  he  reads 
Voltaire,  the  offer  of  "good  books,"  the  at- 
tempts to  interest  him  in  missions  or  relig- 

^" Naumburg  ist  leider  meine  Abneigung  par  excellence.  Die 
kleine  Stadt,  und  gedriickte  Seelen.  Du  und  ich  sind  nicht  Naum- 
burgisch  gerathen,  viel  zu  unabhangig  und  vielleicht  auch  zu 
leicht  zufrieden,  und  in  uns  zufrieden,  was  diesen  Raths-  und 
Staatsmenschen  nicht  so  leicht  begegnet."  (To  his  sister.  Brief e, 
V,  725.) 


FRIEDRICH  NIETZSCHE:  THE  MAN       51 

ious  gossip — all  this  probably  among  people 
who  lived  as  though  comfort  were  their 
main  object  and  had  little  interest  in 
things  beyond  the  local  horizon.  Nietz- 
sche's whole  life  was  in  reaction.  His  con- 
ception of  Christianity  was  compounded 
of  certain  errors  of  Schopenhauer  and  the 
domestic  pettiness  of  a  small  provincial 
town.  He  was  in  reaction  against  his 
aunts.  ^ 

Secondly,  we  find  him  in  strong  reaction 
against  the  conventions  of  the  academic 
world.  The  narrow  second-hand  culture, 
priding  itself  on  heterodoxy,  the  complacent 
belief  that  by  the  multiplication  of  research 
and  professorial  activities  the  progress  of 
mankind  is  assured,  the  easy-going  middle- 
class  ideals  of  a  rationalist  millennium,  all 
this  revolted  him.  We  see  its  beginning  in 
the  essay  on  Strauss;  but  the  attitude  is  un- 
changed throughout  his  life,  except  in  so  far 

^Perhaps  this  passage  has  a  note  of  the  same  feeling:  "  Wer  hat 
nicht  seine  Mutter  getodtet,  seine  Frau  verrathen,  wenn  es  auf 
Gedanken  ankommt?  Man  wiirde  in  einer  artigen  Einsamkeit 
leben,  wenn  Gedanken  todten  konnten." 


52  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

as  he  seemed  partly  to  have  receded  in  the 
period  of  Ree's  influence.  Because  he  had 
been  a  professor,  he  is  thoroughly  alive  to 
the  defects  of  the  professorial  view  of  the 
universe.^ 

In  the  same  way,  after  submitting  to  the 
influence  of  Schopenhauer,  he  turned  round, 
and  in  regard  to  the  fundamental  thesis  of 
the  evil  of  life,  and  of  salvation  through 
denial  of  the  will  to  live,  he  became  the 
strongest  opponent  of  what  he  once  adored. 
It  is  needless  to  point  out  how  the  same  is 
true  of  his  relations  to  Wagner.  It  is  not 
really  so  much  these  adversaries  whom  he 
attacks,  as  it  is  himself  in  his  former  state  of 
mind.  Half  the  bitterest  things  in  contro- 
versy are  those  said  in  all  sincerity  by  men 
who  have  changed  their  view,  and  are  for 
ever  lashing  themselves  in  punishment  of 
their  peccadilloes  in  opinion.  It  would 
have  been  the  same  with  the  Superman. 
Had  the  Superman  or  the  ruling  caste  of 

^  "Keine  erbarmlichere  Gesellschaft  giebt  es,  als  die  von  Gelehr- 
ten:  jene  wenigen  abgerechnet  die  militarische  Geluste  im  Leibe 
und  Kopfe  haben."     (Nietzsche,  Werke,  XI,  249.) 


FRIEDRICH  NIETZSCHE:  THE  MAN       53 

Nietzsche's  prophetic  dreams  ever  been 
made  manifest  to  his  sight,  no  critic  would 
have  been  more  contemptuous.  Nietzsche 
would  have  broken  his  ancient  idol  into  a 
thousand  splinters. 

Nietzsche  had  the  temper  of  detachment. 
His  words  about  loneliness,  as  a  means  not 
of  withdrawal  from  reality  but  of  deeper  im- 
mersion therein,  might  have  been  used  by 
any  mystic  and  many  monks.  His  affinities 
were  by  no  means  what  he  supposed  them. 
Could  the  two  have  met,  Henri  Beyle,  with 
his  real  cynicism,  would  have  repelled  the 
poet-soul  of  Nietzsche,  who  tried  all  his  Hf  e  to 
be  a  cynic  and  could  achieve  only  the  mood 
of  "the  great  love  and  the  great  contempt." 

Many  of  his  inconsistencies  we  can  under- 
stand. Very  few  writers  but  feel  to  some 
degree  the  need  and  the  value  of  that  lone- 
liness which  was  to  Nietzsche  at  once  his 
cro^s  and  his  crown.  Yet  few  men,  how- 
ever much  they  feel  the  need  to  be  by  them- 
selves, but  feel,  like  Nietzsche,  the  need  of 
a  little  love  in  regard  to  their  creations. 


54  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

Mere  friendship  without  this  seems  some- 
thing outside.  Vanity  may  seem  the  name 
for  some  of  Nietzsche's  imaginings,  such  as 
his  desire  for  a  few  disciples,  who  would 
keep  the  rest  of  the  world  in  respect.  But 
there  was  something  deeper. 

That  loneliness  helped  Nietzsche  as  an 
artist.^  Maybe  without  it  we  could  not 
have  his  most  splendid  passages,  or  the 
mystic  beauty  and  apocalyptic  of  Zara- 
thustra.  As  a  thinker  he  lost  by  it. 
Nietzsche  always  seems  to  discern  some 
truth  in  whatever  topic  he  discusses.  His 
psychological  insight  is  deep  and  real.  But 
he  sees  it  out  of  proportion,  and  having  seen 
it,  he  magnifies  all  into  a  unity  of  feeling  by 
shutting  off  all  other  sides  and  refusing  to 
listen  to  any  criticism.  Dialectic  would 
have  saved  him.  Doubtless  it  would  not 
have  altered  his  fundamental  view,  but  it 

^"Zuletzt  hat  mir  die  Krankheit  den  allergrossten  Nutzen 
gebracht:  sie  hat  mich  herausgelost,  sie  hat  mir  den  Muth  zu  mir 
selbst  zuriickgegeben.  .  .  .  Auch  bin  ich,  meinen  Instinkten 
nach,  ein  tapferes  Thier,  selbst  ein  militarisches.  Der  lange 
Widerstand  hat  meinen  Stoiz  ein  wenig  exasperirt."  (N.  to 
Brandes,  Briefe,  III,  302.) 


FRIEDRICH  NIETZSCHE:  THE  MAN       55 

would  have  shewn  him  the  hmits  of  its  ap- 
phcation,  and  made  him  less  attractive  but 
more  enduring.  Nothing  could  be  less  like 
the  moderation  of  the  classics  and  their  bal- 
ance and  harmony  than  the  febrile  energy, 
always  a  httle  hectic,  of  the  hermit  of  Sils- 
Maria.  Nietzsche  jeers  at  Wagner  for  his 
incessant  expressivo.  Yet  nothing  is  more 
characteristic  of  his  own  style. 

This  is  but  an  instance  of  the  same  fact 
— all  his  ideals  express  disgust  at  his  own 
character  and  hmitations.  An  incurable 
Romanticist,  he  is  all  for  the  classics.  Pro- 
foundly naturahstic  in  his  fundamental 
view,  he  is  for  ever  chafing  against  the 
thought,  and  denies  materiahsm  in  favour 
of  some  doctrine  of  spirit,  which  he  is  careful 
not  to  define.  His  dishke  of  sympathy  is 
due  to  his  being  naturally  full  of  it  and 
afraid  of  giving  way.  His  adoration  of 
force  is  partly  the  expression  of  physical 
weakness.^    Lonely,  he  longed  for  friends, 

i"Malgrado  le  immagini  e  le  allegorie,  malgrado  gli  ampi  oriz- 
zonti  scenografici  ed  i  crescendi  delle  sinf  onie,  il  segreto  di  Nietz- 
sche e  stato  scoperto.     In  una  parola — ^in  una  sola  e  piccola 


56  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

and  cries  out  pathetically  at  the  neglect  of 
him  in  his  native  land.  Even  his  dislike  of 
the  Germans  is  partly  due  to  his  conscious- 
ness of  being  one.^  Despite  all  assertions  to 
the  contrary,  some  of  his  characteristics  are 
eminently  German — ^notably  his  violence  of 
language.  Urbanity  in  controversy  is  a 
quality  of  French  culture. 

Rays  of  light  came  to  him  at  the  last. 
He  heard  that  Georg  Brandes  at  Copen- 
hagen was  giving  a  course  of  lectures  on 
his  philosophy  and  that  it  drew  crowded 

parola — sta  il  secreto  di  Nietzsche,  nella  parola  debolezza"  (II 
Crepuscolo  dei  Filosofi.     Papini,     225.) 

^"Toute  sa  vie  cet  Allemand  pur  sang  s'enorgueillit  de  ne  pas 
etre  Allemand.  Fils  d'un  pasteur  de  campagne  prussien,  il 
s'imagine  qu'il  descend  d'line  vieille  famille  noble  polonaise  du 
nom  de  Nietzky,  alors  que  (sa  soeiu-  elle  m^me  en  fait  la  remarque) 
il  n'a  pas  une  goutte  de  sang  polonais  dans  les  veines;  des  lors  son 
slavisme  imaginaire  devient  une  idee  fixe  et  une  idee-force;  il 
finit  par  penser  et  agir  sous  I'empire  de  cette  idee.  Le  noble  polo- 
nais, dit-il,  avait  le  droit  d'annuler  avec  son  seul  veto  la  delibe- 
ration d'une  assemblee  tout  entiere;  lui  aussi  heroiquement  a 
tout  ce  qu'a  decide  la  grande  assemblee  humaine  il  dira:  veto. 
'Copemic  etait  Polonais  et  Copemic  a  change  le  systeme  du 
monde.'  Nietzsche  renversera  le  systeme  des  idees  et  des  va- 
leurs;  il  fera  tourner  I'humanite  autour  de  ce  qu'elle  avait  meprise 
et  honnie.  Chopin  le  Polonais  ...  a  *delivre  la  musique  des 
influences  tudesques';  Nietzsche  delivrera  la  philosophic  des  in- 
fluences allemandes;  il  s'en  flatte,  il  le  croit;  et  il  developpe  en  une 
direction  nouvelle  la  philosophic  de  Schopenhauer."  (Fouillee, 
Nietzsche  et  V Immoralisme,  VI.) 


FRIEDRICH  NIETZSCHE,  THE  MAN       57 

audiences.  One  or  two  signs  latterly  at  Tu- 
rin and  Sils-Maria  made  him  feel  he  was 
getting  known.  But  it  was  too  late.  Dur- 
ing the  last  years  one  day  he  heard  talk  of 
books,  and  his  face  lit  up.  "Ah,"  said 
Nietzsche,  "I  also  have  written  some  good 
books." 

One  quahty  he  had — a  terrific  pride.  He 
said  that  he  was  too  proud  to  make  friends, 
for  none  alive  were  of  the  same  rank.^  All 
loneliness  of  spirit  easily  becomes  arrogance. 
This  Nietzsche  does  not  react  against.^  It 
is  his  constant  quality.  Of  that  pride  he 
proceeded  to  make  an  ideal.  In  the  next 
lecture  I  shall  try  to  shew  what  it  was. 

^1885.  "Ich  bin  viel  zu  stolz  um  je  zu  glauben  dass  ein 
Menschen  mich  lieben  konne.  Dies  wiirde  namlich  voraussetzen 
dass  er  wisse  wer  ich  bin.  Ebensowenig  glaube  ich  daran  dass 
ich  je  Jemanden  lieben  werde;  dies  wiirde  voraussetzen  dass  ich 
einmal — Wunder  liber  Wunder — einem  Menschen  meines  Ranges 
finde."     {Briefe,  V,  596.) 

"Ich  selbst  den  Stifter  des  Christenthums  in  mancher  Hinsicht 
als  oberflachUch  empfinde." 

Cf.  also:  685.  His  pathetic  account  of  loneliness:  "Ein 
tiefer  Mensch  braucht  Freunde;  es  ware  denn  dass  er  seinen 
Gott  noch  hatte.     Und  Gott  ich  habe  weder  Gott  noch  Freunde." 

2  "On  chercherait  en  vain  dans  I'histoire  des  lettres,  des  philo- 
sophies, voire  des  religions  depuis  les  temps  les  plus  recules, 
jusqu'a  nos  jours  un  autre  exemple  d'orgueuil  aussi  prodigieuse- 
ment  ingenu,  de  narcissime  intellectuel  a  ce  point  exalte."  (Pal- 
lares,  Le  CrSpuscule  d'une  idole,  125.) 


II 

THE  GOSPEL  OF  NIETZSCHE 

Courage,  mon  ami,  le  diable  est  vif,  might 
be  taken  as  the  motto  for  the  Gospel  ac- 
cording to  Nietzsche,  heralded  with  the 
call,  Repent  ye  of  your  virtues,  for  the 
kingdom  of  earth  is  at  hand.  For  it  is  an 
Evangel  that  Nietzsche  sets  forth  with,  on 
it  the  title  marked,  "the  rich  have  the  Gos- 
pel preached  to  them";  save  that  by  the 
rich  Nietzsche  would  mean  rich  in  faculty 
and  not  goods.  Nietzsche  is  no  less  con- 
vinced than  any  Moses  that  he  is  to  lead 
his  people  into  a  promised  land.  As  he 
says  in  Ecce  Homo: 

"My  life-task  is  to  prepare  for  human- 
ity one  supreme  moment  in  which  it  can 
come  to  its  senses,  a  great  noon  in  which 
it  will  turn  its  gaze  backward  and  for- 
ward, in  which  it  will  step  from  under 
the  yoke  of  accident  and  of  priests,  and 

58 


THE  GOSPEL  OF  NIETZSCHE  59 

for  the  first  set  the  question  of  the  why 
and  wherefore  of  humanity  as  a  whole — 
this  Hfe-task  naturally  follows  out  of  the 
conviction  that  mankind  does  not  get  on 
the  right  road  of  its  own  accord.^ 

"For  such  a  task  there  is  requisite  a 
different  kind  of  spirits  than  our  age  is 
likely  to  produce;  spirits  strengthened  by 
wars  and  victories;  to  whom  conquest, 
adventure,  danger,  even  pain  have  be- 
come a  need;  for  it  an  accustoming  to 
thin,  Alpine  air,  to  winterly  wanderings, 
to  ice  and  mountains  in  every  sense;  nay, 
even  a  kind  of  sublime  maliciousness,  an 
ultimate  and  most  self-assured  sprightli- 
ness  of  knowledge,  indispensable  for  the 
great  health:  to  say  a  bad  thing  in  one 
word,  even  this  great  health  is  requisite ! 
But  is  just  this  even  so  much  as  possible 
to-day?  But  at  some  time  and  in  a 
stronger  time  than  this  tottering,  self- 
doubting  age  of  ours  he  is  to  arise,  the 
redeeming  man  of  the  great  love  and  con- 

1  Ecce  Homo,  93,  I. 


60  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

tempt,  the  creative  spirit  who  by  his 
thronging  power  is  ever  again  driven 
away  from  every  corner  and  other  world; 
whose  lonehness  is  misunderstood  by  the 
people,  as  though  it  were  a  flight  from 
reality,  whereas  it  is  but  his  sinking, 
burying,  and  deepening  into  reality,  in 
order  that  when  he  rises  again  into  light, 
he  may  bring  home  with  him  the  redemp- 
tion of  reality,  its  redemption  from  the 
curse  which  the  old  ideal  has  laid  upon  it. 
This  man  of  the  future  who  will  redeem 
us  from  the  old  ideal,  as  also  from  that 
which  had  to  grow  out  of  that  ideal,  from 
great  surfeit  from  the  will  to  nothing, 
from  Nihilism,  this  bell-stroke  of  noon- 
day and  the  great  decision  which  restores 
freedom  to  the  will,  which  restores  to 
the  earth  its  goal  and  to  man  his  hope; 
this  Anti- Christ  and  Anti-Nihilist,  this 
conqueror  of  God  and  of  the  Nothing — 
he  must  come  some  day.  .  .  . 

"But    what    say    I    here.^     Enough! 
Enough !     At  this  place  but  one  thing 


THE  GOSPEL  OF  NIETZSCHE  61 

befits  me — silence:  lest  I  should  infringe 
on  that  which  only  one  younger  than  I 
am,  only  one  more  futurous  than  I  am, 
one  stronger  than  I  am  is  free  to  do — on 
that  which  my  Zarathustra  is  free  to  do 
— Zarathustra  the  ungodly.  .  .  ."^ 

Nietzsche  is  an  apostle  preaching  a  new 
religion  of  redemption.^  For  the  doctrine 
of  Nietzsche,  no  less  than  that  of  Christ  or 
of  Buddha,  is  a  doctrine  of  redemption  and 
deliverance.  Nietzsche  believes  that  man, 
especially  European  man,  is  in  evil  case. 
He  preaches  that  he  must  be  delivered  from 
this.  He  holds  that  this  needs  a  radical 
change  of  nature.  It  is  a  "new  creature" 
that  is  needed.^     This  will  be  reached  not  by 

^  The  Genealogy  of  Morals,  121. 

2  "Tiefes,  feindseliges  Schweigen  iiber  das  Christenthum  im 
ganzen  Buche,  es  ist  weder  apollinisch  noch  dionysisch;  es  negirt 
alle  asthetischen  Werthe  (die  einzigen  Werthe  die  'Die  Geburth 
der  Tragodie'  anerkennt);  es  ist  im  tiefsten  Sinne  nihilistisch, 
wahrend  im  dionysischen  Symbol  die  ausserste  Grenze  der  Bejah- 
mig  erreicht  ist."     {Leben,  II,  103.) 

This  is  his  summing  up  of  his  attitude  to  Christianity  in  the 
account  he  wrote  later  on  of  his  first  book. 

^  "Tutto  quello  che  gli  resto  di  energia  lo  speso  per  gridare  in 
belle  forti  parole  il  suo  desiderio  di  salute  e  di  forza  trasformato  in 
teoria  redentrice  e  per  suonare  e  risuonare  alcuni  arguti  motivi 
con  un  sas  porticcio  flauto  di  antico  saggio."     (Papini,  260.) 


62  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

education  or  intellect,  but  by  raising  a  por- 
tion of  man,  the  ruling  class,  into  a  higher 
order  of  life,  a  new  society.  It  is  a  religion, 
even  more  than  a  philosophy  or  even  an 
ethic  that  Nietzsche  preached.  His  atti- 
tude to  the  Universe  is  in  one  respect  re- 
ligious. True,  he  does  not  in  the  strict 
sense  believe  in  a  universe  at  all,  but  only 
a  chaos  of  forces.  Yet  his  doctrine  of  the 
eternal  recurrence  makes  up  for  this,  and 
justilSes  a  certain  reverence.  It  is  life  that 
he  worships;  and  his  adoration  is  so  whole- 
hearted, that  he  requires  every  second  of 
the  tale  of  life  to  be  told  again,  like  children 
who  never  tire.  Not  without  justice  does 
one  who  knew  him  say: 

"In  Nietzsche  there  dwelt  in  continual 
warfare,  side  by  side  of  one  another  and 
in  turn  tyrannising  over  one  another,  a 
musician  of  high  talent,  a  thinker  with  a 
free  orientation,  a  religious  genius,  and  a 
born  poet."^ 

*  Nietzsche  in  seinen  WerJcen,  23, 

"In  Nietzsche  lebten  in  stetem  Unfrieden,  neben  einander  und 


THE  GOSPEL  OF  NIETZSCHE  63 

But  we  must  not  forget  that  of  this  new 
reKgion  the  presupposition  is  the  non- 
existence of  other-worldly  values.  Not 
once  do  these  occur  to  Nietzsche,  except 
as  a  target  for  attacks.  The  possibility 
that  they  have  any  basis  in  reality  he  does 
not  consider.  Rather  his  whole  philosophy 
starts  from  the  attempt  to  make  people 
think  out  the  consequences  of  those  denials 
which  he  says  they  have  already  made.  It 
is  no  use  to  give  up  God,  and  yet  remain  in 
the  prison-house  of  an  ethical  system,  which 
resulted  from  faith  in  God.  See  what  your 
denial  involves,  and  be  bold  enough  to  carry 
it  to  its  logical  conclusion.  "Thorough"  is 
his  motto.  A  passage  in  the  Joyful  Wisdom 
puts  this  very  well: 

"Have  you  ever  heard  of  the  madman 
who  on  a  bright  morning  lighted  a  lantern 
and  ran  to  the  market-place,  calling  out 
unceasingly:    'I  seek  God!     I  seek  God!' 

sich  gegenseitig  tyrannisierend,  ein  Musiker  von  hoher  Begabung, 
ein  Denker  von  freigeisterischer  Richtung,  ein  religioses  Genie, 
imd  ein  geborener  Dichter."  {Friedrich  Nietzsche  in  seinen  Wer- 
ken,  Lou  Andreas-Salome,  II,  23.) 


64  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

As  there  were  many  people  standing  about 
who  did  not  beheve  in  God,  he  caused  a 
great  deal  of  amusement.  'Why  is  he 
lost?'  said  one.  'Has  he  strayed  away 
Hke  a  child?'  said  another.  'Or  does  he 
keep  himself  hidden?'  'Is  he  afraid  of 
us?'  'Has  he  taken  a  sea-voyage?' 
'Has  he  emigrated?'  the  people  cried  out 
laughingly,  all  in  a  hubbub.  The  insane 
man  jumped  into  their  midst  and  trans- 
fixed them  with  his  glances.  'Where  is 
God  gone?'  he  called  out.  'I  mean  to 
tell  you  !  We  have  killed  him — ^you  and  I. 
We  are  all  his  murderers.  But  how  have 
we  done  it  ?  How  were  we  able  to  drink 
up  the  sea  ?  Who  gave  us  the  sponge  to 
wipe  away  the  whole  horizon?  What  did 
we  do  when  we  loosened  this  earth  from 
its  sun?  Whither  does  it  now  move? 
Whither  do  we  move?  Away  from  all 
suns?  Do  we  not  dash  on  unceasingly? 
Backward,  sideways,  forward,  in  all  di- 
rections? Is  there  still  an  above  and 
below  ?     Do  we  not  stray,  as  through  in- 


THE  GOSPEL  OF  NIETZSCHE  65 

finite  nothingness?  Does  not  empty 
space  breathe  upon  us?  Has  it  not  be- 
come colder?  Does  not  night  come  on 
continually,  darker  and  darker?  Shall 
we  not  have  to  light  lanterns  in  the  morn- 
ing? Do  we  not  hear  the  noise  of  the 
grave-diggers,  who  are  burying  God? 
Do  we  not  smell  the  divine  putrefaction  ? 
For  even  Gods  putrefy.  God  is  dead ! 
God  remains  dead !  And  we  have  killed 
him!  How  shall  we  console  ourselves, 
the  most  murderous  of  all  murderers? 
The  holiest  and  the  mightiest  that  the 
world  has  hitherto  possessed,  has  bled  to 
death  under  our  knife — who  will  wipe 
the  blood  from  us?  With  what  water 
could  we  cleanse  ourselves?  What  lus- 
trums? What  sacred  games  shall  we 
have  to  devise  ?  Is  not  the  magnitude  of 
this  deed  too  great  for  us  ?  Shall  we  not 
ourselves  have  to  become  Gods,  merely  to 
seem  worthy  of  it.  There  never  was  a 
greater  event — and  on  account  of  it,  all 
who  are  born  after  us  belong  to  a  higher 


;  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

history  than  any  history  hitherto.'  Here 
the  madman  was  silent,  and  looked  again 
at  his  hearers.  They  also  were  silent,  and 
looked  at  him  in  surprise.  At  last  he 
threw  his  lantern  on  the  ground,  so  that 
it  broke  in  pieces  and  was  extinguished. 
'I  came  too  early,'  he  then  said.  'I  am 
not  yet  at  the  right  time.  This  prodig- 
ious event  is  still  on  its  way,  and  is  trav- 
elling— it  has  not  yet  reached  men's  ears. 
Lightning  and  thunder  need  time,  the 
light  of  the  stars  needs  time,  deeds  need 
time,  even  after  they  are  done,  to  be  seen 
and  heard.  This  deed  is  as  yet  farther 
from  them  than  the  farthest  star — and 
yet  they  have  done  it!'  It  is  further 
stated  that  the  madman  made  his  way 
into  different  churches  on  the  same  day 
and  there  intoned  his  Requiem  ceternam 
deo.  When  led  out  and  called  to  account, 
he  always  gave  the  reply:  'What  are 
these  churches  now,  if  they  are  not  the 
tombs  and  monuments  of  God.^'"^ 

1  Joyful  Wisdom,  167. 


THE  GOSPEL  OF  NIETZSCHE  67 

What,  then,  is  the  nature  of  this  rehgion  ? 
Has  it  no  object  of  worship  ?  It  has — Life, 
The  yea-saying  to  the  whole  of  hfe  is  the 
sum  and  substance  of  it  all.  Nietzsche  him- 
self had  suffered  so  much  and  profited  by  his 
suffering  so  deeply  that  he  could  not  feel 
with  Schopenhauer  that  existence  is  evil,  be- 
cause of  the  suffering  which  it  involves.  No 
less  deeply  than  any  Christian  was  Nietz- 
sche persuaded  that  what  makes  life  noble  is 
richness  of  experience,  and  that  suffering  is 
irrelevant.  No  less  than  any  Christian  does 
he  repudiate  the  stoic  ideal  of  apathy.  We 
are  not  to  train  ourselves  to  impassibility, 
but  to  endure  and  even  to  embrace  the 
Cross,  on  account  of  the  strength  and  beauty 
that  can  be  won  thereby.^     Fulness  of  hfe  is 

1  Nietzsche,  Werke,  XIII,  89,  §  226:  "  Wer  das  Leiden  als  Argu- 
ment gegen  das  Leben  fuhlt  gilt  mir  als  oberflachlich,  mitten 
unsrer  Pessimisten." 

§227:  "Mit  der  narrischen  und  mibescheidnen  Frage,  ob  in 
der  Welt  Lust  oder  Unlust  iiberwiegt,  steht  man  in  mitten  der 
philosophischen  Dilettanterei:  dergleichen  sollte  man  sehnsuch- 
tigen  Dichtem  und  Weibern  iiberlassen." 

Ihid.,  XIV,  81,  §  162:  "  Leiden  verringern  und  sich  selber  dem 
Leiden  (d.  h.  dem  Leb^n)  entziehn — das  sei  moralisch?  Leiden 
schaffen — sich  selber  und  Anderen — und  sie  zum  hochsten  Leben, 
dem  des  Siegers,  zu  befahigen — ware  mein  Ziel." 

Ihid.,  XIV,  102,  §  222:  "Es  ist  Nichts  hart  sein  wie  ein  Stoiker; 


68  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

the  end,  and  topics  of  joy  and  suffering  are 
as  irrelevant;  just  as  fatigue  is  irrelevant  to 
an  athlete  or  losses  in  battle  to  a  com- 
mander, if  victory  be  the  one  end.^  He  had 
learned  to  welcome  all  that  befel  him — ^just 
as  Madame  Guyon  declared  that  whatever 
has  happened  to  one  is  the  Will  of  God  after 
it  has  happened;  or  as  St.  Paul — "All  things 
work  together  for  good  to  them  that  love 
God."     As  he  says  in  The  Will  to  Power: 

"The  kind  of  experimental  philosophy 
which  I  am  living,  even  anticipates  the 
possibility  of  the  most  fundamental  Ni- 
hilism, on  principle;  but  by  this  I  do  not 
mean  that  it  remains  standing  at  a  nega- 
tion, at  a  no,  or  at  a  will  to  negation.  It 
would  rather  attain  to  the  very  reverse — 

mit  der  Unempfindlichkeit  hat  man  sich  losgelost.  Man  muss 
den  Gegensatz  in  sich  haben — die  zarte  Empfindung  und  die 
Gegenmacht,  nicht  zu  verbluten,  sondern  jedes  Ungliick  wieder 
plastisch  zum  Besten  zu  wenden." 

1  {Leben,  II,  838.)  "Und  spater  schreibt  er:  *Ich  habe  langst 
bei  mir  beschlossen,  meine  eigenen  Wunsche  und  Plane  nicht 
so  wichtig  zu  nehmen.  Gelingt  mir  das  nicht,  geUngt  mir  jenes: 
und  im  Ganzen  weiss  ich  nicht,  ob  ich  nicht  alien  Misslingen  so 
gut  zu  Dank  verpflichtet  bin,  wie  irgend  welchem  Gelingen.  Das 
was  mir  Werth  und  Ertrag  des  Lebens  ausmacht,  liegt  wo  an- 
ders/  " 


THE  GOSPEL  OF  NIETZSCHE  69 

to  a  Dionysian  affirmation  of  the  world,  as 
it  is,  without  subtraction,  exception,  or 
choice — it  would  have  eternal  circular 
motion :  the  same  things,  the  same  reason- 
ing, and  the  same  illogical  concatenation. 
The  highest  state  to  which  a  philosopher 
can  attain:  to  maintain  a  Dionysian  atti- 
tude to  Life — ^my  formula  for  this  is  amor 
fatir^ 

Nietzsche  will  go  farther.  Affirmation  of 
life  carried  to  its  logical  extreme  means  not 
only  the  acceptance  of  the  moment.  It  in- 
volves also  the  desire  for  its  recurrence,  pre- 
cisely in  all  particularity  as  it  took  place. 
It  is  to  recur  again  and  again.  To  this 
end  courage  is  needed.  The  doctrine  is 
probably  the  expression  of  Nietzsche's  own 
resolution  in  his  darkest  hours  no  less  than 
in  bright  ones.  ^'No,  I  will  not  give  way. 
No  weakness;  none  of  your  pity.  It  won't 
last  for  ever.  As  the  schoolboy  says:  It 
will  be  all  the  same  a  hundred  years  hence." 

1  Will  to  Power,  II,  412. 


70  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

Then  a  further  access  of  courage.  "No,  I 
don't  care  if  it  does  go  on.  I  will  still  bear 
it,  bear  it  if  it  lasts  for  ever;  bear  it  if  it 
repeats  itself  ad  infinitum."  Some  such 
experience  nightly  when  he  had  toothache 
is  partly  at  the  bottom  of  the  Eternal  Recur- 
rence. On  the  other  side  there  is  the  more 
obvious  desire  for  the  recurrence  of  joyful 
moments.  This  is  expressed  in  his  refrain: 
"Eternity  is  sought  by  all  delight."  We 
have  Nietzsche's  own  word  for  it,  that  all 
his  doctrines  represent  experience  lived  and 
aflame.  Courage  is  the  one  virtue  which 
Nietzsche  leaves  untouched.  His  disciples 
are  to  have  the  courage  of  their  sufferings 
and  of  their  sins.  They  are  to  risk  the 
depths  that  they  may  win  the  heights.  Far 
from  seeking  serenity  and  the  pensioned  dull 
existence  of  the  safely  insured,  they  must 
court  danger  and  adventure,  ever  driven  by 
one  thought,  the  newness  of  the  moment 
and  the  self-affirmation  of  life.  No  weak 
sympathy  for  themselves  is  to  deter  them. 
What  they  need  not  for  themselves,  they 


THE  GOSPEL  OF  NIETZSCHE  71 

are  not  to  dishonour  their  fellows  by  offering 
to  them.^  "'I  reckon  the  overcoming  of 
pity  as  noble."  Life,  life,  and  more  abun- 
dant life  is  his  cry.  This  is  the  need  of 
every  soul — life — not  comfort  nor  happiness 
nor  riches.  Some  of  his  words  are  not  un- 
like those  of  another  Master:  "In  the  world 
ye  shall  have  tribulation,  but  be  of  good 
cheer,  I  have  overcome  the  world."  Or 
again:  "Blessed  are  ye  when  men  shall  hate 
you  and  persecute  you  and  revile,  and  say 
all  manner  of  things  falsely  against  you,  for 
my  sake.    Rejoice  and  be  exceeding  glad."^ 

1  See  the  letter  to  Peter  Gast  on  the  value  of  Vomehmheit,  IV, 
219.  *1n  alien  meinen  Ej'ankheits-Zustanden  fuhle  ioh  mit 
Schrecken,  eine  Art  Herabziehimg  zu  pobelhaften  Schwachen, 
pobelhaften  Milden,  sogar  pobelhaften  Tugenden. 

"  Vornehm  ist  z.  B.  der  festgehaltene  frivole  Anschein  mit  dem 
eine  stoische  Harte  und  Selbstbezwingung  maskirt  wird.  Vor- 
nehm ist  das  Langsamgehen  in  alien  Stucken,  auch  das  langsame 
Auge.  Wir  bewmidern  schwer.  Es  giebt  nicht  zu  viel  werthvol- 
ler  Dinge;  und  diese  kommen  von  selben  und  wollen  zu  uns." 

2  "Dass  man  diese  Lehrefur  einen  frivolen  Egoismus,  eine  Heilig- 
sprechung  epikiu-eischer  Ziigellosigkeit  angesehen  hat,  gehort  zu 
den  wunderliehsten  Augentauschungen  in  der  Geschichte  der 
Moral.  .  .  . 

"Nietzsche  hat  den  Personalismus  zu  einem  objektiven  Ideal 
gemacht  und  ihn  damit  von  dem  eigentlichen  Egoismus  der  immer 
auf  das  Subjekt  zurucksieht,  aufs  Entschiedenste  abgetrennt. 
Der  Egoismus  wiU  etwas  haben,  der  Personalismus  will  etwas 
sein."     (Simmel,  Schopenhauer  und  Nietzsche,  245.) 


72  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

One  of  the  most  wholesome  elements  in 
Nietzsche  is  his  contempt  for  the  vulgar 
eudcemomsm  of  the  Manchester  school,  "the 
bagman's  paradise"  of  Cobdenism,  the  tea- 
grocer's  philosophy  of  Spencer,  as  he  calls 
it.  To  all  who  know  England  it  is  strange 
to  find  Nietzsche  identifying  Benthamite 
utilitarianism  with  English  civilisation,  as 
though  that  were  anything  more  than  a 
particular  phase.  But  it  is  true  to  say  with 
Meyer:  No  philosophy  was  ever  less  eudse-. 
monistic  than  that  of  Nietzsche,  despite  the 
fact  that  some  have  thought  of  him  as 
teaching  sheer  hedonism.^  Mere  money- 
getting  on  the  part  of  those  who  have 
enough  is  the  ugliest  of  all  the  idols  of 
human  worship.  Nietzsche  deserves  all 
honour  in  that  he  sets  his  face  against  this, 
no  less  than  any  daring  Hebrew  prophet. 
Not  that  he  is  justified  in  doing  so  on 
his  own  theory.  A  man  struggling  for 
financial  triumph,  say,  to  be  a  "Bun-Em- 

^"Weniger  eudamonistisch  ist  keine  Philosophie  als  die 
Nietzsches,  den  man  einen  Genussphilosophen  zu  nennen  gewagt 
hat."     (Meyer,  689.) 


THE  GOSPEL  OF  NIETZSCHE  73 

peror"  as  in  Mr.  London's  tale,  may  plausi- 
bly argue  that  he  incarnates  the  will  to 
power  in  a  modern  pacific  and  industrial 
society,  and  is  preparing  the  way  for  the 
superman.  None  the  less  is  it  true  that 
what  revolted  Nietzsche  above  all  things 
was  the  millennium  of  the  utilitarian  com- 
fort-idolater, whether  individuahst  or  so- 
cialist. 

The  religion  of  valour  is  no  bad  name  for 
this  side  of  Nietzsche's  teaching.  No  one 
need  be  at  pains  to  quarrel  with  his  inculca- 
tion of  heroism.     As  he  says  of  his  disciples : 

"The  type  of  my  disciples — to  such 
men  as  concern  me  in  any  way  I  wish 
suffering,  desolation,  sickness,  ill-treat- 
ment, indignities  of  all  kinds.  I  wish 
them  to  be  acquainted  with  profound 
self-contempt,  with  the  martyrdom  of 
self-distrust,  with  the  misery  of  the  de- 
feated: I  have  no  pity  for  them;  be- 
cause I  wish  them  to  have  the  only  thing 
which  to-day  proves  whether  a  man  has 


74  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

any  value  or  not,  namely,  the  capacity  of 
sticking  to  his  guns."  ^ 

The  ground  of  all  this  is,  that  the  fulness 
of  life  is  won  only  this  way.  Risk  and  pain 
are  needful  for  the  tempering  of  the  steel  of 
spirit.  In  this  he  preaches  a  doctrine  pre- 
cisely similar  to  that  of  our  Lord:  "Whoso 
loseth  his  life  shall  save  it."  It  is,  in  fact, 
the  doctrine  of  the  Cross,  Uttle  as  Nietzsche 
seems  aware  of  this. 

To  Nietzsche  Life,  development,  is  the 
one  fact.  Uavra  pel  ovBev  fievec,^  There  is 
neither  being  nor  spirit  nor  matter  nor 
individual  nor  universe — all  is  becoming.^ 
Every  conception  involving  substance  is  a 
mere  illusion  of  language  created  by  our 

1  Will  to  Power,  II,  p.  333,  §  910. 

2  (Simmel,  op.  cit.,  262.)  "So  ruht  seine  ganze  Lehre  auf  dem 
dogma tischen  Imperativ:  das  Leben  soil  sein." 

3"Es  giebt  weder  Geist,  noeh  Vernunft,  noch  Denken,  noch 
Bewusstsein,  noch  Seele,  noch  Wille,  noch  Wahrheit.  Alles  Fik- 
tionen  die  unbrauchbar  sind.  Es  handelt  sich  nicht  um  'Subjekt 
und  Objekt,'  sondern  um  eine  bestimmte  Thierart,  welche  nnr 
unter  einer  gewdssen  relativen  Richtigkeit,  vor  allem  Regelmas- 
sigkeit  ihrer  Wahrnehmungen  (so  dass  sie  Erfahrung  kapitalisieren 
kann)  gedeiht. 

"Die  Erkenntniss  arbeitet  als  Werkzeug  der  Macht.  So  Hegt 
es  auf  der  Hand,  dass  sie  wachst  mit  jedem  Mehr  von  Macht." 
(II,  770.) 


THE  GOSPEL  OF  NIETZSCHE  75 

habit  of  chopping  up  the  world,  so  as  to  con- 
trol it.  Strictly  speaking,  there  is  no  world, 
only  a  perpetual  flow  of  becoming.  That 
becoming,  that  energy  (you  will  at  once 
recall  the  elan  vital  of  M.  Bergson,  and  the 
eternal  flux  of  Heraclitus) — is  wrongly 
conceived  if  it  is  thought  of  as  the  will 
to  live.  There  cannot  be  a  will  to  live. 
That  would  be  supposing  something  ante- 
rior to  life.  Life  is.  What  does  it  mean  ? 
A  will  for  more  and  more  and  ever  more;  in 
other  words,  a  will  to  power.  This  is  the 
one  reality.  Every  other  picture  of  the 
world,  every  other  living  piece  of  the  world, 
ourselves  included,  is  merely  a  distorted 
image  of  this  reality.  As  he  puts  it  in  an 
eloquent  passage  at  the  close  of  the  Will  to 
Power: 

"Do  ye  know  what  Hhe  universe'  is  to 
my  mind  .^  Shall  I  show  it  to  you  in  my 
mirror.^  This  universe  is  a  monster  of 
energy,  without  beginning  or  end;  a  fixed 
and   brazen    quantity   of   energy    which 


76  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

grows  neither  bigger  nor  smaller,  which 
does  not  consume  itself,  but  only  alters 
its  face;  as  a  whole  its  bulk  is  immutable, 
it  is  a  household  without  either  losses  or 
gains,  but  likewise  without  increase  and 
without  sources  of  revenue,  surrounded  by 
nonentity  as  by  a  frontier.  It  is  nothing 
vague  or  wasteful,  it  does  not  stretch  into 
infinity,  but  is  a  definite  quantum  of 
energy  located  in  a  limited  space,  and  not 
in  space  which  would  be  anywhere  empty. 
It  is  rather  energy  everywhere,  the  play 
of  forces  and  force-waves,  at  the  same 
time  one  and  many,  agglomerating  here 
and  diminishing  there,  a  sea  of  forces 
storming  and  raging  in  itself,  for  ever 
changing,  for  ever  rolling  back  over  incal- 
culable ages  to  recurrence,  with  an  ebb 
and  flow  of  its  forms,  producing  the  most 
complicated  things  out  of  the  most  simple 
structures;  producing  the  most  ardent, 
most  savage,  and  most  contradictory 
things  out  of  the  quietest,  most  rigid,  and 
most  frozen  material,  and  then  returning 


THE  GOSPEL  OF  NIETZSCHE  77 

from  multifariousness  to  uniformity,  from 
the  play  of  contradictions  back  into  the 
delight  of  consonance,  saying  yea  unto 
itself,  even  in  this  homogeneity  of  its 
courses  and  ages,  for  ever  blessing  itself  as 
something  which  recurs  for  all  eternity — 
a  becoming  which  knows  not  satiety,  or 
disgust,  or  weariness:  this,  my  Dionysian 
world  of  eternal  self -creation,  of  eternal 
self-destruction,  this  mysterious  world  of 
twofold  voluptuousness;  this,  my  'Be- 
yond Good  and  Evil,'  without  aim,  un- 
less there  is  an  aim  in  the  bliss  of  the  cir- 
cle; without  will,  unless  a  ring  must  by 
nature  keep  good-will  to  itself — would 
you  have  a  name  for  my  world  ?  A  solu- 
tion of  all  your  riddles  ?  Do  ye  also  want 
a  hght,  ye  most  concealed,  strongest,  and 
most  undaunted  men  of  the  blackest  mid- 
night ?  This  world  is  the  Will  to  Power 
— and  nothing  else !  And  even  ye  your- 
selves are  this  will  to  power — and  nothing 
besides !"  ^ 

1  Will  to  Power,  II,  431,  2. 


78  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

This  will  to  power  is  everything;  the  goal 
and  development  of  spirit  no  less  than  of 
matter.  In  truth,  there  is  neither  one  nor 
the  other,  but  only  this  chaos  of  warring 
forces,  all  with  the  one  end.  The  will  to 
power  determines  the  ''law"  of  gravitation, 
the  process  of  the  planets,  the  origin  of 
species,  the  course  of  human  history.  It  is 
the  reality  behind  all  science,  all  art,  and  all 
religion.  Every  act  which  seems  to  deny  it 
is  nothing  but  a  mask  to  insure  its  deeper 
predominance.  Since  this  will  to  power  is 
the  one  reality,  and  since,  also,  it  has  no 
meaning,  for  there  is  no  goal  of  evolution,  no 
"far-off  divine  event."  ''The  world  is  not 
an  organism,  it  is  a  chaos,"  blind  and  with- 
out purpose  or  meaning,  with  neither  end 
nor  beginning,  after  passing  through  every 
possible  combination  it  must  ultimately  re- 
peat itself.  The  world  is  thus  a  clock  run- 
ning down,  and  then  self-winding  to  an  ex- 
actly similar  course.  Since  all  this  is  the 
one  will  to  power,  individuality  can  be  no 
more  than  an  appearance  of  it.     Individuals 


THE  GOSPEL  OF  NIETZSCHE  79 

do  not  in  any  real  sense  exist — any  more 
than  they  do  on  the  system  of  Schopen- 
hauer.^ Nietzsche  lays  stress  on  personal- 
ity. His  object  is  to  secure  strong  individ- 
uals. Yet  I  do  not  see  how  on  his  system 
they  have  any  reaUty;  they  are  the  mere 
soap-bubbles  blown  for  the  nonce  by  the 
will  to  power;  the  superman  is  only  the 
largest  and  most  highly  coloured  soap-bub- 
ble. 

Since  the  will  to  power  is  all,  and  since 
moral  value  is  denied  to  it,  to  talk  of  wrong- 
doing is  absurd.  All  actions,  after  they 
have  taken  place,  are  holy.  Will,  however, 
which  can  make  all  things  new,  finds  one 
obstacle.  It  cannot  reverse  the  past.  In 
revenge  for  this  impotence,  it  invents  the 
torment  of  evil  conscience.  In  theory 
Nietzsche  rejects  all  moral  valuations.  In 
practice  he  reasserts  them.  Otherwise  there 
is  no  meaning  in  his  attacks  on  decadence, 
and  all  forms  of  decadent  ethics,  whether 

^  "  Egoismus  ist  ebenso  wie  'Selbstlosigkeit'  eine  populare  Fic- 
tion; insgleichen  das  'Individuum'  die  'Seele.'"  (Werke,  XIII, 
148.) 


80  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

philosophic  pessimism  Uke  that  of  Schopen- 
hauer, or  a  rehgion  Hke  Christianity,  or 
any  formal  adoption  of  the  golden  rule. 
All  these  in  Nietzsche's  view  are  equally 
a  no-saying  to  life;  they  are  a  crushing  of 
the  will  to  power,  a  forcing  down  of  the 
strong  and  adventurous  in  favour  of  the 
anaemic  (in  whose  interest  commonly  the 
rules  were  framed).  Every  form  of  self- 
denial  and  humility  is  thus  to  be  con- 
demned, except  on  one  condition.  These 
qualities  are  the  note  of  all  those  who  are  by 
nature  slaves.  Among  such  they  are  to  be 
fostered,  not  for  any  good  they  do  to  the 
slaves,  but  because  they  make  them  more 
ready  of  service  to  their  masters. 

Everything  is  power;  the  world  is  always 
in  flux;  it  never  is.  Supermen  are  life  repre- 
sented by  its  highest  moments  of  power,  its 
concentrations  in  a  classical  epoch,  an  im- 
perial race,  a  triumphant  personality.  Spe- 
cies is  but  a  name.  Mankind  is  in  no  sense 
real  or  ideal,  a  unity.  To  talk  of  Jiomo  surriy 
humani  nihil  a  me  alienum  puto  is  to  talk 


THE  GOSPEL  OF  NIETZSCHE  81 

nonsense.  That  maxim  is  the  low-water 
mark  of  development,  a  symbol  of  the  mon- 
grel world  over  which  Rome  ruled,  the 
mishmash  of  the  mob.  The  problem  is  to 
realise  the  highest  type  of  man.  This  will 
be  produced  not  by  raising  the  people,  but 
by  producing  a  select  caste  of  born  com- 
manders. The  only  sense  of  moral  virtue 
is  command,  whether  inside  the  individ- 
ual or  in  relation  to  others.^  [A  state,  says 
Nietzsche,  is  simply  "nature's  roundabout 
way  of  making  a  few  great  individuals." 
At  the  moment  under  the  influence  of  ideals, 
which  are  Christian  in  essence  if  not  in 
name,  the  mob  is  too  powerful  for  the  strong 
personahties.  That  is  why  Napoleon  failed 
— ^and  Cesare  Borgia.  Our  object  should  be 
to  bring  about  conditions  in  which  such  men 
are  the  rule  and  no  longer  the  exception.    So 

*  "Das  Nachdenken  iiber  Freiheit  und  Unfreilieit  des  Willens, 
hat  mich  zu  einer  Losung  dieses  Problems  gefiihrt,  die  man  sich 
griindlicher  mid  abschliessender  gar  nicht  denken  kami — nam- 
lich  zm*  Beseitigmig  des  Problemis  vermoge  der  erlangten  Ein- 
sicht:  es  giebt  gar  keinen  Willen,  weder  einen  freien  noch  einen 
imfreien."     (Nietzsche,  Werke,  XIH,  263.) 

"Der  freie  Mensch  ist  ein  Staat  und  eine  Gesellschaft  von 
Individuen."     (Nietzsche,  Werke,  XH,  116.) 


/ 


82  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

far  from  the  weak  needing  protection  against 
the  strong,  it  is  the  strong  who  need  protec- 
tion against  the  unified  jealousy  of  the  weak, 
powerful  only  by  numbers.  The  end  can  be 
reached  only  by  securing  a  ruling  race  or 
class,  and  by  such  subordination  and  breed- 
ing as  will  keep  individuaKties  strong.  To 
such  an  end  the  rest  of  mankind  are  only 
tools.  In  themselves  they  have  no  valueTJ 
To  take  an  instance,  in  art  a  genius  gives 
value  to  his  epoch,  he  is  not  the  mere  resul- 
tant of  the  other  individuals  in  his  milieu. 
The  aristocrat  exists  for  himself  and  for  his 
order,  not  to  serve  the  community.  Yet 
even  the  aristocracy  does  not,  hke  a  body  of 
voluptuaries,  exist  for  itself  alone.  Its  pur- 
pose (often  unknown  to  its  members)  is  to 
produce  a  higher  type  of  man.  Therefore  it 
must  have  experience  both  of  the  heights 
and  the  depths.  Its  training  must  be 
Spartan,  only  more  severe.  It  must  shrink 
from  nothing.  All  the  old  rules  of  morals 
vanish  before  it.  The  Ubermensch  is  beyond 
good    and    evil.  /Morality    exists   for    the 


THE  GOSPEL  OF  NIETZSCHE  83 

mediocre,  the  herd,  the  inhabitants  of  the 
world,  in  which  you  and  I  are  ahve.  Europe 
is  becoming  more  and  more  one;  mediocrity 
is  becoming  more  and  more  and  more  medi- 
ocre. As  against  this  background  of  com- 
mon people,  united  by  a  slave  morality, 
there  is  at  the  same  time  gradually  defining 
itself,  at  present  dimly  seen,  a  master  caste 
of  free,  adventurous  spirits.  They  prepare 
the  way  for  the  superman.  He  is  not  yet 
here.  The  succeeding  ages,  even  at  their 
highest,  are  but  the  forerunners  of  the 
supermen  of  the  future.  To  that  far  goal 
they  must  sacrifice  themselves.  This  new 
nobility  exists  for  itseK  alone.  No  sym- 
pathy or  fellow-feeling  with  the  slaves  who 
are  its  instruments  is  to  stain  its  sense  of 
distinction. 

Distinction,  indeed,  the  "pathos  of  dis- 
tance," must  increase,  until  it  reaches  a 
higher  point  than  that  between  a  Roman 
Senator  and  his  slaves.  No  existing  aris- 
tocracy has  enough  of  it.  Nietzsche  ad- 
mired the  Prussian  officer   corps  with  its 


84  THE  WELL  TO  FREEDOM 

exclusive  claims  and  discipline.^  Not,  how- 
ever, from  the  Germans  does  he  hope  for 
much;  he  treats  them  as  more  hostile  to  cul- 
ture than  even  the  English,  and  declares 
that  the  presence  of  a  German  retards  his 
digestion. 2  It  is  the  "good  Europeans"  who 
are  the  beginning  of  the  master  race  of  the 
future.  This  does  not  mean  the  intellec- 
tuals in  the  university  sense.     All  his  life 


^{Lehen,  II,  617.)  "Man  hat  behauptet,  dass  mein  Bruder 
stets  eine  starke  Vorliebe  fiir  den  Adel  und  das  deutsche  Offizier- 
corps  ausgesprochen  habe.  Mit  vollem  Recht — nur  darf  man  den 
Begriff  'Adel'  nicht  zu  eng  fassen.  In  unserm  demokratischen 
Zeitalter  empfand  er  es  als  eine  Wohlthat,  dass  es  noch  gesell- 
schaftliche  Klassen  gab,  die  den  Muth  batten,  sich  abzusondern, 
die  mannlichsten  Tugenden  alien  andern  voranzustellen,  und 
welche  Befehlen  und  Gehorchen  in  der  Vollkommenheit  kennen 
und  lernen.  Allerdings  wiinschte  er,  dass  der  Adel  und  das  Oflfi- 
ziercorps  strenger  in  der  Forderung  guter  Herkunft  bei  der  Ehe 
sei,  scharfer  in  dem  Sich-Abheben  von  dem  Andern,  tapferer  und 
kraftiger  in  dem  sich-selbst  Ziel-setzen." 

Cf.  Nietzsche's  own  words : 

"Die  Zukimft  der  deutschen  Kultur  ruht  auf  den  Sohnen  der 
preussischen  Offiziere."  {Nietzsche  Nachlass,  Taschen-Ausgabe, 
VIII,  494.) 

2  "So  ergiebt  sich  die  seltsame  Verbindung,  dass  ein  durchaus 
intemational-gesinnter  Mensch,  ein  Verkenner  und  Verachter  des 
Deutschtums,  das  Geheimniss  und  den  *Geist'  der  erausspricht,die 
als  specifisch-typische  Deutsche  sich  am  lautesten  gebarden  .  .  . 
werden."     (Tonnies,  Der  Nietzsche  Kultus,  10.) 

"England's  Klein-Geisterei  ist  die  grosse  Gefahr  jetzt  auf  der 
Erde.  Ich  sehe  mehr  Hang  zu  Grosse  in  den  Gefuhlen  der  rus- 
sischen  NihiUsten:  als  in  denen  der  englischen  Utilitarier." 
{Nachlass,  8,  495.) 


THE  GOSPEL  OF  NIETZSCHE  85 

Nietzsche  was  tilting  at  the  culture-PhiUs- 
tines.  He  declares  that  it  is  not  intellect 
that  ennobles  blood,  but  blood  that  enno- 
bles intellect,  while  a  sedentary  life  is  the 
sin  against  the  Holy  Ghost.  What  he  wants 
is  a  more  highly  educated  chivalry  without 
the  strong  Christian  element  in  the  chival- 
rous ideal — a  race  of  Alcibiades,  and  Borgia, 
freer,  less  bookish,  less  second-hand  than 
the  modern  men  of  culture.  Neither  the 
Almanack  de  Gotha  nor  Minerva  will  give 
him  what  he  wants.  The  peasantry  has 
some  of  the  qualities  better  developed  than 
the  modern  culture  of  the  newspaper  and 
the  cafe.  This  class,  when  it  is  established, 
will  achieve  a  transvaluation  of  all  values. 
It  will  retranslate  the  word  good  into  its 
older  and  more  pagan  equivalents,  noble, 
proud,  self-centred,  courageous,  barbarous. 
Some  have  debated  as  to  how  far  Nietz- 
sche was  looking  to  a  new  development 
of  man,  as  a  species.  Did  he  think  that 
evolution  would  produce  a  new  species,  dif- 
fering from  man  as  much  as  man  differs 


86  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

from  the  ape?  This  is  denied  by  his  sister. 
But  we  must  treat  her  statements  with 
reserve.  She  writes  apologetic.  Nietzsche 
is  ever  saying  that  man  is  not  a  goal  but  a 
bridge — that  man  is  something  that  must  be 
surpassed. 

Nietzsche,  despite  his  dislike  of  Darwin 
and  contempt  for  the  Darwinians,  was  much 
under  the  influence  of  Darwin.  Probably 
at  times  he  dallied  with  the  notion  that  the 
(Jbermensch  expressed  a  physiological  devel- 
opment.^ But  it  cannot  be  said  to  be  a  rul- 
ing thought.  The  Ubermensch  is  a  vague 
term:  it  must  be  taken  to  express  Nietzsche's 
dissatisfaction  with  man  as  he  now  is,  and 
his  behef  that  it  is  only  by  a  radical  height- 
ening of  what  to  him  are  the  noble  elements 
in  his  nature,  that  things  can  be  bettered.^ 
It  means  a  higher  type  of  man,  something 


i"AucliderhochstebleibtemMensch.  .  .  .  Der  tlbermensch 
kann  nicht  das  Endziel  der  Menschen  sein;  denn  was  ware 
dann  das  Endziel  der  tJbermenschen  selber?"  (Riehl,  Friedrich 
Nietzsche,  der  Kiinstler  und  der  Denker,  132.) 

2  "  Der  Ubermensch  ist  nichts  als  die  Kristallf  orm  des  Gedankens, 
dass  der  Mensch  sich  iiber  sein  Gegenwartsstadium  hinausent- 
wickeln  kann  und  also  soil."     (Simmel,  253.) 


THE  GOSPEL  OF  NIETZSCHE  87 

better  in  the  Nietzschean  sense  of  better 
than  we  have  now;  a  new  kind  of  superior 
persons  or  race  of  persons.  The  superman 
is  a  new  creature,  not  merely  the  race  as  it 
now  is  better  educated.^ 

That  raises  a  more  important  question  i^ 
Is  the  superman  an  individual  or  a  class? 
Here  once  more  Nietzsche  is  not  consistent. 
Much  of  his  language  favours  the  vk  s?  that 
the  superman  is  an  individual,  or  a  n  imber 
of  individuals;  the  strong  man  with  intellect 
and  no  restraint.  Much  points  that  way  in 
his  taking  of  individuals  such  as  Napoleon, 
Cesare  Borgia,  the  individual  man  of  virtu 
in  Machiavelli's  sense,  the  need  of  freedom 
from  all  morals,  the  nullity  of  communal 
claims,  the  statement  that  all  fellowship 
is  degrading,  the  value  set  upon  solitude. 

^Werke,  XIV,  §  281:  "Das  Christenthum  hat  darin  Recht: 
man  kann  einen  neuen  Menschen  anziehen." 

2  On  the  question  whether  the  superman  is  an  order  or  an  indi- 
vidual, cf.  especially  Sinimel,  Schopenhauer  und  Nietzsche,  and 
Dorner,  Pessimismus,  Nietzsche  und  Naturalismus ;  Simmel  be- 
lieves it  to  be  a  race;  Dorner  takes  the  new  Herren-Order  as  pre- 
paratory to  the  superman.  Belarl  in  his  book  on  Wagners  und 
Nietzsches  Freundschafts-Tragodie  quotes  eight  varieties  of  the 
superman. 


88  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

Yet,  on  the  other  hand,  we  have  his  definite 
statement  that  what  he  looks  for  is  a  new 
hierarchy  of  ranks,  that  his  works  are  di- 
rected to  the  new  master  class  and  the  often- 
repeated  injunction  that  the  higher  man  is 
to  endm^e  discipline  and  suffer.  The  truth 
is,  that  in  view  of  Nietzsche's  repudiation  of 
sheer  egoism,  the  problem  is  immaterial. 
We  may  say,  perhaps,  that  his  supermen 
will  be  separate  individuals,  arising  out  of 
but  not  identical  with  the  master  class, 
formed  by  discipline  to  severity;  or  we  may 
say  CX.C.C  they  are  a  set  of  individuals.  But 
in  any  case  he  allows  them  no  absolute  free- 
dom. They  are  to  be  governed  by  the 
ideal  of  distinction,  ^'Vornehmheit,''  gentle- 
manliness,  as  we  might  say.  They  are  to  be 
free  of  morals  in  the  sympathetic  sense,  but 
more  than  others  are  they  to  be  bound  by 
the  morality  of  courage.  The  superman  is 
to  incarnate  personality  at  its  highest,  in- 
volving self-control,  adventure,  fine  man- 
ners, and  powers  of  command.  If  it  is  a 
superclass  of  which  Nietzsche  is  thinking. 


THE  GOSPEL  OF  NIETZSCHE  89 

he  would  not  allow  mere  heredity  apart 
from  discipline  and  fitness  to  be  a  claim  to 
membership.  If  it  is  an  individual  or  indi- 
viduals, clearly  again  they  will  not  be  super- 
men merely  by  pleasing  themselves,  but 
must  incarnate  certain  qualities  of  ascend- 
ing life.^  The  social  element  is  never  en- 
tirely absent  from  Nietzsche's  thought, 
however  much  some  of  his  followers  may 
repudiate  it.  Nothing  is  farther  from  his 
intention  than  to  pander  to  mere  unbridled 
egoism  in  the  individual,  although,  despite 
his  intention,  that  is  very  often  the  result  of 
his  teaching.  At  any  rate,  there  can  be  no 
doubt  that  Nietzsche  looked  forward  to  a 
new  aristocracy.  It  is  to  be  a  society  re- 
cruited upon  blood  and  training,  resting 
upon  a  slave  system,  kept  pure  by  eugenic 
methods.^     It  will  develop  in  common  the 

^  "Zarathustra  gliicklich  dariiber,  dass  der  Kampf  der  Stande 
voriiber  ist,  und  jetzt  endlich  Zeit  ist  fiir  eine  Rangordnung  der 
Individuen.  Hass  auf  das  demokratische  Nivellirungs-System  ist 
nur  im  Vordergrund:  eigentlich  ist  er  sehr  froh,  dass  dies  so  weit 
ist.  Nun  kann  er  seine  Aufgabe  losen."  (Nietzsche,  Werke,  XI, 
417.) 

-  On  Nietzsche's  relation  to  eugenics  and  biology  see  Richter, 
Nietzsche  et  les  theories  hiologiques  contemporaines. 


90  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

virtues  characteristic  of  an  aristocracy,  and 
it  is  to  produce  forms  of  culture  higher  than 
anything  hitherto  known — to  carry  forward 
the  work  of  the  Romans,  as  they  might  have 
developed,  had  not  they  been  attacked  by 
the  corrupting  virus  of  Christianity.  This 
aristocracy  is  not  the  servant  of  society,  but, 
on  the  other  hand,  it  is  not  its  own  master; 
it  exists  for  the  raising  of  the  type  man. 
Rome,  Nietzsche  says  often,  offered  the 
nearest  approach  to  his  ideal.  The  new 
rulers  will  no  more  regard  themselves  as 
servants  of  the  mob  than  a  Roman  would 
think  of  duties  towards  his  slaves.  Rather 
they  will  incarnate  the  ideal  of  Dionysos; 
this  in  one  place  he  seems  to  identify  with 
barbarism  and  sensuality.  On  Nietzsche's 
principles  we  might  look  forward  a  millen- 
nium or  two  and  see  in  a  vision  a  race  of 
masters,  seated  in  a  grander  Colosseum, 
once  more  urging  on  torturers  to  whip  their 
slave-gladiators  into  courage  by  white-hot 
electric  rods,  in  order  that  their  sesthetie 
sensibilities  may  be  stimulated.     We  need 


THE  GOSPEL  OF  NIETZSCHE  91 

not  suppose  that  Nietzsche  desired  this. 
But  it  would  be  a  natural  result  of  the  ac- 
ceptance of  his  principles.  Clearly,  he  says 
that  he  wants  more  barbarism,  that  un- 
counted sufferings  are  needed  to  produce  his 
new  lords;  to  this  end  all  other  men  are 
mere  tools.  Nietzsche  is  not  to  be  blamed 
for  asserting  that  higher  powers  in  life  are 
worth  having  at  the  cost  of  suffering;  or 
that  if  culture  is  to  reach  a  higher  stage 
much  must  be  gone  through  for  it.  Where 
he  is  wrong  is  in  his  attempt  to  purchase 
these  goods,  not  only  apart  from  the  world 
at  large,  but  deliberately  at  its  cost.  His 
system,  if  it  is  to  be  called  a  system,  is  a 
new  return  to  Nature;  less  idyllic  than  that 
of  the  eighteenth  century  with  its  cry: 

"  I  am  as  free  as  Nature  first  made  man 
Ere  the  base  laws  of  servitude  began 
When  wild  in  woods  the  noble  savage  ran."  ^ 

Sick  of  the  stuffy  atmosphere  of  academic 
lecture-halls,  Nietzsche  cries  for  the  free  and 

^  Dryden,  Conquest  of  Granada. 


92  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

open  air.  Wearied  with  domestic  virtues 
and  morality  in  petto,  he  hails  barbaric 
grandeur.  From  the  mean  streets  of  mod- 
ern civilisation  he  calls  men  to  Alpine 
heights  of  danger  and  triumph,  despising 
above  all  things  utilitarian  democracy  and 
the  optimism  of  inevitable  progress,  with  its 
gospel  of  the  sofa-millennium.  Nietzsche 
boldly  proclaims  life  to  be  immoral  and 
preaches  a  gospel  for  the  few.  "Pulchrum 
est  paucorum  hominum"  is  one  of  his  favour- 
ite tags.  His  desire  is  to  herald  a  new  Re- 
naissance when  man  "free  from  moralic  acid" 
shall  display  the  splendours  of  individual- 
ity, and  a  brighter  Borgia  shall  win  a  more 
enduring  triumph.  Nietzsche  was  angry 
at  being  compared  with  Carlyle.  Yet  in 
some  respects  the  superman  is  curiously 
like  Carlyle's  strong  man.  Nor  need  we 
forget  that  while  Carlyle  bade  men  fall 
down  and  worship  Frederick  the  Great, 
Nietzsche  declared  that  the  present  Kaiser 
would  be  able  to  understand  the  Will  to 
Power.    Maybe  he  was  right. 


THE  GOSPEL  OF  NIETZSCHE  93 

This  Will  to  Power  is  the  expression  of 
life.  The  yea-saying  to  Hfe,  i,  e.,  to  all 
reality  and  not  merely  to  a  part  of  it  is 
the  fundamental  maxim  of  Nietzsche.  But, 
he  argues,  if  we  are  to  say  yes  to  any  mo- 
ment, we  ought  logically  to  desire  that 
moment  to  recur.  Besides,  the  energy  in 
the^ world  is  limited  in  amount.  Had  there 
been  any  goal  of  all  this  striving  it  would 
long  ago  have  been  manifest.  Since  no 
such  goal  has  been  seen,  and  since  the  num- 
ber of  combinations  is  limited,  Nietzsche 
deems  it  certain  that  the  whole  universe  is 
turning  for  ever  on  its  axis.  Every  event 
even  in  its  minute  detail  is  repeated  in- 
finitely. This  doctrine  of  the  eternal  re- 
currence is  not  much  dwelt  upon  by  Nietz- 
sche's disciples.  Yet  it  is  integral  to  his 
thought.  He  himself  declares  it  to  be  the 
central  doctrine  of  Zarathustra.  Early  in 
his  life  in  the  second  of  the  Essays  Out  of 
Season  Nietzsche  had  adumbrated  the  idea. 
Not  until  later  did  it  become  one  of  his 
chief  articles  of  faith.     The  notion  is  the 


94  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

ancient  one  of  the  Annus  Platonicus. 
First  of  all,  the  thought  that  he  would 
have  to  go  through  everything  over  again 
filled  Nietzsche  with  unutterable  repul- 
sion. Afterwards  he  contemplated  it  with 
a  certain  mystic  awe.  Vainly  does  his 
sister,  Frau  Forster-Nietzsche,  endeavour 
to  minimise  its  importance  to  him.  The 
despised  Frau  Lou  Andreas-Salome  is  more 
trustworthy  on  this  point.  One  or  two 
passages  will  serve  to  set  it  forth: 

*'  'Behold,'  I  continued,  Hhis  moment ! 
From  this  gateway  called  moment  a 
long,  eternal  lane  runneth  backward : 
behind  us  lieth  an  eternity. 

"'Must  not  all  that  can  run  of  things 
have  run  already  through  this  lane? 
Must  not  what  can  happen  of  things 
have  happened,  have  been  done  and 
have  run  past  here? 

"'And  if  all  things  have  happened  al- 
ready: what  dost  thou  dwarf  think  of 
this  moment?  Must  not  this  gateway 
have  existed  previously  also? 


THE  GOSPEL  OF  NIETZSCHE  95 

"  'And  are  not  thus  all  things  knotted 
fast  together  that  this  moment  draweth 
behind  it  all  future  things?  Conse- 
quently— draweth  itself  as  well  ? 

"Tor  what  can  run  of  things — in  that 
long  lane  out  there,  it  must  run  once  more  ! 

"'And  this  slow  spider  creeping  in  the 
moonshine,  and  this  moonshine  itself, 
and  I  and  thou  in  the  gateway  whisper- 
ing together,  whispering  of  eternal  things, 
must  not  we  all  have  existed  once  in 
the  past  ? 

"'And  must  not  we  recur  and  run  in 
that  other  lane,  out  there,  before  us, 
in  that  long,  haunted  lane — must  we 
not  recur  eternally?' 

"Thus,  I  spake  and  ever  more  gently. 
For  I  was  afraid  of  mine  own  thoughts 
and  back-thoughts."  ^ 

Here  is  a  more  prosaic  expression  of  the 
same  idea: 

"If  the  universe  may  be  conceived  as 
a  definite  quantity  of  energy,  as  a  def- 

^  Zarathustra,  230. 


96  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

inite  number  of  centres  of  energy — and 
every  other  concept  remains  indefinite 
and  therefore  useless — it  follows  there- 
from that  the  universe  must  go  through  a 
calculable  number  of  combinations  in  the 
great  game  of  chance  which  constitutes  its 
existence.  In  infinity  at  some  moment 
or  other,  every  possible  combination 
must  once  have  been  realised;  not  only 
this,  but  it  must  have  been  realised  an 
infinite  number  of  times.  And  inas- 
much as  between  every  one  of  these 
combinations  and  its  next  recurrence 
every  other  possible  combination  would 
necessarily  have  been  undergone,  and 
since  every  one  of  these  combinations 
would  determine  the  whole  series  in  the 
same  order,  a  circular  movement  of 
absolutely  identical  series  is  thus  demon- 
strated: the  universe  is  thus  shown  to 
be  a  circular  movement  which  has  al- 
ready repeated  itself  an  infinite  num- 
ber of  times,  and  which  plays  its  game 
for  all  eternity.     This  conception  is  not 


THE  GOSPEL  OF  NIETZSCHE  97 

simply  materialistic;  for  if  it  were  this, 
it  would  not  involve  an  infinite  recur- 
rence of  identical  cases,  but  a  finite 
state.  Owing  to  the  fact  that  the  uni- 
verse has  not  reached  this  finite  state, 
materialism  shows  itself  to  be  but  an 
imperfect  and  provisional  hypothesis."  ^ 

The   doctrine   of   the   Eternal   Recurrence 
served  three  purposes: 

1.  It  justified  a  certain  mystical  at- 
titude of  reverence  by  giving  an  element 
of  eternity  to  every  act.  This  would  other- 
wise have  been  lacking  in  a  system  accord- 
ing to  which  all  things  are  for  ever  in  rapid 
movement.  Nietzsche  said  that  it  marks 
the  nearest  possible  approach  of  the  ideas  of 
Being  and  Becoming.  His  frequent  phrase, 
"Eternity  is  sought  by  all  dehght,"  is  a  ne- 
cessity of  the  artist-nature. 

2.  It  supplied  the  place  of  a  faith  in 
immortality.  Nietzsche  was  a  forward- 
looking    spirit.      He    could    not    face    the 

1  The  Will  to  Power,  H,  430. 


98  THE  WELL  TO  FREEDOM 

thought  of  extinction.  DisbeHeving  in 
any  transcendent  world,  he  had  no  hope 
of  any  individual  life  beyond,  no  resur- 
rection, not  even  its  pale  philosophic  coun- 
terpart, the  immortality  of  the  soul.  Nor 
is  absorption  in  the  All  of  any  attraction, 
if  there  be  no  unity  in  things.  The  eternal 
recurrence  does  assure  a  sort  of  immortal- 
ity, although  purely  unconscious.  It  pro- 
vides the  only  form  in  which  Nietzsche 
could  preserve  something  of  the  values 
of  immortality,  while  keeping  clear  of  all 
faith  in  an  unseen  world. 

3.  This  doctrine,  as  Professor  Simmel 
points  out,  gave  Nietzsche  the  right  to 
formulate  a  new  canon  of  ethics,  akin  to 
that  of  Kant.  Kant  had  said:  "Act  so 
that  the  principle  of  thy  action  may  be  a 
universal  law."  Nietzsche  would  say,  or 
might  say:  "Act  as  though  your  action 
were  to  be  eternally  repeated."  ^  Such  a 
canon  gives   dignity  to  the  moment  and 

*  "Meine  Lehre  sagt:  so  leben  dass  du  wiinschen  musst,  wieder 
zu  leben,  ist  die  Aufgabe — du  wirst  es  jedenfalls."  (Nietzsche, 
Werke,  XII,  64,  §  116.) 


THE  GOSPEL  OF  NIETZSCHE  99 

preserves  the  doer  from  what  is  base. 
Such  words  as  base  and  noble  may  seem 
strange  in  a  writer  who  professedly  repu- 
diates all  moral  responsibility.  Nietzsche 
is  radically  inconsistent.  His  yea-saying 
to  life  might  mean  only  that  we  accept 
whatever  happens  after  the  event.  But 
since  Nietzsche  regards  all  remorse  as  due 
to  illusion,  and  repudiates  freedom  of 
choice,  he  can  have  no  right  to  rank  acts. 
Yet  he  does  so.  His  whole  system  is  based 
on  selection,  on  the  notion  that  some  kind 
of  actions  are  of  worth  and  some  are  not, 
although  these  differ  for  different  classes.^ 
On  no  other  hypothesis  can  his  violence  of 
abuse  of  Christian  ethics  be  justified,  even 
on  Nietzsche's  own  showing.  Briefly,  the 
morals  of  Nietzsche  consist  in  an  exalta- 

^The  following  passage  gives  Nietzsche's  own  account  of  his 
jBrst  perception  of  the  Will  to  Power,  and  shows  how  it  arose  to 
counteract  the  plethora  of  sympathy  aroused  by  the  sufferings 
of  the  wounded: 

"So  voUstandig  der  Ausdruck  einer  Rasse  die  siegen,  herrschen 
oder  untergehen  will — 'da  fiihlte  ich  wohl,  meine  Sch wester,' 
fiigte  mein  Bruder  hinzu,  *dass  der  starkste  und  hochste  Wille 
zum  Leben  nicht  in  einem  elenden  Ringen  urn's  Dasein  zum  Aus- 
druck kommt,  sondern  als  Wille  zum  Kampf,  als  Wille  zur 
Macht  und  tJbermacht.'"     (Leben,  H,  683.) 


100  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

tion  of  courage  and  a  rejection  of  all  other 
moral  values,  and  a  sense  of  the  value  of 
distinction  and  individuality.  "Live  dan- 
gerously," is  his  motto,  and  live  differently 
from  others.^ 

The  romantic  expression  of  sheer  nat- 
uralism is,  perhaps,  the  best  account  that 
can  be  given  of  this  gospel.  Nietzsche 
had  discarded  all  supernatural  values.  He 
was   not   unnaturally    disgusted   with   the 


^  The  barrenness  of  the  mere  empty  notion  of  power  is  well 
stated  here: 

"Kurz:  in  Nietzsche  verbindet  sich  der  Naturalismus  mit  der 
Romantik.  .  .  . 

"Aber  sein  oberstes  Prinzip  ist  widerspruchsvoU;  der  Wille  zur 
Macht  oder  besser  die  Machtaktionen  die  eo  ipso  Anderes  brau- 
chen,  mn  sich  auszubreiten.  Je  machtiger  eine  Aktionsgruppe,  ein 
Selbst,  um  so  ohnmachtiger  macht  sie  die  Anderen  Das  Leben 
ist  irrational  an  sich,  Kampf  mit  sich  selbst.  Von  einem  Ganzen 
der  Welt  kann  eigentlich  Keiner  reden,  und  doch  redet  er  von  dem 
Ganzen."  (Dorner,  Pessimismus,  Nietzsche  und  Naturalismus, 
189.) 

"Die  formale  Macht  wird  wie  ein  Selbstzweck  behandelt. 
Aber  die  Macht  ist  kein  Selbstzweck.  Es  kommt  darauf  an,  wozu 
die  Macht  verwendet  wird.  Weil  Kultur  da  ist,  ist  Kampf  um 
die  Kultur.  Aber  die  Kultur  ist  nicht  bloss  Mittel  fiir  die  for- 
male Macht.  Wenn  die  Macht  nur  auf  der  Ausbeutung  des 
Fremden  beruht,  was  ist  sie  an  sich  selbst  ?  Was  hat  diese  Aus- 
beutung fiii-  einen  Wert  ?  Nietzsche  redet  von  der  Vergeistigung 
der  Macht;  aber  woher  der  Geist  bei  seinem  ausschliesslich  physi- 
ologischen  Standpunkte  ?  Was  versteht  er  unter  Geist  ?  Er  hat 
ihn  in  die  metaphysische  Rumpelkammer  verwiesen  und  will  ihn 
nun  doch  wieder  zitieren."     {Ibid.,  191.) 


THE  GOSPEL  OF  NIETZSCHE  101 

prevailing  Pantheistic  idealism  of  the  Uni- 
versities. His  romantic  tendency  combined 
with  the  relics  of  the  system  of  Schopen- 
hauer to  produce  the  doctrine  of  the  Will 
to  Power.  Essentially  he  accepts  the  stand- 
point of  naturalism;  and  grafts  on  to  it 
a  religious  attitude  in  the  maxims  of  yea- 
saying  to  Life,  and  the  Eternal  Return. 
It  is  described  by  Papini  as  a  dithyrambic 
transfiguration  of  evolutionary  naturalism.^ 

^  "lo  credo  per  conto  mio  che  la  piii  espressiva  definizione  che  si 
possa  dare  della  filosofia  de  Nietzsche  sia  questa — una  transfi- 
gurazione  ditirambica  del  naturalismo  evoluzionista."  (Papini, 
op.  cit.,  238.) 


Ill 

NIETZSCHE  AND  CHRISTIANITY 

Nietzsche  regarded  it  as  one  of  his 
greatest  achievements  in  originahty,  that 
he  was  the  first  to  perceive  the  true  na- 
ture of  Christianity.^  As  we  saw,  it  is 
with  Christianity  as  a  way  of  hfe  that  he 
is  concerned.  So  far  as  it  is  a  doctrine 
of  the  other  world,  Nietzsche  always  as- 
sumes without  argument  that  it  is  a  sys- 
tem of  lies.  The  only  question  for  him  is 
what  person  or  group  of  persons  developed 
his  will  to  power  through  these  lies.    Chris- 

^  "Man  hat  bisher  das  Christenthum  immer  auf  eine  falsche, 
imd  nicht  bloss  schiichterne  Weise  angegriffen.  So  lange  man 
nicht  die  Moral  des  Christcnthums  als  Kapitalverbrechen  am 
Leben  empfindet,  haben  dessen  Vertheidiger  gutes  Spiel.  Die 
Frage  der  blossen  'Wahrheit'  des  Christenthums — sei  es  in 
Hinsicht  auf  die  Existenz  seines  Gottes,  oder  die  Geschicht- 
lichkeit  seiner  Entstehungslegende,  gar  nicht  zu  reden  von  der 
christlichen  Astronomie  und  Naturwissenschaft — ist  eine  ganz 
nebensachliche  Angelegenheit  so  lange  die  Werthfrage  der  christ- 
lichen Moral  nicht  bertihrt  ist.  Taugt  die  Moral  des  Christen- 
thums etwas,  oder  ist  sie  eine  Schandung  und  Schmach  trotz  aller 
Heiligkeit  der  Verf uhrungskiinste  ?  "     {Leben,  I,  30.) 

102 


NIETZSCHE  AND  CHRISTIANITY         103 

tianity  is  a  system  of  ethics,  and  it  must 
be  judged  alongside  of  all  other  systems 
of  ethics,  which  have  the  same  or  similar 
principles.  In  Ecce  Homo  he  recounts 
his  services  to  posterity:^ 

*'No  one  hitherto  has  felt  Christian 
morality  beneath  him;  to  that  end  there 
were  needed  light  and  remoteness  of  vi- 
sion, and  an  abysmal  psychological  depth, 
not  believed  to  be  possible  hitherto.  Up 
to  the  present.  Christian  morality  has 
been  the  Circe  of  all  thinkers — they  stood 
at  her  service.  What  man  before  my 
time  had  descended  into  the  underground 
caverns  from  out  of  which  the  poisonous 

1 "  Ich  habe  jetzt  mit  einem  Cynismus  der  welthistorisch 
werden  wird,  mich  selbst  erzahlt.  Das  Buch  heisst  Ecce  Homo, 
und  ist  ein  Attentat  ohne  die  geringste  Riicksicht  auf  den  Ge- 
kreuzigten;  es  endet  in  Donnern  und  Wetterschlagen  gegen  Alles 
was  christlich  oder  chi-istlich-infekt  ist,  bei  dentn  Einem  Sehen 
und  Horen  vergeht.  Ich  bin  zuletzt  der  erste  Psychologe  des 
Christenthums  und  kann,  als  alter  Artillerist  der  ich  bin,  schweres 
Geschiitz  vorfahren,  von  dem  kein  Gegner  des  Christenthums 
auch  nur  die  Existenz  vermuthet  hat.  .  .  .  Ich  schwore  Ihnen 
zu  dass  wir  in  zwei  Jahren  die  ganze  Erde  in  Convulsionen  haben 
werden.  Ich  bin  ein  Verhangniss."  (Nietzsche  to  Brandes,  Briefe, 
III,  321.)  Nietzsche  must  have  been  thinking  of  Antichrist,  not 
of  Ecce  Homo. 


104  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

fumes  of  this  ideal — of  this  slandering  of 
the  world — burst  forth ?"^ 


"What  separates  us,  is  not  that  we 
do  not  rediscover  any  God,  either  in 
history  or  in  nature  or  behind  nature — 
but  that  we  recognise  what  was  wor- 
shipped as  God  not  as  'divine,'  but  as 
pitiable,  as  absurd,  as  injurious — not  only 
as  an  error,  but  as  a  crime  against  life. 
We  deny  God  as  God.  If  this  God  of  the 
Christians  were  proved  to  us,  we  should 
still  less  know  how  to  believe  in  him. 
In  a  formula:  Deus  qualem  Paulus  creavit, 
Dei  negatioJ'  ^ 

"I  call  Christianity  the  one  great 
curse,  the  one  great  intrinsic  depravity, 
the  one  great  instinct  of  revenge,  for 
which  no  expedient  is  sufficiently  poison- 
ous, secret,  subterranean,  mean — I  call 
it  the  one  immortal  blemish  of  man- 
kind." 3 

"That   which  deifies   me,  that   which 

» Ecce  Homo,  138.  2  Antichrist,  316.  ^  Ihid.,  354. 


NIETZSCHE  AND  CHRISTIANITY        105 

makes  me  stand  apart  from  the  whole 
of  the  rest  of  humanity  is  the  fact  that 
I  have  unmasked  Christian  morahty. 
.  .  .  Christian  morahty  is  the  most 
mahgnant  form  of  all  falsehood,  the 
actual  Circe  of  humanity,  that  which 
has  corrupted  mankind."^ 

One  or  two  passages  from  the  many 
which  express  Nietzsche's  attitude  may 
be  taken  as  samples.  They  might  be 
multiplied  almost  to  any  extent.  No  one 
familiar  with  Nietzsche's  writings  in  his 
last  period  will  deny  their  representative 
quality. 

His  point  is  that  all  merely  theoretical 
and  historical  criticism  is  worthless,  so 
long  as  the  Christian  values  are  retained. 
Moreover,  supposing  the  Christian  values 
are  in  themselves  unobjectionable,  such 
criticism  would  be  needless,  and  even 
harmful.  Nietzsche  considered  truth  to 
be  merely  the  illusion  that  was  useful. 

1  Ecce  Homo,  139. 


106  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

"Wherever  the  will  to  power  declines 
in  any  way,  there  is  always  also  a  physio- 
logical retrogression,  a  decadence.  The 
Deity  of  decadence,  pruned  of  his  man- 
liest virtues  and  impulses,  henceforth, 
becomes  necessarily  the  God  of  the 
physiologically  retrograde,  the  weak. 
They  do  not  call  themselves  the  weak, 
they  call  themselves  the  'good.'  .  .  . 
It  is  obvious  (without  a  further  hint 
being  necessary)  in  what  moments  of 
history  only,  the  dualistic  fiction  of  a 
good  and  a  bad  God  became  possible. 
Through  the  same  instinct  by  which 
the  subjugated  lower  their  God  to  the 
*good  in  itself,'  they  obliterate  the 
good  qualities  out  of  the  God  of  their 
conquerors;  they  take  revenge  on  their 
masters  by  bedevilling  their  God.  The 
good  God,  just  like  a  devil;  both  are 
abortions  of  decadence.  How  can  one 
defer  so  much  to  the  simplicity  of  Chris- 
tian theologians  as  to  decree  with  them 
that  the  continuous  development  of  God 


NIETZSCHE  AND  CHRISTIANITY        107 

from  the  'God  of  Israel/  from  the  na- 
tional God  to  the  Christian  God,  to 
the  essence  of  everything  good,  is  a 
progress?  But  so  does  even  Renan.  .  .  . 
It  is  just  the  very  opposite  that  strikes 
the  eye.  When  the  presuppositions  of 
ascending  life,  when  everything  strong, 
brave,  domineering  and  proud  has  been 
eliminated  out  of  the  concept  of  God, 
when  he  sinks  step  by  step  to  the  sym- 
bol of  a  staff  for  the  fatigued,  a  sheet- 
anchor  for  all  drowning  ones,  when  he 
becomes  the  poor  people's  God,  the 
sinners'  God,  the  God  of  the  sick  par 
excellence,  and  when  the  predicate  of 
Saviour,  Redeemer,  is  left  as  the  sole 
divine  predicate,  what  does  such  a  change 
speak  of?  such  a  reduction  of  the  divine? 
To  be  sure,  the  kingdom  of  God  has 
thereby  become  greater.  Formerly,  he 
had  only  his  people,  his  'chosen'  people. 
Since  then  he  has  gone  abroad  in  his 
travels,  quite  like  his  people  itself;  since 
then  he  has  never  again   settled   down 


108  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

quietly  in  any  place,  until  he  has  finally 
become  at  home  everywhere,  the  great 
*  cosmopolitan' — till  he  has  gained  over 
the  'great  number,'  and  the  haK  of 
earth  to  his  side.  But  the  God  of  the 
'great  number,'  the  democrat  among 
Gods,  became,  nevertheless,  no  proud 
pagan  God;  he  remained  a  Jew,  he  re- 
mained the  God  of  the  woods,  the  God 
of  all  dark  corners  and  places,  of  all 
unhealthy  quarters  throughout  the  world. 
.  .  .  His  world  empire  is  still,  as  for- 
merly, an  underworld  empire,  a  hos- 
pital, a  subterranean  empire,  a  Ghetto- 
empire.  .  .  .  And  he  himself  so  pale, 
so  weak,  so  decadent  Even  the  palest  of 
the  pale  still  became  master  over  him — 
the  Metaphysicians,  the  conceptual  Al- 
binos. They  spun  round  about  him 
so  long,  until  hypnotised  by  their  move- 
ments he  became  a  cobweb-spinner,  a 
metaphysician  himself.  Henceforth,  he 
spun  the  world  anew  out  of  himself — 
sub  specie  Spinozse — henceforth  he  trans- 


NIETZSCHE  AND  CHRISTIANITY         109 

figured  himself  always  into  the  thinner 
and  the  paler,  he  became  'ideal,'  he  be- 
came 'pure  spirit,'  he  became  'absolu- 
tum,'  he  became  'thing  in  itself,'  Ruin 
of  a  God  .  .  .  God  became  thing  in 
itself.  .  .  . 

"  The  Christian  concept  of  God — God  as 
God  of  the  sick,  God  as  cobweb-spinner, 
God  as  spirit — is  one  of  the  most  cor- 
rupt concepts  of  God  ever  arrived  at 
on  earth;  it  represents  perhaps  the  gauge 
of  low  water  in  the  descending  develop- 
ment of  the  God  type.  God  degenerated 
to  the  contradiction  of  life,  instead  of 
being  its  transfiguration  and  its  eternal 
yea!  In  God  hostility  announced  to  life, 
to  nature,  to  the  will  to  life.  God  as  the 
formula  for  every  calumny  of  'this  world,' 
for  every  lie  of  'another  world.' ^  In  God 
nothingness  deified,  the  will  to  nothing- 
ness declared  holy !  .  .  . 

"This   hybrid   image   of   ruin   derived 


1  We  may  compare  with  this  ISIark  Pattison's  dictum  that  the 
'idea  of  God  had  been  defecated  to  a  Qm-e  transparency." 


110  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

from  nullity,  concept,  and  contradic- 
tion, in  which  all  decadence  instincts,  all 
cowardices,  and  lassitudes  of  soul  have 
their  sanction."  ^ 

This  is  strong  language.  But  it  is  not 
mere  extravagance.  Nietzsche  does  not  set 
out  only  to  epater  le  bourgeois.  He  is  not 
amused  with  things,  he  is  passionate  in 
his  sense  of  the  value  of  life,  and  in  hatred 
of  all  that  he  thought  opposed  to  fulness 
of  life.  To  appreciate  his  purpose,  we  must 
recur  to  the  fundamental  doctrine  of  the 
Will  to  Power,  as  the  one  reality.  All 
other-worldly  values  are  false  coin.  The 
problem  is  to  determine  what  kind  of  man 
finds  his  account  in  uttering  this  coinage. 
Briefly,  the  answer  is  that  Christianity  is 
the  boomerang-throw  of  the  slave  races 
by  which  they  have  taken  captive  their 
conquerors.    The  theory  is  simple. 

What,  first  of  all,  is  the  origin  of  con- 
science.^     According    to    Nietzsche,    con- 

1  Antichrist,  260-2. 


NIETZSCHE  AND  CHRISTIANITY        111 

science  arises  from  the  taming  of  man  by 
civilisation.  As  society  settles  down,  fight- 
ing ceases  to  be  the  main  work  of  man; 
cruelty,  moreover,  in  private  life  has  less 
free  scope.  Consequently,  man  turns  his 
need  of  inflicting  pain  upon  his  inner 
being,  and  suffering  results.  This  un- 
pleasantness inside  is  a  fact.  The  priest 
and  all  who  share  his  instincts  proceed 
to  exploit  it.  They  invent  the  doctrine 
of  moral  freedom  and  responsibility.  By 
this  means,  man  is  led  to  feel  that  the  pain 
is  his  own  fault.  The  conception  of  guilt 
is  introduced.  With  the  sense  of  burden 
seK-created  but  irremovable  by  his  own 
efforts,  man  develops  the  need  of  redemp- 
tion. Ascetic  morality  of  all  kinds  is  due 
to  the  belief  that,  if  man  will  but  add  a 
little  self-inflicted  pain,  the  ill  conscience 
will  be  removed.  Man  is  willing  to  suffer, 
and  indeed  to  increase  his  suffering,  if 
only  he  can  be  persuaded  that  the  pain 
has  an  object.  That  object,  the  negation 
of  the  will,  is  the  aim  of  morality.     Chris- 


112  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

tianity  is  little  more  than  the  most  trium- 
phant form  of  this  tendency,  which  arises 
from  the  instinct  of  priests  (men  of  no 
real  personal  force,  but  great  ingenuity) 
to  secure  power  for  themselves.  In  this 
way  they  get  power  which  the  weakness 
of  their  personality  would  otherwise  pre- 
vent. Among  priests  he  includes  moralists 
and  most  philosophers.  He  starts  from 
the  true  notion  that  right  and  wrong  are 
fundamental  values.  He  will  have  noth- 
ing to  do  with  the  English  utilitarian 
moralists  and  associationists,  who  teach 
that  the  idea  of  right  is  merely  the  com- 
munal sanction  of  what  is  useful  to  men 
in  general.  Good  and  evil  are  original 
value-judgments.  Like  all  our  ideas,  they 
come  from  the  will  to  power.  Power, 
satisfied,  triumphant,  embodied  in  a  con- 
quering race,  "the  splendid  blond  beast" 
calls  all  its  own  characteristics  good.  Good 
meant  in  the  first  instance  the  qualities 
of  a  ruling  class.  It  is  the  same  as  noble 
and  implies  courage  and  an  enduring  will. 


NIETZSCHE  AND  CHRISTIANITY        113 

pride,  and  self-sufficiency.  Its  opposite 
is  the  character  of  the  enslaved  people, 
base,  mean,  villainous.  tTThus,  goodness 
has  nothing  to  do  with  love,  humility, 
justice,  or  self-denial.  These  qualities  are 
displayed  by  the  down-trodden,  or  at 
least  admired  by  them.  Do  unto  others  as 
ye  would  that  they  should  do  to  you  is  the 
maxim  of  the  herd,  the  helot,  the  outcast, 
the  chandala.  For  the  slave  world,  since 
it  goes  on  living,  has  its  own  will  to  power. 
It  is  ever  seeking  to  turn  the  tables  on  its 
masters.  To  do  this  subtlety  is  needed. 
Victory  in  the  field  is  not  to  be  thought 
of.  If,  however,  the  slaves  can  instil 
into  their  masters  a  belief  that  the  highest 
moral  values  are  those  qualities  which 
slaves  are  forced  to  display,  gentleness, 
meekness,  self-sacrifice,  industry,  obedience, 
pity,  they  may  gradually  reverse  the  order 
and  once  more  rule  their  masters^  The 
superior  culture  of  Greece  took  captive  the 
Romans.  Christian  morality  is  a  similar 
effort,  only  it  is  exercised  not  by  a  real 


V 


114  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

culture,  like  that  of  Greece,  but  by  a 
spurious  set  of  moral  values,  the  so-called 
Christian  virtues.  The  terrain  of  the  con- 
flict has  been  changed  before  the  masters 
were  aware  of  the  fact.  The  herd  will 
treat  as  good — and  by  their  numbers  and 
cunning  will  ultimately  make  even  their 
rulers  think  good — ^those  qualities  which 
unite  people  in  herds  and  keep  them  in 
subjection.  In  this  way  they  have  achieved 
a  trans  valuation  of  all  values.  The  new 
values  thus  grow  upward  from  below, 
until  at  last  the  masters  begin  to  have  a 
bad  conscience  for  pride  and  self-sufficiency. 
They  will  even  stoop  so  low  as  to  pretend 
that  their  sole  claim  to  rule  is  based  on 
service  of  the  community.  The  maxim: 
"I  am  among  you,  as  a  slave"  has  raised 
Jesus  of  Nazareth  to  be  Lord  in  name  of 
the  world.  "He  that  is  greatest  among 
you  let  him  be  your  minister"  is  the  ex- 
pression of  the  same  principle  by  one 
who  believed  it.  Its  real  import  is  that 
by  affecting  to  minister  to  others,  a  weak 


NIETZSCHE  AND  CHRISTIANITY        115 

man  or  race  will  win  greatness.J  In  this 
revolution,  which  began  in  early  times, 
priests  are  the  leaders.  They  are,  as  they 
claim,  not  rulers  but  shepherds.  They 
symbolise  and  heighten  the  power  of  the 
herd  as  against  the  unique,  the  rare,  the 
distinguished.  Priesthood  represents  the 
success  of  the  mob,  the  chandala,  the  herd 
morality.  By  this  means  a  mental  empire 
is  established  vested  in  them,  and  polit- 
ical dependence  is  avenged. 

Morals,  i.  e.,  all  morals  based  on  any 
doctrine  of  humanity,  are  due  to  the  in- 
stinct of  revenge.  They  are  the  will  to 
power  of  impotent,  decaying  folk.  "Moral- 
ity is  the  idiosyncrasy  of  the  decadent 
revenging  themselves  upon  Life."  The 
Jews  are  the  most  outstanding  instance. 
That  race,  mean  and  ignoble  like  all 
cowards,  was  willing  to  sacrifice  every- 
thing to  its  desire  to  live.  It  went  on 
despite  political  annihilation.  The  will 
to  power,  was  only  dormant  and  began 
to  reassert  itself.    Firstly,  its  priests  turned 


116  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

all  its  history  topsyturv;s',  and  changed 
every ^  moral  value.  The  Old  Testament 
contains  ample  evidence  that  originally 
the  Hebrews  were  as  other  nations,  and 
their  God  a  prince  of  power.  This,  how- 
ever, has  been  changed  by  the  priestly 
caste,  and  the  conception  of  Jehovah  as 
a  loving  Father,  and  of  holiness  and  all 
the  mean  virtues  of  "fellowship"  have 
been  introduced  and  suffered  to  corrupt 
the  ancient  story.  In  Jesus  of  Nazareth 
the  Jewish  race  produced  a  man  who  car- 
ried still  further  this  philosophy  of  re- 
sentment. Our  Lord  was  consumed  with 
Love  and  led  a  revolt  inside  the  Jewish 
nation  of  the  poor  and  outcast  against 
the  aristocracy  of  Jerusalem.  He  died 
for  his  own  guilt,  and  in  modern  days 
would  have  been  sent  to  Siberia;  for  he 
asserted  the  superiority  before  God  of 
the  "poor,  the  maimed,  the  halt,  and  the 
blind,"  and  denied  the  claims  of  the  rulers. 
In  bringing  our  Lord  to  the  Cross,  the 
Jewish  spirit  performed  its  master-stroke. 


NIETZSCHE  AND  CHRISTIANITY         117 

By  crucifying  him  as  a  criminal  (which 
he  was),  and  then  proclaiming  the  King- 
dom of  the  Crucified  and  Risen  Saviour, 
it  secured  for  a  couple  of  thousand  years 
the  triumph  of  Hebrew,  i,  e.,  slave  valua- 
tions. The  Incarnation  is  the  apotheosis  of 
slave  morality. 

The  world  at  large  was  in  a  state  which 
enabled  the  movement  to  win  success. 
Multitudes  of  slaves  filled  the  Roman 
Empire.  These  were  eager  to  fall  in  with 
any  system  which  would  restore  their 
dignity.  The  mixture  of  races  all  through 
the  Empire  brought  with  it  a  physiological 
depression,  which,  disguised  as  the  sense 
of  sin,  made  men  eager  for  a  salvation 
cult.^  Add  to  this  that  Socrates  and  Plato, 
the  great  Greek  decadents,  had  long  cor- 
rupted the  pagan  mind  with  notions  of 
goodness,  justice,  and  the  Eternal  world.^ 

^"Alle  unsere  Religionen  und  Phllosophien  sind  Symptome 
unseres  leiblichen  Befindens:  dass  das  Christenthum  zum  Sieg 
kam,  war  die  Folge  eines  allgemeinen  Unlust-Gefuhls,  und  einer 
Rassen-Vermischung."     (Nietzsche,  WerJce,  XVI,  250.) 

2  It  is  easily  seen  how  this  notion  of  the  genesis  of  the  Catholic 
Christianity  underlies  the  whole  work  of  Houston  Stewart  Cham- 
berlin — The  Foundations  of  the  Nineteenth  Century. 


118  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

The  persecution  of  Christians  by  the  state 
was  fooHsh,  for  it  gave  them  precisely  the 
leverage  which  they  needed,  as  Apostles 
of  the  Cross,  and  enabled  them  in  very 
deed  to  make  their  strength  "perfect  in 
weakness."  Even  the  Roman  Law  and 
the  stoic  moralists  prepared  the  way;  for 
although  in  regard  to  slaves,  the  ruling 
order  kept  its  hand  on  the  whip,  in  theory 
it  was  admitted  that  men  were  by  nature 
free,  that  man  as  man  deserves  to  be  con- 
sidered, that  justice,  not  force,  is  the  end 
of  social  institutions.  All  these  tendencies 
united  to  help  on  the  march  of  the  Chris- 
tian Church  from  the  catacombs  to  the 
chair  of  St.  Peter;  and  transformed  the 
fisherman  of  Galilee  into  the  prince  of  the 
Apostles,  the  slave  of  the  slaves  of  God 
into  the  Vicar-General  of  the  Universe. 
The  Church  was  able  to  clothe  it  all  in 
a  philosophic  or  semiphilosophic  garb,  and 
to  provide  a  symbol  which  for  a  time  en- 
slaved alike  the  intellect  and  the  heart  of 
man.     At  last,   through  its  leadership   of 


NIETZSCHE  AND  CHRISTIANITY         119 

the  slave  races  and  lower  orders,  the  Church 
of  Christ  was  able  to  triumph  over  the 
Pagan  Empire,  the  proudest  and  most 
valuable  organisation  of  the  Will  to  Power, 
which  the  world  has  hitherto  seen. 

All  this  is  the  victory  of  decadence. 
All  morality  is  decadence.  Ascending  life 
is  ever  pitiless  and  proud.  Christianity, 
it  is  true,  is  nowadays  out  of  fashion  as 
a  creed.  Yet  men  deceive  themselves. 
Its  poison  lurks  in  all  the  idealisms  of 
the  day,  in  the  generally  accepted  code  of 
moral  values,  in  democratic  equality,  in 
nearly  every  notion  of  the  so-called  free- 
thinkers.^ Nietzsche  with  his  band  of 
free  spirits  will  topple  over  the  house  of 

^  George  Eliot.  "They  have  got  rid  of  the  Christian  God,  and 
now  think  themselves  obliged  to  cling  firmer  than  ever  to  Chris- 
tian morality,  that  is  English  consistency;  we  shall  not  lay  the 
blame  of  it  on  ethical  gii'ls  a  la  Eliot.  In  England  for  every 
little  emancipation  from  divinity,  people  have  to  reacquire 
respectability  by  becoming  moral  fanatics  in  an  awe-inspii*ing 
manner.  That  is  the  penalty  they  have  to  pay  there.  With 
us  it  is  different.  When  we  give  up  Christian  belief,  we  there- 
by deprive  ourselves  of  the  right  to  maintain  a  stand  on  Chris- 
tian morality.  This  is  not  at  all  obvious  of  itself,  we  have  again 
and  again  to  make  this  point  clear,  in  defiance  of  English  shallow- 
pates.  Christianity  is  a  system,  a  view  of  things,  consistently 
thought  out  and  complete.  If  we  break  out  of  it  a  fundamental 
idea,  the  belief  in  God,  we  thereby  break  the  whole  in  pieces." 
{Tvyilight  of  the  Idols,  167.) 


120  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

cards.  The  old  pagan  valuation  will  be 
restored.  The  trans  valuation  will  be  ef- 
fected. So  important  is  this  aim  of 
Nietzsche,  that  his  final  period  is  some- 
times spoken  of  as  his  Umwerthungszeit, 
Meanwhile,  Christian,  moralist,  humani- 
tarian ideals  are  not  to  be  allowed  to 
drop.  They  are  to  be  retained,  as  the 
most  useful  for  the  mass  of  men,  the 
herd.  With  the  general  tendency  of  the 
world  to  become  more  mediocre,  with  the 
ever-growing  clamour  of  the  triumphant 
middle-class,  Nietzsche  would  not  inter- 
fere. Against  this  and  out  of  it  as  a  back- 
ground will  the  new  ruling  order  define 
itself.  Herein  a  few  spirits,  courageous, 
intellectual,  and  highly  tempered  as  steel, 
the  philosophers  of  the  superman  world, 
will  rule.  They  are  the  first  order.  Of 
the  second  order  are  the  warrior  class, 
Kings  and  statesmen.  Both  these  are  priv- 
ileged, beyond  good  and  evil,  free  from 
the  herd  morality.  Curious  it  is  to  no- 
tice how  like  is  Nietzsche's  conception  to 


NIETZSCHE  AND   CHRISTIANITY         121 

the  mediaeval  doctrine  of  the  two  swords, 
with  the  spiritual  first  and  the  ruler  govern- 
ing in  his  interest. 

Let  us  now  consider  in  detail  Nietzsche's 
account  of  Christianity. 

1.  It  is  based  upon  an  essential  mis- 
understanding. Nietzsche  has  identified 
the  pessimistic  ethic  of  Schopenhauer  with 
the  ideals  of  Christianity.  Both  agree  in 
this.  They  teach  self-denial,  and  this  in 
some  sense  is  a  principle  of  every  system, 
which  selects  between  actions.  If  any 
actions  are  selected,  there  must  be  self- 
denial,  or  in  times  of  stress  we  shall  choose 
the  opposite  course.  This  ascetic  quality 
ought  to  have  been  no  objection  to 
Nietzsche,  for  Nietzsche's  whole  notion 
of  the  superman  involves  severe  discipline, 
i.  e.,  self-denial.  He  even  goes  so  far  as 
to  say  that  he  wanted  a  natural  asceticism. 
All  that  Nietzsche  said  in  favour  of  an 
enduring  will,  his  attitude  to  suffering 
as  the  condition  of  insight,  is  in  fact  very 


122  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

similar  to  the  Christian.  Creighton  said 
that  suffering  gives  an  insight  denied  to 
thought,  and  Hort  declared  that  power  of 
life  means  power  of  suffering.  Both  of 
these  maxims  are  in  full  accordance  with 
the  teaching  of  Nietzsche.  Nietzsche  in 
no  way  taught  a  doctrine  of  voluptuous 
enjoyment.  No  man  whose  vision  is  of 
the  far  future  would  do  that.  He  has 
indeed  been  blamed  for  this  ascetic  side, 
but  unfairly.^ 

All  asceticism,  from  the  training  of  the 
athlete  to  that  of  the  scholar,  from  the 
discipline  of  the  child  to  the  experience 
of  a  St.  John  of  the  Cross,  may  direct 
similar  acts,  or  abstinences — a  fact  which 
is  too  often  forgotten,  when  people  either 
attack  or  defend  the  morality  of  the  Cross. 
The  question  is  in  regard  to  every  act  of  ap- 
parent and  immediate  self-denial;  whether 
it  be  to  abstain  from  alcohol,  or  to  face 
an  almost  certain  death  in  the  trenches 
— to  what  purpose  is  this  waste  .^     Is  the 

^  E.  g.,  by  Seillieres,  Apollon  ou  Dionysos. 


NIETZSCHE  AND  CHRISTIANITY        123 

ointment  of  man's  tears  to  be  poured 
out,  and  the  alabaster  of  his  gifts  to  be 
broken  for  a  noble  or  an  ignoble  pur- 
pose? Is  the  result  to  be  the  development 
or  the  annihilation  of  the  personality? 
The  latter  is  the  teaching  of  Schopen- 
hauer, of  Buddhism,  and  of  the  various 
forms  of  Oriental  pessimism.  To  them  the 
individual  being  is  the  supreme  evil,  or  else 
the  curse  of  existence.  Christianity  and 
Nietzsche  also  might  commend  the  same 
ascetic  practices  as  the  Buddhist;  but  the 
object  is  different.  Always  it  is  the  devel- 
opment of  the  personality — not  its  extinc- 
tion. It  is  a  negative  means  to  reach  a 
positive  end.  ''I  am  come  that  they  might 
have  life,  and  might  have  it  more  abun- 
dantly" is  the  principle  of  Christian  asceti- 
cism; every  whit  as  much  as  the  expansion 
of  Life  is  the  maxim  of  Nietzsche.  It  may 
be  that  now  and  then  the  means  are  unwise, 
in  which  case  they  are  analogous  to  over- 
training a  crew  for  a  race.  Sometimes, 
also.    Christian    teachers    with    too    little 


124  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

hold  on  the  sacramental  principle,  or  with 
Pantheistic  leanings,  may  have  taught  a 
doctrine  of  Christian  self-denial  which  is 
truly  negative  and  Oriental.  That  does 
not  affect  the  main  issue.  Christianity  is 
essentially  sacramental  in  the  doctrine  of 
the  Incarnate  Lord  and  the  Risen  Body. 
It  does  not  teach  the  neglect  of  the  body, 
except  in  so  far  as  any  act  of  discipline  in- 
volves the  postponement  of  immediate 
ease  for  some  greater  good.  Moreover, 
as  Nietzsche  knew,  even  for  bodily  health 
a  too  meticulous  thoughtfulness  will  de- 
feat its  own  ends.  A  little  carelessness  is 
essential.  The  risks  it  involves  are  less 
than  those  which  it  avoids.  Now  and  then 
Nietzsche  admits  and  even  deplores  the 
effect  of  Christianity  exercised  in  height- 
ening the  sense  of  individual  worth;  for 
it  did  this  for  all,  whereas  it  is  only  the 
few  whose  personality  is  worth  develop- 
ing. On  the  whole,  however,  Nietzsche 
never  freed  himself  from  the  doctrine  of 
Schopenhauer,  that  all  morality  is  in  the 


NIETZSCHE  AND  CHRISTIANITY        125 

literal  sense  self-abnegation,  and  is  to  culmi- 
nate in  the  destruction  of  the  will  to  live. 

Thus   he   is   ever  repeating  the   charge, 
that   Christianity   is  the   supremely   deca- 
dent  religion,    nihilism.      He    might   have 
been  undeceived,  had  he  read  a  Uttle  more 
Church  history,  or  even  studied   the  New 
Testament  which  he  so  heartily  despised. 
He   could   hardly   then   have   ignored   the 
words  about  abundant  life  and  fulness  of 
JQy — while   St.   Paul's  frequent  references 
to  joy  in  suffering  would  seem  almost  de- 
signed to  meet  Nietzsche's  own  experience. 
It  is  not  the   sense  of   weakness,   but  of 
power  that  is  the  most  obvious  thing  in 
the    psychology    of    the    early    Christians. 
Two  great  facts  about  the  Church  impress 
themselves   upon  the   reader  of  the   New 
Testament:     (1)    it    was    possessed    by    a 
spirit  of  power;    (2)   it  was  a  separating, 
distinguishing    force,    adding    to    dignity: 
"Ye  are  a  holy  nation,  a  royal  priesthood, 
a  peculiar  people."    True,  Nietzsche  might 
counter  this  by  saying  it  was  power  for 


126  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

the  wrong  sort  of  people,  and  distinction 
for  those  by  nature  undistinguished. 

The  truth  is  that  the  Church  of  God 
so  far  from  being  a  denial  of  life  has  been 
and  now  is  the  greatest  yea-saying  force 
in  the  world. ^  That  does  not  mean  that 
it  refuses  to  select  between  actions  or  to 
forbid  those  which  are  less  admirable. 
Neither  does  Nietzsche.  Any  yea-saying 
which  involves  courage,  involves  also  no- 
saying.  Nietzsche  is  right,  when  he  says 
that  education  should  be  directed  rather 
to  make  the  will  taut  than  to  convey 
information.  That,  however,  cannot  be 
done  without  a  no-saying,  which  is  equally 
important,  perhaps  more  so  than  yea-say- 
ing. 

Nietzsche   never   discerns   power  except 


^"Nietzsche  ist  aber  in  historischem  Lrtum  von  grober  Art 
befangen,  wenn  er  dem  Christentum  die  Wirkung  zuschreibt 
dass  es  die  mannliche  Tiichtigkeit  untergrabe,  dass  es  aus  dem 
Menschen  ein  Zahmes  Haustier  iind  Herdentier  gemacht 
habe.  .  .  . 

"Aber  auch  wenn  man  das  Barbarische  ausser  Acht  liisst,  so 
hat  sich  das  christliche  Ideal  mit  dem  einer  edien  Mannlichkeit, 
mit  dem  ritterlichen  Ideal,  nicht  allein  vertragen,  sondern  aufs 
Innigste  vermahlt."     (Tonnies,  Der  Nietzsche- Kultus,  91.) 


NIETZSCHE  AND  CHRISTIANITY        127 

as  explosion.  Yet  it  is  equally  great  as 
containing.  The  first  lesson  of  courage  is 
doubtless  yea-saying  to  life;  not  to  shrink; 
not  to  stop  development  because  of  dan- 
gers or  fatigues;  to  face  the  unknown; 
to  be  adventurous,  and  so  forth.  Equally 
needful  and  harder  to  teach  is  the  lesson 
of  no-saying,  i,  e,^  to  concentrate,  to  limit 
oneself,  to  hold  oneself  in;  to  control  the 
desire  to  be  always  on  the  move.  Even 
Napoleon,  Nietzsche's  great  idol,  used  to 
talk  of  the  importance  of  savoir  se  homer, 
Nietzsche  introduced  an  opposition  where 
none  really  exists  between  yea-saying  and 
no-saying  to  impulses.  Every  yielding  to 
impulses  presents  itself  to  the  mind  as 
yea-saying.  Yet  no  one  would  be  quicker 
than  Nietzsche  to  assert  that  mere  yield- 
ing to  impulse  would  produce  not  the 
superman  but  the  decadent.  The  point 
is  whether  or  no  we  are  to  select  between 
acts,  some  which  we  commend,  others 
which  we  contemn.  Both  Christianity 
and  Nietzsche  say  that  we  are.    It  is  true 


128  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

that  to  the  strong  character  the  element 
of  no-saying  will  be  harder  than  to  the 
weak.  Most  of  us  know  men  of  strong 
character,  the  beauty  of  which  consists 
not  in  the  hardness  which  they  have  by 
an  inherited  gift,  but  in  the  refinement  and 
self-denial  by  which  it  is  tempered  to 
noble  ends.  "Be  hard,"  as  Nietzsche 
preached,  is  by  no  means  bad  advice  to 
people  naturally  soft.  Tendencies  in  our 
age  there  are  which  such  words  might  at- 
tack. But  the  opposite  maxim,  Be  gentle, 
is  even  more  needful,  or  civilisation  will 
lose  its  most  delicate  blooms.  Nietzsche 
himself  would  be  the  first  to  deplore  this. 
The  sentimentalism  of  "beautiful  souls" 
against  which  Nietzsche  protested  may 
have  been  evil,  but  Nietzsche,  who  felt 
in  himself  the  dangers  of  sentimentalism, 
is  entirely  one-sided  in  the  way  in  which 
he  preaches  force  and  nothing  but  force. 
Nor  can  any  process  of  interpretation  rid 
him  of  this  violence  of  overemphasis.^ 

^  "La  sua  filosofia  e  stata  da  capo  a  fondo  la  confessione  e  la 
proiezione  della  debolezza  della  sua  vita."  (Giovanni  Papini,  // 
Crepuscolo  dei  Filosofi,  233.) 


NIETZSCHE  AND  CHRISTIANITY        129 

2.  Nietzsche  made  a  second  error  in 
regard  to  Christianity.  He  treated  it  as 
inculcating  pure  altruism.  This  the  Chris- 
tian ethic  never  was  and  never  will  be. 
It  teaches  us  to  love  our  neighbour  as  our- 
self.  It  does  not  teach  that  thfe  individual 
is  entirely  to  be  merged  in  the  group.  From 
this  it  is  saved  by  its  doctrine  of  individual- 
ity/ which  asserts  that  every  man  has  a 
special  value  and  meaning  of  his  own: 
"One  star  differeth  from  another  star  in 
glury — so  also  is  it  in  the  resurrection  of 
the  dead."  Nietzsche  saw  that  it  was 
vain  to  expect  to  maintain  the  Christian 
values,  after  Christian  supernaturaUsm  is 
surrendered.  He  failed  to  see  that  Comtism 
and  other  purely  humanitarian  schemes, 
although  Christian  in  their  provenance, 
are  only  partially  Christian  in  their  ethics 
and  omit  certain  indispensable  elements 
of  the  Christian  canons  of  conduct.     Nor 

1  "Nietzsche  iibersieht  im  Christenthum  volllg  diese  Zustiitzung 
zu  dem  Eigenwerte  der  Seele,  in  dem  er  das  Christliche  Wertgefiihl 
ausschliesslich  in  den  Altruismus  verlegt.  Nicht  auf  den,  dem 
gegeben  ward,  sondern  auf  den,  der  gibt,  nicht  auf  den,  fiir  den 
gelebt  wird,  sondern  auf  den,  der  lebt,  kommt  es  Jesus  an." 
(Simmel,  ScJwpenhauer  und  Nietzsche,  200.) 


130  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

again  does  Christianity  make  all  Love 
consist  in  sympathy.  That  is  another 
mistake  due  to  Schopenhauer,  alles  Lieh 
ist  Mitleid,  Nietzsche  somewhere  com- 
plains that  religion  nowadays  means  noth- 
ing more  nor  less  than  sympathy  with 
suffering.  Naturally  enough  he  attacked 
the  habit  of  making  material  comfort  the 
one  idol  and  the  only  test  of  development. 
But  Christians  do  not  do  this.  Often, 
indeed,  they  are  blamed  because  they  seem 
callous  to  much  unmerited  suffering  (as 
even  at  this  moment  they  are  blamed  be- 
cause they  refuse  to  assert  that  all  war  is 
always  to  be  condemned).  Christianity 
must  be  judged  by  its  own  ideals,  not  by 
the  dreams  of  sentimental  rationalists,  who 
deck  themselves  out  in  Christian  colours. 

In  matters  like  the  marriage  law  and 
the  limits  of  the  Christian  society,  and 
the  need  of  principle.  Churchmen  are 
frequently  attacked  because  they  refuse 
to  allow  sentimental  sympathy  to  be  the 
sole   arbiter,   and   decline   to   identify   the 


NIETZSCHE  AND   CHRISTIANITY        131 

Holiness  of  God  with  the  weak  good 
nature  of  a  parent  who  spoils  his  sons.  It 
is  hard  to  understand  how  any  one  not 
wholly  ignorant  of  Christian  life  could 
have  made  such  a  charge. 

3.  The  same  may  be  said  of  the  attack 
on  Christianity  as  hostile  to  culture.  Like 
many  other  classical  scholars,  Nietzsche 
was  ignorant  of  the  Middle  Ages.  Yet 
he  was  familiar  with  Venice,  and  must 
have  seen  the  great  pictures  of  Italy,  al- 
though it  does  not  appear  that  he  cared 
for  painting.^  How  could  a  man  who  had 
once  seen  St.  Mark's  at  Venice  or  St. 
Ambrogio  at  Milan  declare  with  any  sin- 
cerity that  Christianity  was  always,  and 
through  its  whole  course  of  set  purpose, 
hostile  to  culture  .f^  Doubtless  he  might 
say  that  the  great  painters  of  the  Renais- 
sance were  not  truly  Christians.  He  does 
say   so   of  Raphael.     That  may  be  true 

^  "  Selten  habe  ich  Vergniigen  an  einer  bildnerischen  Darstel- 
lung,  aber  dieses  Bild,  'Ritter,  Tod  und  Teufel/  steht  mir  nahe, 
ich  kann  kaum  sagen  wie."  Nietzsche  to  Malwida  von  Meysen- 
bug.     {Brief  e.  III,  2,  491.) 


132  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

partially  of  the  later  or  high  Renaissance. 
It  is  not  true  of  Fra  Angelico  or  Giotto 
or  the  primitives.  Even  Nietzsche  could 
not  have  believed  it  to  be  true  of  Michel- 
angelo. Probably  the  noblest  material 
treasure  of  mankind  is  the  great  Gothic 
cathedrals.  That  will  to  power,  that  ascend- 
ing energy  of  which  he  makes  so  much, 
has  had  nowhere  larger  expression  than  in 
Romanesque  and  Gothic  architecture.  Re- 
cently, Mr.  March  Phillips  in  the  Works 
of  Man  has  taught  us  to  see  in  the  Gothic 
essentially  the  expression  of  energy.  He 
omits,  indeed,  a  certain  spiritual  aspira- 
tion, yet  it  is  none  the  less  true  that  we 
have  a  spirit  of  power.^ 

Once  more.  The  Christian  Church  does 
not  accord  any  especial  honour  to  the  tame 
anaemic  virtues.  No  truer  typical  Chris- 
tians can  be  found  in  history  than  Alfred 
the  Great  and  St.  Louis — or,  though  on  a 

^  One  of  Nietzsche's  more  unbalanced  admirers,  Mr.  A.  M. 
Ludovici,  is  good  enough  to  inform  us  that  Gothic  is  no  true  art. 
Was  this  the  notion  of  the  Germans  when  they  gave  us  the  Kultur- 
lesson  of  the  bonfire  of  Louvain? 


NIETZSCHE  AND   CHRISTIANITY        133 

lower  grade  of  character,  Charlemagne.  Or 
taking  Churchmen  in  the  technical  sense, 
Gregory  the  Great,  St.  Bernard,  Bishop 
Grossetete  were  not  weaklings.  Were  the 
English  to  make  a  formal  canonisation  for 
the  nineteenth  century,  it  is  almost  cer- 
tain that  their  choice  would  fall  on  General 
Gordon. 

It  is  true  that  cowardice  and  indolence 
may  keep  certain  natures  of  low  vitality 
from  active  sins,  while  the  greater  a  man's 
powers,  the  more  chances  he  has  of  going 
wrong.  Yet  outside  a  few  specialised 
circles,  the  Church  cannot  be  said  to 
honour  the  one-horse-power  type  of  char- 
acter. Great  characters,  if  they  do  more 
wrong,  will  do  more  right.  The  true  type 
of  active  Christian  is  our  King  Edward  I, 
with  his  motto  Pactum  serva,  not  ashamed 
to  burst  into  tears  before  his  people  and 
own  himself  in  the  wrong.  Our  Lord  him- 
self was  blamed  because  he  liked  the  society 
of  harlots  and  collectors.  Do  we  suppose 
that  these  people  were  tame  cats  ?   I  cannot 


134  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

help  thinking  that  Nietzsche  was  in  this 
respect  led  astray  by  the  social  antipathies 
of  his  highly  respectable  relatives  at  Naum- 
burg.  The  lay  figure  against  which  he  tilts, 
in  the  character  of  the  Christian  ideal,  is 
ludicrously  untrue  to  reality. 

Lastly,  it  must  be  said  that  Nietzsche 
misconceived  the  Christian  doctrine  of 
equality  before  God.  That  doctrine  as- 
serts that  every  soul  has  an  eternal  value, 
none  is  merely  a  thing,  a  tool.  Nietzsche, 
it  is  true,  would  deny  this,  except  for  the 
few.  But  when  he  goes  on  to  say  that 
Christianity  makes  all  souls  equal,  in  the 
sense  that  it  denies  the  aristocracy  of 
character,  he  is  asserting  the  direct  con- 
trary of  the  fact.  This  alleged  over- 
democratic  character  of  Christianity  is 
not  there.  In  its  doctrine  of  the  saints,  it 
asserts  clearly  definite  degrees  and  carries 
them  beyond  this  life.  Further,  it  goes  on 
to  say  that  what  matters  is  the  whole  per- 
sonahty.  That,  indeed,  sometimes  under- 
goes a  cataclysmic  change  in  the  process 


NIETZSCHE  AND  CHRISTIANITY        135 

we  call  conversion.  But  this  is  not  uni- 
versal. The  point  is  that  neither  on 
earth  nor  beyond  it  does  Christianity 
deny  the  "aristocracy  of  character" — al- 
though it  has  never,  like  Nietzsche,  as- 
serted its  right  to  tyrannise  in  virtue  of 
superiority. 

Nietzsche  charges  against  the  Christian 
Church  all  the  developments  of  the  modern 
democratic  ideal.  I  would  that  more  of 
these  developments  were  chargeable  there- 
to. Yet  even  socialism  he  appears  to  have 
misunderstood.^  Socialism  is  a  means  to 
an  end :  it  demands  no  more  than  equality  of 
opportunity;  it  does  not  assert  identity  of 
gifts  for  every  man.  Nietzsche,  doubtless,  is 
opposed  alike  to  socialism  and  to  individual- 
ism, because  they  each  assert  the  worth  of 
every  individual  and  merely  differ  in  the 
means  whereby  they  promote  it.  But  it 
is  not  true  to  assert,  as  Nietzsche  does, 
that  either  asserts  or  even  implies  that  all 

^"Nietzsche  probably  misunderstood  the  inmost  meaning  of 
democracy."     (Wolf,  The  Philosophy  oj  Nietzsche.) 


136  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

men  are  of  equal  power.  A  few  extreme 
democrats  may  do  this,  just  as  a  few  ex- 
tremists may  deny  any  select  moments 
or  epochs  in  history.  But  such  a  charge 
is  contrary  to  fact  in  regard  to  nearly  all 
believers  in  democracy,  whether  Chris- 
tian or  not.  Moreover,  the  Christian 
Church,  in  its  sense  of  the  sanctity  of 
marriage  and  the  unity  of  family  life,  has 
been  and  remains,  sometimes  almost  in 
spite  of  itself,  a  chief  barrier  to  that  un- 
regulated individualism,  "the  mishmash  of 
the  mob,"  which  Nietzsche  condemns. 

Nietzsche  says  a  great  deal  about  "the 
pathos  of  distance,"  and  is  very  anxious 
that  the  sense  of  difference,  of  distinction, 
between  men  shall  increase.  He  would 
base  all  this  upon  a  radical  difference  of 
nature,  and,  in  so  far  as  this  is  the  case, 
Christianity  would  be  opposed  thereto. 
Once,  however,  admit  the  common  human 
quality,  i.  e.,  capacity  for  choice  and  for  God 
of  every  "even- Christian,"  and  the  Church 
will  really   operate,  is  operating  now,  in 


NIETZSCHE  AND  CHRISTIANITY        137 

the  direction  which  Nietzsche  desired.  This 
happens  in  more  ways  than  one.  First, 
the  modern  world  is  rehgiously  hetero- 
geneous. Christians  are  but  a  part  of 
it.  More  and  more  will  the  Christian 
tend  to  be  separated  by  the  fact  of  his 
Christianity — the  words  *'a  royal  nation, 
a  peculiar  people"  are  bound  to  have  a 
more  immediate  application,  as  the  pres- 
sure of  religious  competition  increases. 
Secondly,  in  the  Christian  ideal  there  is 
latent  a  certain  Vornehmheit,  Nietzsche 
never  realised  that  it  is  the  sinner  who  is 
always  commonplace,  the  real  saint  who 
is  the  distinguished  person.  Nietzsche's 
beloved  Borgia  were  vulgar  enough;  it 
was  Michelangelo  and  Savonarola,  Con- 
tarini  and  Pole  who  had  true  distinction. 
Most  of  us  know  some  in  whom  the  per- 
fection of  Christian  saintliness  has  reached 
that  miracle  of  refinement.  A  certain 
dignity  and  detachment,  a  certain  grace 
of  holiness  seems  to  attach  to  such  natures, 
and  they  attain  a  charm  given  by  nothing 


138  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

else;  neither  by  high  birth  nor  by  high 
culture.  Thirdly,  Christianity  asserts  for 
every  man  a  definite  idea,  a  place  in  the 
Kingdom.  None,  it  declares,  there  is,  how- 
ever lowly,  who  has  not  in  him  something 
that  is  a  beauty  all  his  own.  Nietzsche 
denies  this,  and  asserts  it  only  of  the  few; 
although  he  gives  no  criterion  to  distin- 
guish the  classes. 

True,  Christianity  is  a  fellowship,  a 
common  life.  It  teaches  that  no  one  can 
reach  his  end  in  isolation.  So  did  Nietzsche, 
however  high  the  value  he  set  upon  lone- 
liness. The  qualities  he  desiderates — power 
to  command,  a  certain  proud  obedience, 
refinement,  distinction  of  manner — can 
none  of  them  be  won  except  at  the  cost  of 
a  strong  social  discipline.  His  idea  of 
Vornehmheit  has  no  meaning  whatever  out 
of  society.  What  he  says  of  the  need  of 
severe  schooling  shews  how  well  aware  he 
is  of  the  social  element,  even  in  the  making 
of  the  superman.  True,  he  appears  to 
teach  that,  once  his  superman  is  made,  he  is 


NIETZSCHE  AND  CHRISTIANITY        139 

free  from  all  social  restraints.  Even  this  is 
doubtful;  he  would  be  restrained  in  his 
dealings  with  his  peers,  though  not  with 
the  herd. 

Modern  knowledge  has  shown  that  after 
all  there  is  something  in  the  idea  of  race, 
of  good  breeding,  of  family.  This  eugenic 
notion  of  a  carefully  prepared  birth-issue, 
is  what  Nietzsche  rested  upon  at  the  last. 
Nor  is  there  anything  in  this  (provided  cer- 
tain safeguards  are  taken)  which  Chris- 
tianity need  object  to.  The  multiplication 
of  the  unfit — ^provided  we  know  what  are 
truly  unfit — it  is  no  concern  of  the  Church 
to  preserve;  although  it  is  concerned  (un- 
like Nietzsche)  for  their  proper  treatment 
when  once  they  are  here. 

Even  in  politics  the  aspirations  of  the 
most  ardent  social  reformers  have  passed 
away  from  that  vast  state,  the  "all  too 
many,"  as  fairy  godmother,  and  are  all 
in  favour  of  groups  as  the  only  effective 
method  of  securing  good  conditions  on  a 
large  scale.     Such  groups  (even  in  a  sys- 


140  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

tern  of  guild-socialism)  will  not  be  equal — 
a  group  of  doctors  or  artists  would  be 
different  in  all  its  requirements  from  a 
group  of  engineers.  Each  will  have  its 
own  place.  The  honour  and  austerity  of 
its  life  and  its  dignity  will  be  enhanced 
by  the  fact  that  hereditary  influences  are 
bound  to  have  much  influence  in  helping 
towards  membership,  as  they  do  now. 

Even  Nietzsche  once  admits  that  there 
is  something  common  running  through  all 
men.  Christianity  teaches  that  the  lowest 
of  us  is  not  too  low  to  be  redeemed  by  the 
blood  of  Christ,  and  that  the  noblest  is 
not  so  high  that  he  needs  no  forgiveness. 
In  this  we  are  diametrically  opposed  to 
Nietzsche,  who  would  divide  the  world 
at  birth  into  those  who  are  and  those 
who  are  not  capable  of  rising  above  the 
herd;  although  even  for  the  former  dis- 
cipline is  needed.  We  have  seen,  more- 
over, that  Nietzsche  was  unconsciously 
Christian  in  his  conception  of  the  tragic  na- 
ture of  existence  as  against  the  facile  opti- 


NIETZSCHE  AND  CHRISTIANITY        141 

mism  of  Strauss  and  the  Hegelians,  in  his 
sense  that  redemption  is  needed,  and  that 
this  can  come  only  by  a  "new  creature." 

Further,  there  is  something  analogous  to 
Christian  thought  even  in  Nietzsche's  Be- 
yond Good  and  EviL  What  that  book  at- 
tacks is  the  ethics  of  Kant  and  all  other 
codifiers  of  the  Categorical  Imperative. 
Christianity  is  not  a  code,  but  a  spirit. 
Love  to  God  and  to  our  neighbour  is  the 
principle.  The  ordinary  rules  of  morals  are 
merely  formulse,  which  express  the  ap- 
plication of  this  principle  under  normal 
conditions.  There  are  cases  when  they 
do  not  apply.  That  is  the  excuse  for 
casuistry,  which  discusses  all  these  cases 
on  the  edge.  It  is  true,  for  instance,  that 
necessity  knows  no  law,  Salus  populi  su- 
perna  lex — is  the  motto  for  certain  rare  con- 
ditions which  justify  the  disregard  of  all 
normal  rules.  The  error  of  Machiavelli 
and  all  who  follow  him  is  that  they  raise 
cases  of  necessity  into  the  normal  rule  of 
action.     They  are  an  instance  of  the  mis- 


142  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

take  of  trying  to  legislate  for  hard  cases. ^ 
Nietzsche  discerns  the  truth  of  the  matter 
when  he  says  that  acts  *'done  for  love 
are  beyond  good  and  evil."  Nietzsche's 
system,  as  practically  applied,  is  wrong, 
for  it  would  make  normal  what  is  meant 
to  be  exceptional.  But  it  must  be  pointed 
out,  that  his  polemic  against  conventional 
morality  is  less  anti-Christian  than  he  sup- 
poses, and  that  his  error  springs  from  the 
fallacy  frequent  in  Germany  of  identify- 
ing Christian  moraUty  with  the  systems  of 
some  philosophers  who  are  either  not 
Christian  at  all,  or  else  very  partially  so. 

It  has  appeared,  then,  that  much  of  the 
attack  of  Nietzsche  is  due  to  misconcep- 
tion. Is  it,  then,  the  case  that  Nietzsche 
was,  after  all,  only  a  Christian  who  had 
lost  his  way,^  that  his  own  system  was, 

^  On  the  relation  of  Nietzsche  to  MachiavelU,  c^.  Caffi's  Nietzsches 
Stellung  zu  Machiavellis  Lehre. 

1  have  said  something  on  this  topic  in  From  Gerson  to  Grotius, 
chap.  III. 

2  "II  Nietzsche,  invece,  era  nel  fondo  un'  anima  assai  cristiana 
e  non  ingiustamente  e  stato  chiamato  da  qualcuno  un  'prete  de- 
cadente.'     L'ideale  del  superuomo  corrisponde  un  poco  a  quelle 


NIETZSCHE  AND  CHRISTIANITY        143 

had  he  but  understood  it  better,  the  same 
thing  so  far  as  rules  of  conduct  went? 
No.  True,  some  hke  Mr.  Stephen  Graham 
may  say  that  Nietzsche  was  on  his  way  to 
become  a  transcendent  Christian.  That 
may  be,  for  he  was  always  changing.  But 
it  is  unlikely,  unless  his  view  of  the  non- 
existence of  the  supernatural  had  altered. 
We  must  take  him  as  he  wrote.  Had  he 
not  gone  mad,  he  might  have  become 
saner.  It  is  true,  also,  that  Nietzsche's 
ideas  have  very  much  more  affinity  with 
the  truly  Christian  conception  of  Hfe 
than  had  the  moral  ideas  of  Strauss  or  of 
any  other  of  the  Pantheistic  philosophers 
whom  he  superseded.  It  is  true,  also, 
that  his  attitude  to  hfe  is  at  bottom  mys- 
tical. He  sees  that  man  as  he  is  is  not  a 
beautiful  sight.     He  sees  the  wickedness 

del  Cristo — ^I'accettazione  del  male  corresponde  all  cristiana 
accettazione  del  dolore — il  sacrifizio  degli  inferiori  alia  futura 
vita  superiore,  al  sacrifizio  della  vita  attuale  per  la  beatitudine 
della  vita  futura.  I  superuomini  somigliano  oltre  che  ai  guardiani 
della  repubblica  platonica,  anche  ai  monaci  soldati,  ai  Templari 
o  ai  cavalieri  di  Malta,  e  il  Nietzsche  e  arrivato  a  scrivere  che 
*chi  vuol  impiegare  il  suo  denaro  da  spirito  libero  deve  fondare 
istituti  sul  tipo  dei  conventi.' "     (Papini,  254.) 


144  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

of  pessimism.  Pessimism,  the  nay-saying 
to  life,  is  ten  thousand  times  more  wicked 
than  all  the  variegated  blasphemies  of 
Nietzsche.  Man  can  be  saved  only  by 
becoming  changed  in  his  nature.  That  is 
the  Christian  doctrine  of  grace.  Nietzsche 
is  nearer  to  this  than  are  those  who  preach 
a  dogma  of  inevitable  progress  or  those  who 
deny  sin.  Sin  Nietzsche  admits  practically, 
though  not  theoretically;  it  is  the  instinct 
of  decadence.  Also,  when  Nietzsche  talks 
of  the  rarity  of  the  higher  man,  he  is  more 
like  Christianity  than  those  who  teach 
the  contrary.  Christians  are,  and  are 
likely  to  be,  a  minority.  Only  persecution 
or  its  results  have  obscured  that  fact.  We 
are  not  yet  rid  of  the  confusion  between 
Christianity  and  citizenship.  Distinction, 
further,  is  the  outward  and  visible  sign  of 
an  invisible  grace,  the  sacrament  of  per- 
sonality— it  depends  on  a  consecrated  will. 
It  is  a  will  consecrated  to  God  that  marks 
the  Christian,  not  emotion  or  knowledge. 
In  his  insistence  on  the  will  and  its  train- 


NIETZSCHE  AND  CHRISTIANITY        145 

ing  Nietzsche  is  in  harmony  with  Chris- 
tianity and  with  the  characteristic  'Eng- 
lish conception  of  education.  Even  the 
ideal  of  the  superman  enshrines  the  truth 
that  individuahty  or  group  distinction  has 
its  own  quahty,  and  that  man  is  of  worth, 
through  something  inherent  and  inahen- 
able  in  himself.^  All  forms  of  Christianity 
admit  this,  except  the  heresies  which  are 
toppling  into  Pantheism.  Nietzsche's  ha- 
tred of  equality  in  the  sense  in  which  he  gives 
it  is  not  belied  by  Christian  sentiment. 
His  idealisation  of  heroism — his  use  of 
suffering,  the  religion  of  valour — is  only 
the  ancient  doctrine  of  the  Cross  taught 
by  Jesus  Christ,  palpitating  in  St.  Paul 
and    the    whole    New    Testament.      Even 


^  "Der  christliche  Altruismus,  so  fern  er  dem  Kraft-  und  Ent- 
wicklungsideal  Nietzsches  steht,  teilt  mit  ihm  doch  den  Gegen- 
satz  gegen  alle  in  engerem  Sinne  bloss  moralische  und  soziale 
Idealbildung;  nicht  in  der  altruistischen  Handlung  als  soleher, 
sondern  in  der  Heiligung  und  Seligkeit  der  Seele,  die  deren  Innen- 
seite  bildet,  liegt  der  abschliessende  Wert."  (Simmel,  202.)  Cf. 
also  a  little  earlier. 

"  Wenn  der  reiche  Jiingling  sein  Gut  an  die  Armen  verschen- 
ken  soil,  so  ist  das  keine  Anweisung  zum  Almosengeben,  sondern 
ein  Mittel  und  Zeichen  der  Vollendung  und  Befreiung  der  Seele." 
(Simmel,  201.) 


146  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

what  he  says  of  the  barbaric  virtues,  his 
new  commandment,  "Be  hard,"  might  per- 
haps be  interpreted  as  Httle  more  than  a 
warning  against  that  pity  which  is  born 
of  cowardice,  or  that  sympathy  which  is 
a  form  of  luxury.  All  this  may  be  said. 
Also  it  is  added  that  Nietzsche  is  care- 
ful to  distinguish  Christianity  from  its 
Founder.  He  is  the  author  of  the  saying 
that  there  has  been  only  one  Christian, 
and  he  died  upon  the  Cross.  This  quali- 
fication, however,  is  but  a  slight  one. 
All  that  can  be  said  is  that  the  venom 
which  we  note  in  his  attack  on  St.  Paul 
and  the  New  Testament  is  less  apparent 
in  his  words  about  Jesus  of  Nazareth. 
One  or  two  places  show  a  certain  rever- 
ence. In  the  main,  however,  he  treats 
Him  with  contempt.  Jesus  is  to  him  a 
decadent,  a  madman  (curiously  enough, 
Nietzsche  attacks  others  for  the  idiosyn- 
crasies of  his  own  temperament).  He  had 
the  melancholy  of  an  ill-nourished  person: 
was  the  most  ill-natured  of  all  men,  suf- 


NIETZSCHE  AND  CHRISTIANITY        147 

fering  from  a  lunatic  pride,  which  took 
dehght  in  humihty.^  He  died  for  His  own 
guilt.  He  led  an  indefensible  revolt.  The 
sermon  on  the  mount  is  not  spoken  from 
an  elevated  standpoints  The  distinctive 
note  of  Jesus  is  His  hatred  of  all  actuality. 
Nietzsche  wishes  Dostoieffsky  could  have 
described  the  world  of  morbid  unreality  in 
which  Jesus  lived,  and  written  the  life  "of 
this  most  interesting  decadent."  He  sums 
up  at  the  close  of  Ecce  Homo:  "Have  you 
understood  me,  Dionysos  or  Christ?" 

Had  Nietzsche  corrected  those  miscon- 
ceptions of  which  I  spoke,  his  ideal  of  con- 
duct would  still  remain  fundamentally  an- 
tagonistic to  the  Christian.  Nor  need  one 
be  so  cruel  as  to  tear  from  his  melancholy 

*  "Jesus  mit  der  Melancholie  der  scUechten  Emahrung. 

"Jesus:  will  dass  man  an  ihn  glaubt,  und  schickt  AUes  in  die 
HoUe  was  widerstrebt.  Arme,  Dumme,  Kranke,  Weiber,  Kinder, 
eingerechnet  Huren  und  Gesindel  von  ihm  bevorzugt:  unter  ihnen 
fiihlt  er  sich  wohl.  Das  Gefiihl  des  Richtens  gegen  alles  Schone, 
Reiche,  Machtige,  der  Hass  gegen  die  Lachenden.  Die  Giite 
mit  ihrem  grossten  Contrast  in  einer  Seele;  es  war  der  boseste 
aller  Menschen.  Ohne  irgend  welche  psychologische  Billigkeit. 
Der  wahnsinnige  StoLz,  welcher  die  feinste  Lust  an  der  Demuth 
hat."     (Werke,  XIII,  305.) 

"  Man  verkenne  doch  ja  nicht  den  tiefen  Mangel  an  Noblesse 
des  Gefiihls  in  Christus." 


148  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

brows  that  laurel-wreath  which  he  himself 
had  placed  thereon — the  title  of  Antichrist.^ 
The  cardinal  objection  is  this:  Nietzsche 
sets  before  us  the  ideal  of  redemption  by 
the  superman.  The  whole  point,  then,  is 
what  content  he  pours  into  this  vague 
and  plastic  conception.  Nietzsche's  ideal 
is  essentially  anti-Christian.  It  is  based 
on  the  notion  of  pride.  Not  only  is  it 
anti- Christian;  the  superman,  as  Nietzsche 
preaches  him,  is  inexpressibly  vulgar.  The 
notion  of  force  without  any  direction — ■ 
for  he  says  repeatedly  that  life  has  no 
meaning  or  goal — would  ultimately  be  no 
less  destructive  of  the  culture  which 
Nietzsche  desired.  As  Doctor  Tonnies 
points  out  in  his  little  book  Der  Nietzsche- 
Kultus,  all  the  highest  culture  in  the  world 
comes  from  treating  men  as  bound  in 
fellowship,  not  from  mere  tyrannic  pride.^ 

^"Wollen  Sie  einen  neuen  Namen  fiir  mich?  Die  Kirchen- 
sprache  hat  einen:  ich  bin  .  .  .  der  Antichrist."  Nietzsche  to 
Malwida  von  Meysenbug.     {Briefe,  III,  603.) 

2"Alle  edlere,  geistige  Kultur,  alles  'hohere'  Menschensein 
hat  bisher  noch — auch  im  'klassischen  Altertum' — auf  der  breiten 
Basis  gesunden  Bauer-  und  Biirgertums  sich  erhoben.     Die  sys- 


NIETZSCHE  AND  CHRISTIANITY        149 

The  Renaissance  was  noble,  in  so  far  as 
it  worked  upon  the  heritage  of  the  Middle 
Ages.  When  it  became  purely  pagan,  it 
ceased  to  be  interesting  and  lost  refinement. 
It  may  be  said  that  Nietzsche  qualifies 
his  cult  of  power  with  his  cult  of  what  is 
distinguished.  True — but  what  does  he 
mean  by  that?  We  can  judge  from  the 
persons  he  cites  with  most  frequent  admira- 
tion. The  Roman  Empire,  of  which  the 
very  essence  is  "that  river  of  cruelty" 
which  according  to  Mommsen  ran  through 
it  in  its  relations  to  slavery:  and  that  in 
contradistinction  to  the  Christian  Church, 
which  would  assuredly  suffer  a  worse  per- 
secution, if  Nietzsche's  ideals  were  ever  to 
be  really  triumphant.  He  takes  names: 
Napoleon,  and  above  all  Cesare  Borgia. 
Now,  we  know  pretty  well  the  kind  of  man 
Cesare  was.  The  murder  of  the  generals 
at  Sinigaglia  under  a  safe-conduct,  of  his 

tematische  und  massenhafte  Sklavenwirtschaft  war  fiir  die  antike 
Kultur  ebenso  ein  Ende  wie  fiir  die  moderne  die  systematische 
und  massenhafte  Proletarisierimg  des  Volkes."  (Tonnies,  Der 
Nietzsche-Kultus,  105.) 


150  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

brother  the  Duke  of  Gandia,  his  mixture 
of  vulgarity  and  skill  are  familiar  to  all.  It 
is  vain  to  say  that  Nietzsche  did  not  want 
these  people  now.  They  are  the  kind  he 
admired.  His  private  letters  to  Peter  Gast 
and  Georg  Brandes  make  it  even  more 
patent.  Did  Cesare  Borgia  advance  culture 
as  much  as  a  contemporary  like  Dean  Colet  ? 
Nietzsche's  theory  is  at  bottom  a  denial 
of  rights  to  the  mass  of  men.  It  is  a  pro- 
test carried  to  its  utmost  limits  against  the 
maxim:  "Homo  sum,  humani  nihil  a  me 
alienum  puto."  Cicero's  constant  appeal 
to  humanitas  would  be  anathema  to 
Nietzsche.  The  will  to  power,  if  that  be 
all  reality,  must  perforce  treat  all  else  as 
tools.  The  will  to  freedom  is  in  essence 
Christian,  for  it  recognises  in  others  what 
it  claims  for  itself.  To  Nietzsche,  with  all 
outlook  on  the  other  world  denied,  men  in 
the  mass  are  no  more  than  living  beings, 
to  be  the  instrument  of  the  strong  man's 
lust.  The  Putumayo  atrocities,  and  others 
more  recent  which  we  need  not  cite,  are 


NIETZSCHE  AND  CHRISTIANITY        151 

in  accord  with  his  teaching.  An  author 
must  be  judged,  not  by  the  actions  which  he 
directly  enjoins,  but  by  the  kind  of  spirit 
which  will  naturally  come  of  following 
on  his  lines.  Nietzsche  need  not  be  held 
to  have  wished  many  of  the  things  which 
have  happened.  Yet  they  may  be  the  nat- 
ural outcome  of  his  prophecies. 

The  system  of  Nietzsche  is  shattered 
upon  the  rock  of  facts,  just  as  ultimately 
were  the  great  slave  empires  of  the  past. 
All  are  founded  on  a  lie.  Mr.  Paterson 
in  his  Nemesis  of  Nations  has  shown  how 
one  after  another  empires  have  risen  and 
decayed  through  this  very  cause,  that 
they  treated  the  vast  mass  as  mere  tools, 
"chattels,"  as  the  law  said.  This  is  a  lie. 
Treat  human  beings  as  machines  as  much 
as  you  will,  the  fact  remains  that  they  are 
incurably  personal.  Ultimately  this  truth 
is  destructive  of  the  proudest  tyranny, 
though  it  may  last  a  thousand  years. 

The  passion  and  the  pride  of  man  are 
for  ever  trying  to  loose  all  bonds,  and  to 


152  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

enslave  others  to  their  will.  It  is  a  grave 
question  whether  that  is  not  the  real  pur- 
pose of  modern  capitalism.  Those  who 
are  forward  to  condemn  Nietzsche  should 
ask  themselves  how  far  they  allow  them- 
selves to  be  ruled  by  a  like  idea,  how  far 
they  are  content  to  build  their  own  devel- 
opment, their  culture  and  high  tastes,  and 
even  their  religion  upon  the  services  of 
masses  of  men — of  whom  they  think  as  so 
much  machinery.  We  cannot  in  this  or 
any  other  form  of  society  be  free  of  using 
the  services  of  others.  The  point  is,  how  do 
we  regard  those  who  help  us  ?  The  culture, 
which  is  founded  even  in  theory  on  the 
denial  of  all  share  in  it  to  the  common 
people,  may  for  a  time  be  brilliant;  but  it 
lacks  that  freedom  which  is  of  the  essence 
of  all  living  art.  A  society  whose  root- 
notion  is  pride,  which  looks  on  the  rest  as 
though  in  the  slang  phrase  they  ''do  not 
really  exist,"  will  in  the  long  run  develop 
grosser  corruptions.  This  is  said  to  be  the 
cause  of  the  decadence  of  Greece.     Its  art 


NIETZSCHE  AND  CHRISTIANITY        153 

became  hedonist,  and  thereupon  sensuahty 
ruled.  Or  else  its  aristocrats  will  become  so 
highly  refined  that  the  sight  of  the  ugli- 
ness of  the  life  of  the  masses  fills  them  with 
horror,  and  they  seek  to  remedy  it.  This 
will  be  the  case,  even  if  "the  pathos  of  dis- 
tance" be  mainly  intellectual. 

Some  defenders  of  Nietzsche  have  argued 
that  in  no  real  sense  does  he  desire  a  tyranny 
of  masters,  like  that  of  the  ancient  world, 
that  his  words  about  war  refer  only  to 
warfare  of  ideas,  and  that  he  had  no  sym- 
pathy with  the  present  plutocratic  oli- 
garchy. This  may  be  true.  It  is  irrele- 
vant to  the  consideration  of  the  meaning 
of  his  substitute  for  the  good  tidings 
preached  to  the  poor.  Nietzsche's  moral 
system  is  the  apotheosis  of  pride.  His 
own  feeling  that  he  was  of  a  different 
rank  to  other  men,  that  Zarathustra  was 
more  wonderful  than  Faust  or  the  Divina 
Commedia;^    his  words  about  Wagner  and 

^  "If  all  the  spirit  and  goodness  of  every  great  soul  were  collected 
together,  the  whole  could  not  create  a  single  one  of  Zarathustra's 
discourses."     {Ecce  Homo,  106.) 


154  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

many  other  expressions  are  evidence  for 
this  megalomania.  This  was  the  oncoming 
of  disease.  Yet  it  translates  itseK  into 
his  ethical  doctrine.  As  he  claimed  him- 
seK,  his  philosophy  is  eminently  personal. 
However  much  Nietzsche's  wildness  be 
trimmed,  his  effect  would  be  to  endow  the 
'^ superior  person,"  out  of  whose  loins  the 
superman  shall  come,  with  a  sense  of  cold 
aloofness  from  the  rest  of  mankind,  and 
to  destroy  all  sense  of  duty  towards  them. 
Nietzsche  admits  this. 

Nietzsche's  gentle  and  delicate  nature 
is  often  pleaded  in  extenuation.  The 
truth  remains  that  his  doctrine  is,  what 
it  professes  to  be,  a  philosophy  of  force  and 
nothing  but  force,  that  it  is  certain  to 
stimulate  that  pride  from  which  tyranny 
comes  in  its  disciples,  and  that  it  ministers 
to  the  worst  prejudice  of  cultivated  men, 
that  other  people  are  of  no  account. 

Striking  resemblances  are  to  be  found 
between  the  doctrine  of  the  Will  to  Power 
of  Nietzsche  and  the  Elan  vital  of  Berg- 


NIETZSCHE  AND  CHRISTIANITY        155 

son.^  But  there  is  all  the  difference  in  that 
one  makes  freedom  the  aim  of  development, 
and  the  other  power.  For  faith  in  freedom 
means  ultimately  the  belief  in  the  reality  of 
spiritual  forces  other  than  oneself,  and  the 
will  to  power  means  its  denial.^  Nietzsche 
rejoices  in  that  his  superman  will  seem  to 
Christian  moralists  a  devil.  That  must 
be  so,  if  pride  and  force  be  the  only  ideal — 
even  if  one  exclude  physical  force.  The 
great  noon  of  the  world  will  come,  if  it 
ever  comes,  not  when  a  modern  Borgia 
wreaks  his  w^ill  upon  the  weak;  but  when 
pride  itself  becomes  humble,  when  the  lofty 
looks  are  cast  low,  not  from  without  but 
from  within,  when  real  freedom  is  recog- 
nised for  all. 

That  Nietzsche's  antagonism  to  Chris- 
tian ideals  was  more  radical  than  any 
theological  hostility  was  his  boast  in  a 
letter    to    his   mother.      His    dubbing   the 

^  This  is  seen  in  certain  arguments,  e.  g.,  the  Calvinistic,  drawn 
from  the  Omnipotence  of  God  when  he  is  conceived  as  earthly 
autocrat. 

2  Cf.  on  this  point  Caffi,  op.  cit. 


156  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

three  graces,  Faith,  Hope,  and  Charity, 
as  the  three  Christian  dodges  is  evidence  of 
this.  His  view  of  the  primitive  Christian 
community  as  described  in  the  New  Testa- 
ment goes  farther.  Let  me  quote  what 
he  says: 

"One  does  well  to  put  on  gloves  when 
reading  the  New  Testament.  The  prox- 
imity of  so  much  uncleanliness  almost 
compels  one  to  do  so.  We  should  as 
Kttle  choose  'first  Christians'  for  com- 
panionship as  Polish  Jews.  .  .  .  Neither 
of  them  have  a  good  smell.  I  have 
searched  in  vain  in  the  New  Testament 
for  even  a  single  sympathetic  tract. 
There  is  nothing  in  it  free,  gracious, 
open-hearted,  upright.  Humanity  has 
not  yet  made  its  beginning  here — the 
instincts  of  cleanliness  are  lacking.  .  .  . 
There  are  only  bad  instincts  in  the  New 
Testament,  there  is  no  courage  even 
for  those  bad  instincts.  All  in  it  is 
cowardice,   all    is    shutting   of   the   eyes 


NIETZSCHE  AND  CHRISTIANITY        157 

and  self-deception.  Every  book  becomes 
cleanly,  when  one  has  just  read  the  New 
Testament.  To  give  an  example,  imme- 
diately after  Paul,  I  read  with  delight 
Petronius,  that  most  charming  and  wan- 
ton scoffer.  .  .  . 

"Every  expression  in  the  mouth  of 
a  'first  Christian'  is  a  lie,  every  action 
he  does  is  an  instinctive  falsehood — all 
his  values,  all  his  aims  are  injurious, 
but  he  whom  he  hates,  that  which  he 
hates,  has  value.  .  .  .  The  Christian,  the 
priestly  Christian  especially,  is  a  crite- 
rion of  values.  Have  I  yet  to  say  that 
in  the  whole  New  Testament  only  a  single 
figure  appears,  which  one  is  obliged  to 
honour — Pilate,  the  Roman  governor.  To 
take  a  Jewish  affair  seriously,  he  will 
not  be  persuaded  to  do  so.  A  Jew  more 
or  less — what  does  that  matter?  The 
noble  scorn  of  a  Roman  before  whom  a 
shameless  misuse  of  the  word  truth  was 
carried  on  has  enriched  the  New  Testa- 
ment   with    the    sole    expression    which 


158  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

has  value — which  is  itself  its  criticism, 
its  annihilation.    What  is  truth?"  ^ 

Zarathustra  is  a  "strong,  spontaneous, 
adventurous  individual."  So,  also,  were 
St.  Paul  and  St.  Francis.  High-hearted 
courage  has  always  been  a  Christian  vir- 
tue— the  eagle's  pride  and  the  serpent's 
cunning  with  which  Zarathustra  conquers 
may  win  an  audience  in  days  when  old 
bonds  are  broken.  What  is  Nietzsche  at 
his  noblest  as  compared  with  that  ideal 
which  he  contemns:  "God  is  Love:  and 
whoso  dwelleth  in  Love,  dwelleth  in  God. 
If  a  man  love  not  his  brother  whom  he 
hath  seen,  how  can  he  love  God  whom  he 
hath  not  seen.^" 

1  Antichrist,  314,  316. 


IV 

NIETZSCHE'S  ORIGINALITY 

Nothing  is  more  characteristic  of 
Nietzsche  than  his  claim  to  be  original. 
It  is  the  creator  of  new  values  who  is  the 
real  revolutionary,  he  says.  He  is  essen- 
tially apocalyptic,  and  believes  his  power 
to  be  that  of  inspiration.  He  gives  us  an 
account  of  this,  marred  in  its  seK-admira- 
tion  by  no  false  modesty.  Even  the  titles 
of  his  books  betray  this  apocalyptic  spirit. 
The  Dawn  of  Day,  The  Twilight  of  the 
Idols,  It  is  well  to  have  before  us  some 
of  these  passages.  For  Nietzsche  can 
be  judged  only  by  himself.  Books  about 
him  crystallise  into  death  the  flaming 
soul,  which  speaks  in  them: 

"Has  any  one  at  the  end  of  the  nine- 
teenth century  any  distinct  notion  of 
what  poets  of  a  stronger  age  understood 

159 


160  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

by  the  word  inspiration?  If  not,  I 
will  describe  it.  If  one  had  the  smallest 
vestige  of  superstition  left  in  one,  it 
would  hardly  be  possible  completely  to 
set  aside  the  idea  that  one  is  the  mere 
incarnation,  mouthpiece,  or  medium  of 
an  almighty  power.  The  idea  of  rev- 
elation in  the  sense  that  something 
which  profoundly  convulses  and  upsets 
one  becomes  suddenly  visible  and  audi- 
ble with  indescribable  certainty  and 
accuracy  describes  the  simple  fact.  One 
hears — one  does  not  seek — one  takes — 
one  does  not  ask  who  gives:  a  thought 
suddenly  flashes  up  like  lightning,  it 
comes  with  necessity,  without  faltering. 
I  have  never  had  any  choice  in  the  mat- 
ter. There  is  an  ecstasy  so  great  that 
the  universe  strains,  it  is  sometimes  re- 
laxed by  a  flood  of  tears,  during  which 
one's  steps  now  involuntarily  rush  and 
now  involuntarily  lag.  There  is  the 
feeling  that  one  is  utterly  out  of  hand 
with  the  very  distinct  consciousness  of 


NIETZSCHE'S  ORIGINALITY  161 

an   endless   number   of  fine  thrills   and 
titillations  descending  to  one's  very  toes; 
there  is  a  depth  of  happiness  in  which 
the  most  painful  and  gloomy  parts  do 
not  act  as   antitheses  to  the  rest,  but 
are  produced  and  acquired  as  necessary 
shades  of  colour  in  such  an  overflow  of 
light.    There  is  an  instinct  for  rhythmic 
relations  which  embraces  a  whole  world 
ui  forms   (length,  the  need  of  a  wide- 
embracing  rhythm,   is   almost  the  mea- 
sure of  the  force  of  an  inspiration,  a  sort 
of  counterpart  to  its  pressure  and  ten- 
sion).    Everything  happens  quite  invol- 
untarily, as  if  in  a  tempestuous  outburst 
of    freedom,    of    absoluteness    of    power 
and  divinity.     The  involuntary   nature 
of  the  figures  and  similes  is  the  most 
remarkable  thing;    one  loses  all  percep- 
tion of  what  is  imagery  and  metaphor; 
everything    seems    to    present    itself    as 
the  readiest,  truest,  and  simplest  means 
of  expression.      It  actually  seems,  to  use 
one  of  Zarathustra's  own  phrases,  as  if 


162  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

all  things  came  to  one  and  offered  them- 
selves as  similes.  ('Here  do  all  things 
come  caressingly  to  thy  discourse  and 
flatter  thee,  for  they  would  fain  ride 
upon  thy  back.  On  every  simile  thou 
ridest  here  into  every  truth.  Here  fly 
open  unto  thee  all  the  speech  and  word 
shrines  of  the  world,  here  would  all 
existence  become  speech,  here  would  all 
Becoming  learn  of  thee  how  to  speak,') 
This  is  my  experience  of  Inspiration.  / 
do  not  doubt  that  I  should  have  to  go  hack 
thousands  of  years  before  I  could  find  an- 
other, who  could  say  truly.  It  is  mine  al- 
sor  1 

"This  work  stands  alone.  Do  not  let 
us  mention  the  poets  in  the  same  breath. 
Nothing  perhaps  has  ever  been  produced 
out  of  such  a  superabundance  of  strength. 
My  concept  'Dionysian'  here  becomes 
the  highest  deed;  compared  with  it, 
everything  that  other  men  have  done 
seems  poor  and  limited.     The  fact  that 

*  Ecce  Homo,  101. 


NIETZSCHE'S  ORIGINALITY  163 

a  Goethe  or  a  Shakespeare  would  not 
for  an  instant  have  known  how  to  take 
breath  in  this  atmosphere  of  poison  and 
the  heights,  the  fact  that  by  the  side  of 
Zarathustra,  Dante  is  no  more  than  a 
behever,  and  not  one  who  first  creates 
the  truth — that  is  to  say  not  a  world- 
ruling  spirit,  a  fate;  the  fact  that  the 
poets  of  the  Veda  were  priests  and  not 
even  fit  to  unfasten  Zarathustra's  san- 
dal— all  this  is  the  least  of  things  and 
gives  no  idea  of  the  distance,  of  the 
azure  solitude  in  which  this  work  dwells. 
...  If  all  the  spirit  and  goodness  of 
every  great  soul  were  collated  together, 
the  whole  could  not  create  a  singh  one 
of  Zarathustra's  discourses.  .  .  .  Until 
his  coming  no  one  knew  what  was  height 
or  depth  and  still  less  what  was  truth. 
There  is  not  a  single  passage  in  this 
revelation  of  truth  which  had  already 
been  anticipated  and  divined  by  even 
the  greatest  of  men.  Before  Zarathus- 
tra   there    was    no    wisdom,   no    prov- 


164  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

ing  of  the  soul,  no  art  of  speech;  in 
his  book,  the  most  famihar  and  most 
vulgar  thing  utters  unheard-of  words. 
The  sentence  quivers  with  passion.  Elo- 
quence has  become  music.  Forks  of 
lightning  are  hurled  towards  futures  of 
which  no  one  has  ever  dreamed  before. 
The  most  powerful  use  of  parables  that 
has  yet  existed  is  poor  beside  it,  and 
mere  child's  play  compared  with  this 
return  of  language  to  the  nature  of 
imagery."  ^ 

One  more  passage,  and  that  from  Zara- 
thustra,  must  be  cited.  This  will  give  a 
good  notion  of  Nietzsche  in  his  apocalyptic 
robes  of  ceremony: 

"False  shores  and  false  securities  ye 
were  taught  by  the  good.  In  the  lies 
of  the  good  ye  were  born  and  hidden. 
Through  the  good  everything  hath  be- 
come deceitful  and  crooked  from  the 
bottom. 

.    1  Ibid..  106. 


NIETZSCHE'S  ORIGINALITY  165 

"But  he  who  discovered  the  land  'man,' 
discovered  also  the  land  'human  future.' 
Now  ye  shall  be  unto  me  sailors,  brave, 
patient  ones ! 

"Walk  upright  in  time,  O  my  brethren, 
learn  how  to  walk  upright !  The  sea 
stormeth.  Many  wish  to  raise  them- 
selves with  your  help. 

"The  sea  stormeth.  Everything  is  in 
the  sea.  Up  !  Upward  !  Ye  old  sailor 
hearts ! 

"What?  A  fatherland.?^  Thither  sinv- 
eth  our  rudder,  where  our  children's 
land  is.  Out  thither,  stormier  than  the 
sea,  our  great  longing  stormeth  ! 

"  'Why  so  hard.^'  said  once  the  char- 
coal unto  the  diamond,  'are  we  not  near 
relations  ? ' 

"Why  so  soft.?  O  my  brethren,  thus 
I  ask  you.    Are  ye  not — my  brethren.'^ 

"Why  so  soft,  so  unresisting,  and 
yielding?  Why  is  there  so  much  dis- 
avowal and  abnegation  in  your  hearts? 
Why  is  there  so  little  fate  in  your  looks  ? 


166  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

''And  if  ye  are  unwilling  to  be  fates, 
and  inexorable,  how  could  ye  conquer 
with  me  some  day? 

"And  if  your  hardness  would  not 
glance,  and  cut,  and  chip  into  pieces — 
how  could  ye  create  with  me  some  day  ? 

"For  all  creators  are  hard.  And  it 
must  seem  blessedness  unto  you  to  press 
your  hand  upon  millenniums  as  upon 
wax 

"Blessedness  to  write  upon  the  will 
of  millenniums  as  upon  brass — harder 
than  brass,  nobler  than  brass.  The 
noblest  only  is  perfectly  hard. 

"This  new  table,  O  my  brethren,  I 
put  over  you:   'Become  hard  !'  ^ 

"But  what  say  I  where  no  one  hath 
mine  ears !  Here  it  is  still  an  hour  too 
early  for  me. 

"Mine  own  forerunner  I  am  among 
these  folk,  mine  own  cockcrow  through 
dark  lanes. 

"But  their  hour  will  come !  And  mine 
will  come  also!     Every  hour  they  be- 

1  Zarathustra,  318-319. 


NIETZSCHE'S  ORIGINALITY  167 

come  smaller,  poorer,  less  fertile.  Poor 
pot-herbs  !    Poor  soil ! 

''And  soon  shall  they  stand  there  like 
dry  grass  and  prairie,  and,  verily,  wearied 
of  themselves — and  longing  for  fire  more 
than  for  water ! 

"Oh,  blessed  hour  of  lightning!  Oh, 
secret  of  the  forenoon !  Running  fires 
shall  I  one  day  make  out  of  them  and 
announcers  with  fiery  tongues. 

"Announce  shall  they  one  day  with 
fiery  tongues:  'It  cometh,  it  is  nigh,  the 
great  noon!'  "^ 

"But  I  and  my  fate,  we  speak  not 
unto  To-day.  Nor  do  we  speak  unto 
Never.  For  speaking  we  have  patience 
and  time  and  too  much  time.  For  one 
day  it  must  come  and  will  not  be  allowed 
to  pass  by. 

"Who  must  come  one  day  and  will 
not  be  allowed  to  pass  by.^  Our  great 
Hazar,  i,  e,,  our  great  far-off  kingdom  of 
man,  the  Zarathustra-kingdom  of  a  thou- 
sand years."  2 

1  lUd.,  252-253.  a  Ibid.,  353. 


168  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

The  dithyrambic  style  of  Nietzsche  dis- 
guises the  fact  that  this  revelation  is  not 
really  so  new  as  he  claims.  The  intensity 
and  vividness  with  which  he  felt  his  own 
experience  of  this  vision  often  blinded  him 
to  the  amount  of  his  indebtedness  to  others. 
His  ever-present  desire  to  be  in  reaction 
against  his  environment  led  him  to  sup- 
pose that  his  essays  were  more  entirely 
unzeitgemdsse  than  they  were.  Much  of 
his  effort  is  merely  towards  a  revival — an 
anti-Gothic  revival;  classical.  Pagan,  Med- 
iterranean. Even  despite  his  attack  on 
the  decadent  Romanticism  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  Nietzsche  is  essentially  a  Roman- 
ticist. Much  of  his  cult  of  the  superman  is 
the  romantic  cult  of  the  genius.  Signor 
Papini  regards  it  as  the  chief  sign  of  weak- 
ness in  Nietzsche  that  he  is  unable  ever 
to  be  authentically  original.^  Curious  it 
is  and  worthy  of  note  how  much  there  is 
of  recollection  in  his  writing.     Part  of  its 

^  "La  prova  piu  inaspettata  di  questa  fiachezza  consiste,  secondo 
me,  nella  sua  incapacita  ad  essere  veramente  ed  autenticamente 
originale."     (Papini,  op.  cit.,  232.) 


NIETZSCHE'S  ORIGINALITY  169 

charm  lies  in  its  power  to  call  up  memories. 
His  works  are  a  veritable  whispering  gal- 
lery of  literary  echoes.  Nietzsche,  who 
condemns  all  second-hand  culture,  is  em- 
inently literary.  Machiavelli  certainly  and 
Gobineau  probably  have  a  good  deal  to 
do  with  his  cult  of  Cesare  Borgia.  Doctor 
Thiele  discerns  in  So  Spake  Zarathustra 
the  strains  of  influence  of  many  kinds  of 
German  literature  in  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury. Great,  also,  is  Nietzsche's  debt  to 
those  Scriptures  which  he  abhorred.  The 
title  of  his  autobiography  Ecce  Homo  af- 
fords a  striking  instance  of  this.  La  Roche- 
foucauld is  not  obscurely  his  chosen  model 
in  his  aphoristic  vein — although  for  the 
main  part  his  aphorisms  have  not  the 
rapier-point  of  the  great  aristocrat.  It 
would  be  a  good  exercise  in  literary  culture 
to  trace  through  Nietzsche's  writings  all 
the  various  influences  which  moulded  him 
and  are  reflected  in  his  style.  What  Herr 
von  Billow  said  of  his  music  and  its  rela- 
tion  to   Wagner  might  be   said   of  many 


170  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

others  of  his  productions  in  their  Hterary 
provenance.^ 

All  this  does  not  seriously  detract  from 
the  greatness  of  Nietzsche.  Long  since 
have  we  learned  that  the  greatest  literary 
genius  may  borrow  as  much  as  he  likes, 
so  long  as  he  makes  his  takings  his  own, 
and  transfuses  all  with  the  alembic  of  his 
own  personality.  Nietzsche  does  this  in 
an  eminent  degree.  No  writer  is  more  per- 
sonal. But  he  is  not  independent,  despite 
all  his  dithyrambic  praise  of  solitude.  In 
spite  of  his  hatred  of  sentimentalism,  he 
is  above  all  things  a  "man  of  feeling," 
and  is  moved  not  so  much  by  a  positive 
inherent  power,  as  by  irritation  against 
some  other  person  or  writer.     His  relation 

^  Dorner  in  his  work  Pessimismus,  Nietzsche  und  Naturalismus 
has  a  very  acute  summarylof  Nietzsche's  position  as  a  Romanticist. 
I  quote  a  couple  of  passages: 

"Er  spielt  die  antike  Weltanschauung  in  mancher  Beziehung 
gegen  die  Christliche  aus.  Auch  da  ist  er  Romantiker,  er  schaut 
seine  Gedanken  in  die  Vergangenheit,  er  nimmt  was  ihm  passt 
aus  der  Antiken,  vor  allem  nicht  ihr  Mass"  (p.  112). 

"Kurz,  Nietzsche  verteilt  eine  Romantik  des  Lebensdranges, 
des  Machteffektes,  die  auf  der  Herrschaft  des  Naturalismus  der 
Zeit  fusst  und  den  Machttrieb  vergottert,  der  die  Zeit  bestimmt " 
(p.  116). 


NIETZSCHE'S  ORIGINALITY  171 

to  Wagner  is  typical.  He  begins  with 
friendship  and  adoration.  These  find  Ht- 
erary  expression  in  The  Birth  of  Tragedy 
and  the  Essays  out  of  Season,  When  the 
friendship  has  become  enmity,  he  cannot 
get  the  thought  of  Wagner  out  of  his  head, 
and  develops  his  new  principles  in  oppo- 
sition to  him.  Wagner  and  his  wife,  who 
is  probably  "Ariadne,^"  count  for  a  great 
deal  in  Nietzsche's  later  writing,  even 
apart  from  those  pages  devoted  to  that 
topic.  The  same  is  true  of  his  attitude  to 
Christianity.^ 

Even  his  heroic  moral  attitude  has  at 
times  something  rhetorical.  Nietzsche  be- 
trays himself  when,  in  order  to  prepare 
his  readers  for  an  attack  on  the  New  Testa- 
ment, he  is  forced  to  drag  in  a  tag:  "I 
can't  help  it.  Like  Luther,  I  say:  'Here 
I   stand,  I   can  do   no   other!'"     This  is 

1  Cf.  Bernoulli,  Overbeck  und  Nietzsche,  and  also  Belart's  re- 
mark in  Nietzsehes  Freundschafts-Tragodie. 

^ "  Originalite  disions-nous  en  parlant  de  ranimosite  de  notre 
penseur  a  I'egard  de  la  morale  chretienne;  il  faut  s'empresser 
d'ajouter  qu'il  n'est  guere  original  ici  que  par  ses  exces."  (Seil- 
lieres,  210.) 


172  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

eminently    unspontaneous;     very    unlike 
Luther. 

The  literary  affinities  of  Nietzsche  form 
too  multifarious  a  topic  to  be  treated  here. 
Rather  it  is  with  his  philosophic  back- 
ground that  this  lecture  will  try  to  deal. 
Even  then  it  will  not  be  complete.  In 
an  interesting  essay  in  the  International 
Journal  of  Ethics,  written  some  dozen  years 
ago,  M.  Fouillee  writes  as  follows: 

"Nietzsche  has  not  that  supreme  orig- 
inality which  he  claims  for  himself. 
Mix  Greek  sophistry  and  Greek  scep- 
ticism with  the  naturalism  of  Hobbes 
and  the  monism  of  Schopenhauer  cor- 
rected with  the  paradoxes  of  Rousseau 
and  of  Diderot,  and  the  result  will  be 
the  philosophy  of  Zarathustra."  ^ 

And  again: 

*'He  fancies  himself  secure  from  the 
prejudices  which  emanate  from  the  'herd' 

1  "  The  Ethics  of  Nietzsche  and  Guyau,"  A.  Fouillee,  Interna- 
tional Journal  of  Ethics,  1903,  p.  13. 


NIETZSCHE'S  ORIGINALITY  173 

or  are  due  to  environment,  and  yet  no 
one  more  than  this  singer  of  the  praises 
of  force  and  of  war  has  gathered  together 
into  a  single  heap  all  the  gregarious 
prejudices  from  Germany  still  feudal  in 
the  midst  of  the  nineteenth  century,  all 
those  dominant  ideas  which  spring  from 
the  race,  the  environment,  and  the  mo- 
ment, and  combined  them  with  corre- 
sponding ideas  from  antiquity,  the  Mid- 
dle Ages,  and  the  Renaissance."  ^ 

We  shall  not  be  able  to  enter  into  all 
the  questions  aroused  by  this  passage. 
But  it  may  be  worth  while  to  take  in  turn 
Nietzsche's  relation  to  certain  writers,  from 
whom  he  believed  himseK  to  be  wide  apart 
as  the  poles. ^  In  many  cases  that  differ- 
ence was  real,  yet  he  owed  more  to  them 
than  he  suspected.  Having  considered  these 
cases,  we  will  pass  to  another  writer,  who 

1  lUd.,  p.  17. 

2  The  extraordinary  originality  which  enthusiastic  Nietzscheites 
found  in  his  writings  is  mainly  due  to  their  own  unfamiliarity 
with  the  history  of  philosophy.  (Wolf,  The  Philosophy  of  Nietzsche, 
28.) 


174  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

is  usually  credited  with  having  been  partly 
the  inspire!  of  Nietzsche,  or  if  not  that,  a 
more  logical  and  thoroughgoing  exponent 
of  the  same  doctrine.  Max  Stirner,  the 
author  of  Der  Einzige  und  sein  Eigenilium, 
In  this  case  I  believe  that  the  opinion  is 
not  justified,  and  that  Nietzsche,  even  if 
he  had  read  Stirner,  derived  little  or  noth- 
ing from  him.  Nor  would  either  have  ap- 
proved the  other. 

It  may  be  well  to  say  a  few  words  about 
the  course  which  is  best  to  take  in  order 
to  arrive  at  a  comprehension  of  Nietzsche. 
For  the  purposes  of  literary  appreciation 
some  of  his  earliest  books,  such  as  the 
Birth  of  Tragedy  and  the  Future  of  our 
Educational  Institutions;  for  a  complete 
study  all  or  nearly  all  must  be  read.  For 
obtaining  illuminating  critical  views  about 
European  culture,  he  may  be  opened  al- 
most anywhere.  But  for  those  who  desire 
quickly  to  know  something  of  the  Gospel 
of  One  Superman,  his  third  or  last  period 
is  alone  of  supreme  importance.    Nietzsche's 


NIETZSCHE'S  ORIGINALITY  175 

course  may  be  divided  into  three:  the 
Schopenhauer-Wagner  period.  The  Birth 
of  Tragedy,  and  the  Essays  out  of  Season, 
etc.  Then  comes  a  period  of  intellectual- 
ism  of  which  Human,  All  Too  Human  is 
the  most  important  work;  although  the 
Joyful  Wisdom  and  the  Dawn  of  Day  must 
be  assigned  rather  to  that  than  the  suc- 
ceeding time.  In  Human,  All  Too  Human 
Nietzsche  wrote  on  the  side  of  intellec- 
tualist,  scientific  methods,  and  was  much 
under  the  influence  of  Paul  Ree  (although 
he  did  not  admit  this).  In  this  time  he 
was  more  purely  sceptical  than  at  any 
other;  in  his  reaction  against  Wagner  he 
sets  the  relation  of  art  to  science  in  pre- 
cisely the  opposite  light  to  that  in  which 
his  earlier  and  his  later  works  regard  it. 
His  sympathy  for  the  English  Darwinian 
school  and  the  English  psychologists  is 
great,  and  is  unlike  his  later  (or  earlier) 
attitude.  The  most  misleading  of  all  ways 
of  reading  Nietzsche  is  to  regard  anything 
said  in  Human,  All  Too  Human  as  author- 


176  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

itative  for  his  later  and  most  characteristic 
stage.  For  instance,  he  uses  expressions 
here  which  imply  an  attitude  to  war — 
which  is  at  variance  with  all  he  says  later. 
Wagner,  to  whom  this  book  was  sent, 
regarded  it  as  a  proof  of  mental  weakness, 
declaring  that  he  and  his  wife  had  already 
noticed  traces  of  this  during  his  visits  to 
Triebschen.  Had  Nietzsche  continued  in 
the  line  of  this  book,  there  would  have 
been  little  beyond  his  literary  brilliance  to 
distinguish  him  from  many  other  posi- 
tivists.  Nietzsche,  as  the  apostle  of  the 
superman  is  to  be  read  primarily  in  Also 
Sprach  Zarathustra.  This  cryptic  work 
needs  a  commentary,  as  Nietzsche  him- 
self was  aware.  All  the  later  works.  Be- 
yond Good  and  Evil,  The  Genealogy  of 
Morals,  The  Wagner  Tracts,  and  above 
all  the  posthumous  Will  to  Power  and 
Ecce  Homo  and  The  Antichrist  are  to  be 
used  for  this  end.  When  we  speak  of  the 
Nietzschean  doctrine,  it  is  of  the  Nietzsche 
of  this   last  period  that  we  speak.     Nor 


NIETZSCHE'S  ORIGINALITY  177 

can  it  be  disproved  by  citations  from  the 
second  period.^  Books  about  Nietzsche 
are  legion.  Simmers  Schopenhauer  und 
Nietzsche  is  very  illuminating.  As  a  guide 
to  the  ordinary  reader  Doctor  Miigge's 
work  is  of  value.  It  contains  an  account 
of  the  life,  an  analysis  of  his  works  in  order, 
and  an  attempt  at  appraisement  which  is 
neither  partisan  nor  hostile. 

Emmanuel  Kant,  the  philosopher  of 
Konigsberg,  is  one  of  Nietzsche's  most 
common  targets.  Nietzsche  is  never  weary 
of  mocking  him.  He  makes  puns  on  the 
name  to  his  discredit.  He  treats  the  doc- 
trine of  the  Categorical  Imperative  as 
hypocrisy.  He  is  contemptuous  of  Kant's 
Christian  or  semi-Christian  attitude,  of  the 
value  he  sets  on  each  individual,  and  so 
forth.  He  quarrels  with  his  distinction  be- 
tween phenomena  and  noumena,  Nietzsche's 
phenomenalism  is  so  radical  that  he  denies 

^  This  seems  to  me  an  error  in  Doctor  Wolf  on  The  Philosophy 
of  Nietzsche.  He  cites  passages  from  Human,  All  Too  Human,  as 
though  they  were  decisive  evidence  in  regard  to  Nietzsche's  final 
doctrine.     Mugge,  Friedrich  Nietzsche,  describes  the  ttiree  periods. 


178  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

it  to  be  phenomenalism,  for  that  word  im- 
plies a  reality  of  which  it  is  the  appearance. 
These  things  and  others  in  Kant  are  a  target 
not  merely  for  the  general  scorn  in  which 
Nietzsche  holds  German  writing  and  Ger- 
man philosophy,  but  for  special  and  pecu- 
liar mockery.  Yet,  Nietzsche  not  only 
owed  a  great  deal  to  Kant,  but  in  some 
respects  he  actually  developed  his  doc- 
trine.^ Kant  is  really  the  critic  and  the 
destroyer  of  rationalism.  He  shews  rather 
the  limits  than  the  powers  of  the  human 
reason.  Further  in  his  doctrine  of  the 
practical  reason,  he  shews  the  regulative 
value  of  those  ideas,  God,  Freedom,  and 
Immortality,  of  which  he  denied  the  possi- 
bility of  demonstration.  The  modern  anti- 
intellectualist  pragmatist  movement  in  all 
its  forms  owes  much  to  Kant. 

Nietzsche,  it  is  needless  to  say,  did  not 
believe  in  the  three  great  ideas  of  the 
Practical  Reason  as  propounded  by  Kant. 

^  Vaihinger,  Die  Philosophie  des  Als  Oh,  772,  admits  that  Nietz- 
sche took  much  from  Kant,  though  not  from  the  Kant  of  the 
text-books. 


NIETZSCHE'S  ORIGINALITY  179 

Yet  the  best  and  most  influential  part  of 
his  purely  philosophic  writing  is  his  acute 
criticism  of  the  rationalistic  habit  of  mind. 
As  he  said  in  a  letter  to  Brandes,  he  had 
arrived  at  a  state  in  which  he  disliked 
dialectic  and  even  the  sense  of  grounds  for 
an  opinion.  This  is  due  not  to  his  making 
up  his  mind  apart  from  all  reasoning,  but 
to  the  way  in  which  long  brooding  affects 
one.  Arguments  are  considered  on  either 
side,  but  eventually  there  arises  a  unity, 
in  which  all  seems  clear.  Then  it  seems 
silly  and  degrading  to  grope  about  for 
reasons  now  forgotten,  when,  besides,  the 
conviction  is  so  much  more  solid  than  the 
mere  conclusion  of  an  argument. 

To  return  to  Nietzsche  and  his  attack  on 
logicians.  The  philosopher's  trust  in  dia- 
lectic is,  like  everything  else,  merely  a 
form  of  the  will  to  power.  His  desire  is 
to  rule.  So  he  asserts  the  superiority  of 
that  in  which  he  is  an  adept.  More  than 
that,  logic  in  itself,  the  whole  method  of 
the  reasoning  faculty,  is  without  any  ref- 


180  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

erence  to  reality.     It  is  merely  the  outcome 
of  the  instinct  to  control. 

The  object  of  science  is  to  enslave  na- 
ture. Truth  is  merely  that  form  of  il- 
lusion which  enables  one  best  to  live. 
Logic,  the  cutting  of  the  world  into  httle 
bits,  and  treating  it  as  machinery,  is  not 
even  an  elementary  guide  to  reality.  Even 
its  ultimate  principle,  the  necessity  of  in- 
ference, given  certain  premises,  is  dictated 
only  by  the  will  to  power;  e.  g.,  it  is  fatigue, 
not  love  of  knowledge,  that  drives  us  to 
seek  unity — and  reason  is  the  principle  of 
unity.     Let  me  cite  what  Nietzsche  says: 

"Logic  is  the  attempt  on  our  part'^to 
understand  the  actual  world  according 
to  a  scheme  of  Being  devised  by  our- 
selves; or,  more  exactly,  it  is  our  at- 
tempt at  making  the  actual  world  more 
calculable  and  more  susceptible  to  for- 
mulation, for  our  own  purposes.  .  .  . 

"In  order  to  be  able  to  think  and  to 
draw    conclusions,    it    is    necessary    to 


NIETZSCHE'S  ORIGINALITY  181 

acknowledge  that  which  exists:  logic  only 
deals  with  formulse  for  things  which  are 
constant.  That  is  why  this  acknowl- 
edgment would  not  in  the  least  prove 
reality:  'that  which  is'  is  part  of  our 
optics.  The  'ego'  regarded  as  Being 
(not  affected  by  either  Becoming  or 
evolution.) 

"The  assumed  world  of  subject,  sub- 
stance, 'reason,'  etc.,  is  necessary:  an 
adjusting,  simplifying,  falsifying,  arti- 
ficially separating  power  resides  in  us. 
'Truth'  is  the  will  to  be  master  over  the 
manifold  sensations  that  reach  conscious- 
ness; it  is  the  will  to  classify  phenomena 
according  to  definite  categories.  In  this 
way  we  start  out  with  a  belief  in  the 
'true  nature'  of  things  (we  regard  phe- 
nomena as  real.)  ^ 

"Thus  it  is  the  highest  degrees  of  ac- 
tivity which  awaken  belief  in  regard  to 
the  object y  in  regard  to  its  'reality.'  The 
sensations  of  strength,  struggle,  and  re- 

1  The  Will  to  Power,  II,  p.  33. 


182  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

sistance  convince  the  subject  that  there 
is  something  which  is  being  resisted. 

''The  criterion  of  truth  hes  in  the 
enhancement  of  the  feehng  of  power. 

"According  to  my  way  of  thinking, 
'truth'  does  not  necessarily  mean  the 
opposite  of  error,  but,  in  the  most  fun- 
damental cases,  merely  the  relation  of 
different  errors  to  each  other;  thus  one 
error  might  be  older,  deeper  than  an- 
other, perhaps  altogether  ineradicable, 
one  without  which  organic  creatures 
like  ourselves  could  not  exist;  whereas 
other  errors  might  not  tyrannise  over 
us  to  that  extent  as  conditions  of  ex- 
istence, but  when  measured  according 
to  the  standard  of  those  other  'tyrants,' 
could  even  be  laid  aside  and  'refuted.' 

"Why  should  an  irrefutable  assump- 
tion necessarily  be  'true'.^  This  ques- 
tion may  exasperate  the  logicians  who 
limit  things  according  to  the  limitations 
they  find  in  themselves:  but  I  have 
long  since  declared  war  with  this  lo- 
gician's optimism. 


NIETZSCHE'S  ORIGINALITY  183 

"Everything  simple  is  simply  imag- 
inary, but  not  'true.'  That  which  is 
real  and  true  is,  however,  neither  a 
unity  nor  reducible  to  a  unity.^ 

"Life  is  based  on  the  hypothesis  of  a 
belief  in  stable  and  regularly  recurring 
things;  the  mightier  it  is,  the  more  vast 
must  be  the  world  of  knowledge  and 
the  world  called  being.  Logicising,  ra- 
tionalising, and  systematising  are  of  as- 
sistance as  means  of  existence. 

"Man  projects  his  instinct  of  truth, 
his  'aim,'  to  a  certain  extent  beyond 
himself,  in  the  form  of  a  metaphysical 
world  of  Being,  a  'thing  in  itself,'  a 
world  already  to  hand.  His  requirements 
as  a  creator  make  him  invent  the  world 
in  which  he  works  in  advance;  he  antic- 
ipates it:  this  anticipation  (this  faith  in 
truth)  is  his  mainstay. 

"All  phenomena,  movement.  Becom- 
ing, regarded  as  the  establishment  of 
relations  of  degree  and  of  force,  as  a 
contest.  .  .  . 

1  lUd.,  p.  49. 


184  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

"As  soon  as  we  fancy  that  some  one 
is  responsible  for  the  fact  that  we  are 
thus  and  thus,  etc.  (God,  Nature),  and 
that  we  ascribe  our  existence,  our  hap- 
piness, our  misery,  our  destiny,  to  that 
some  one,  we  corrupt  the  innocence  of 
Becoming  for  ourselves.  We  then  have 
some  one  who  wishes  to  attain  to  some- 
thing by  means  of  us  and  with  us. 

"The  'welfare  of  the  individual'  is 
just  as  fanciful  as  the  'welfare  of  the 
species':  the  first  is  not  sacrificed  to 
the  last;  seen  from  afar,  the  species  is 
just  as  fluid  as  the  individual.  'The 
preservation  of  the  species'  is  only  a 
result  of  the  growth  of  the  species — that 
is  to  say,  of  the  overcoming  of  the  species 
on  the  road  to  a  stronger  kind."  ^ 

This  psychological  attempt  to  explain 
the  growth  of  intellect  as  a  development  of 
the  will  to  power  is  not  indeed  conducted 
on  the  same  lines  as  Kant's  critique.     It 

1  Ihid.,  p.  61. 


NIETZSCHE'S  ORIGINALITY  185 

is  more  akin  to  those  of  Bergson  and  some 
of  the  Pragma  lists.  Like  theirs,  it  is  largely 
due  to  the  notion  of  biological  evolution,  and 
the  sense  that  intellect  is  itself  a  product  of 
those  physical  forces  which  we  see  in  nat- 
ural development. 

For  all  that,  Nietzsche  owed  a  great 
deal  more  to  the  work  of  Kant  as  a  critic 
of  intellectualism  than  he  would  have  cared 
to  admit.  As  Doctor  Wolf  puts  it:  "The 
main  point  of  his  theory  of  knowledge,  I 
take  it,  was  to  bring  out  the  human  per- 
spective involved  in  all  human  knowledge 
— somewhat  as  Kant  and  others  had  done 
before  him,  only  more  so."  ^ 

^  The  following  passage  is  also  pertinent: 

(Werke,  XIII,  85,  §  214) :  "Die  wissenschaftliche  Genauigkeit ist 
bei  den  oberfiachliehsten  Erscheinungen  am  ersten  zu  erreichen, 
also  wo  gezahlt,  gereehnet,  getastet,  gesehen  werden  kann,  wo 
Quantitaten  constatiert  werden  konnen.  Also  die  armseligsten 
Bereiche  des  Daseins  sind  zuerst  fruehtbar  angebaut  worden. 
Die  Forderung,  Alles  miisse  meehanistisch  erklart  werden,  ist 
der  Instinct,  als  ob  die  werthvoUsten  und  fundamentalsten  Er- 
kenntnisse  gerade  am  ersten  gelmigen  waren:  was  eine  Naivetat 
ist.  Thatsachlich  ist  ims  Alles,  was  gezahlt  und  begriffen  werden 
kann,  wenig  werth;  wo  man  nicht  hinkommt  mit  dem  'Begreifen' 
das  gilt  uns  als  'hoher.'  Logik  und  Mechamk  sind  nur  auf  das 
oberflachlichste  anwendbar:  eigentlich  nur  eine  Schematisir-  und 
Abktirzungs-Kunst,  eine  Bewaltigung  der  Vielheit  durch  eine 
Kunst  des  Ausdrucks — kein  'Verstehen'  sondern  ein  Bezeichnen 


186  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

Lastly,  the  "thing  in  itself,"  which 
Nietzsche  so  stoutly  denied,  was  to  a  large 
extent  restored  by  him.  In  one  aspect, 
indeed,  he  is  purely  naturalistic.  But  like 
Schopenhauer,  he  beheved  in  a  force  be- 
hind all  phenomena,  that  "infinite  and 
eternal  energy"  (in  the  words  of  another 
philosopher  whom  Nietzsche  disliked), 
which  he  calls  the  will  to  power,  Kuno 
Fischer  long  since  gave  grounds  for  sup- 
posing that  Kant's  ''thing  in  itself"  means 
and  was  intended  by  him  to  mean  no  less 
than  Will.  This  view,  if  not  precisely 
estabhshed,  has  much  to  say  for  itself. 
Nietzsche  denied  all  metaphysical  reality, 
yet  it  is  not  diflScult  to  see  that  his  will  to 
power,  if  it  is  to  have  any  meaning  at- 
tached to  it  at  all  (and  he  always  repudi- 
ated sheer  materialism),  is  of  the  nature  of 
a  spiritual  force — The  will  that  can. 

Existent  behind  all  laws,  that  made  them  and  lo 
they  are. 

zum  Zweck  der  Verstandigung.     Die  Welt  auf  die  Oberflache 
reducirt  denken  heisst:  sie  zunachst  'begreiflich'  machen. 
"  Logic  und  Mechanik  beriihren  nie  die  Ursachlichkeit." 


NIETZSCHE'S  ORIGINALITY  187 

To  take  one  instance  in  detail.  Kant 
had  pointed  out  that  the  uniformity  of 
nature,  natural  laws,  etc.,  were  not  eternal 
realities,  properties  of  things  in  themselves; 
they  merely  depend  on  our  way  of  seeing 
nature,  they  are  the  a  priori  condition  of 
our  experience.  After  saying  that  cosmo- 
logical  proofs  of  God  are  purely  regulative, 
he  goes  on: 

"All  phenomena  depend  in  the  same 
way  a  priori  on  the  understanding,  and 
receive  their  formal  possibility  from  it, 
as  when  looked  upon  as  mere  intuitions, 
they  depend  on  sensibility  and  become 
possible  through  it,  so  far  as  their  form 
is  concerned.  However  exaggeiated 
therefore  and  absurd  it  may  sound,  that 
the  understanding  is  the  source  of  the 
laws  of  nature,  and  of  its  formal  unity, 
such  a  statement  is  nevertheless  correct 
and  in  accordance  with  experience.  .  .  . 

"The  pure  understanding  is  therefore 
the  law  of  the  synthetical  unity  of  all 
phenomena,  and  this  makes  experience. 


188  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

as  far  as  its  form  is  concerned,  for  the 
first  time  possible."  Kant,  Critique  of 
the  Pure  Reason,  Max  Muller's  transla- 
tion, pp.  Ill,  112. 

Nietzsche's  criticism  of  science  is  analo- 
gous, though  different.  Kant  asks,  how 
knowledge  is  possible,  assuming  that  we 
have  knowledge,  at  least  of  phenomena. 
Nietzsche  asks,  what  does  knowledge  mean  ? 
His  answer  is  that  knowledge  has  nothing 
to  do  with  any  so-called  truth,  but  is 
merely  the  complex  of  intellectual  formulae, 
by  which  that  resourceful  animal  Man  is 
able  to  increase  his  power.  Scientific 
knowledge  is  not  only  not  truth,  but  every 
single  instrument  of  so-called  knowledge 
is  merely  a  convenient  lie — i.  e,,  it  begins 
by  treating  as  static  what  is  essentially 
dynamic  and  splitting  up  the  continuum 
of  life  in  flux  into  imaginary  substances. 
We  are  ever  driven  in  the  terrific  whirl  of 
becoming.  The  very  beginnings  of  scientific 
method,  which  assumes  a  hard-and-fast 
multiplicity  of  beings,  are  a  fiction.     Truth 


NIETZSCHE'S  ORIGINALITY  189 

is  in  Nietzsche's  view  that  body  of  conve- 
nient hes  that  helps  us  to  Hve  more  power- 
fully.^ The  object  of  science  is  to  enslave 
the  outward  world,  just  as  morals  is  that 
other  body  of  lies  necessary  for  the  will  to 
power  of  the  majority,  the  oppressed  classes, 
to  move  towards  reconquest. 

Nietzsche  gives  us,  then,  a  psychological 
account  of  scientific  knowledge  which  is 
to  set  us  free  from  fatalism.  Kant  gave 
a  deductive  account  of  the  origin  of  knowl- 
edge, also  designed  to  set  us  free.  Both 
taught  the  regulative  rather  than  the 
absolute  value  of  the  laws  of  nature  and 
of  the  whole  body  of  so-called  knowledge.^ 

Let  us  pass  to  another  case  in  which 
the  disagreement  was  more  violent,  and 
the  dependence  even  more  obvious — that 

1  Nietzsche,  WerJce,  XIII,  102,  §  239:  "Das  Leben  bejahen— 
das  selber  heisst  die  Liige  bejahen.  Also  man  kann  nur  mit 
einer  absolut  unmoralischen  Denkweise  leben." 

^  Fatalism  in  another  sense  is  inherent  in  Nietzsche's  system. 
How  can  there  be  freedom  if  the  one  force  moving  all  reality  is 
blind  will  to  power  ?  No  real  choice  is  possible  in  Nietzsche's 
system,  and  he  himself  denies  all  moral  responsibility,  but  it  is 
freedom  which  he  desires. 


190  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

of  Schopenhauer.  Nietzsche's  relation  to 
Schopenhauer  is  of  capital  importance  in 
any  study  of  him.  The  question  of  his 
debt  to  Kant  is  more  academic.  Nietzsche 
had,  as  we  know,  for  a  long  time  been  an 
ardent  disciple  of  Schopenhauer,  and  after- 
wards turned  against  him.  As  against  any 
form  of  facile  optimism  he  remained  of 
the  same  opinion;  but  from  the  "tragic" 
standpoint,  which  is  his  final  one,  he  as- 
serts, as  we  saw  in  the  second  lecture, 
that  although  the  universe  is  a  chaos,  al- 
though life  has  no  purpose — moral,  intel- 
lectual, or  artistic — although  a  blind  will 
to  power  is  the  sole  reality  and  involves 
suffering  infinite,  yet  Life  is  still  to  be  ac- 
cepted in  its  entirety,  that  any  form  of 
self-denial  is  a  blasphemy  against  exis- 
tence, and  that  the  notion  of  redemption 
from  suffering,  and  therefore  from  exis- 
tence, is  radically  false.^      Nietzsche  does 

1  Nietzsche,  WerJce,  XIII,  90,  §228:  "Die  eigentliche  grosse 
Angst  ist:  die  Welt  hat  keinen  Sinn  mehr.  Inwiefern  mit  *Gott' 
auch  die  bisherige  Moral  weggefallensist:  sie  hielten  sich  gegen- 
seitig." 


NIETZSCHE'S  ORIGINALITY  191 

not  teach  that  suflFering  as  such  is  an  end. 
Like  Christianity,  he  asserts  that  pain  and 
pleasure  are  ahke  irrelevant  in  pursuit  of 
the  main  end,  which  is  life  and  more 
abundant  life,  and  that  whichever  we 
encounter,  alike  pain  or  pleasure,  can  be 
made  the  basis,  if  accepted,  of  a  richer 
development.  This  doctrine  is  in  direct 
opposition  to  that  of  Schopenhauer.  The 
latter  taught  that  the  one  reality  is  will, 
that  the  restlessness  of  will  produces  life, 
and  with  this  as  an  inevitable  consequence, 
suffering;  that  the  only  means  of  redemp- 
tion is  by  the  will  to  love,  i,  e,,  pity — all  love 
is  pity — overcoming  the  will  to  live.  Self- 
denial,  therefore,  in  its  literal  sense,  is  the 
sole  virtue.  Ultimately,  the  whole  conscious 
universe,  which  is  the  expression  of  the  will 
to  live,  will  sink  back  into  an  eternal 
Nothingness,  after  realising  the  mistake  of 
existence.  This  doctrine  appears  an  unre- 
lieved pessimism — although  it  may  be  to 
some  extent  counteracted  by  the  fact  that 
Schopenhauer  did  not  approve  suicide,  and 


192  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

that  he  speaks  with  approval  of  the  "mys- 
tical" death  of  Quietists  like  Madame  Guy- 
on,  and  seems  to  leave  a  loophole  for  sup- 
posing that  Nirvana  means  something  other 
than  actual  annihilation.  Still,  Nietzsche  is 
justified  in  treating  the  redemption  by 
negation  of  Schopenhauer,  as  a  no-saying 
to  life.  His  opposition  to  this  is  radical, 
and  it  is  justified. 

Yet  Nietzsche  was  in  error  when  he  sup- 
posed that  he  had  come  out  of  the  circle 
of  Schopenhauer's  influence.  Both  Scho- 
penhauer and  Nietzsche  teach  a  phi- 
losophy of  the  will.  Along  with  Hart- 
mann,  whom  Nietzsche  so  deeply  despised, 
they  really  rest  on  the  unconscious  and 
subconscious  to  the  depreciation  of  the 
articulate  elements  in  man.  All  three  are 
alike  anti-intellectualist,  although  in  very 
different  ways.  Nietzsche  is  always  psy- 
chological, the  others  are  metaphysicians. 
Even  allowing  for  the  difference  between 
the  will  to  live  and  the  will  to  power,  it  is 
not  true  to  say  that  the  systems  are  iden- 


NIETZSCHE'S  ORIGINALITY  193 

tical.  As  Simmel  points  out,  for  Schopen- 
hauer Will  is  the  reahty  behind  the  world, 
and  will  produces  life.  For  Nietzsche  life  is 
the  ultimate  reality  of  which  will  to  power  is 
the  expression.  Schopenhauer  would  say: 
"I  live,  because  I  will";  Nietzsche:  "I  will, 
because  I  live."  Practically,  however,  it 
remains  true  that  both  Schopenhauer  and 
Nietzsche,  and  Hartmann  along  with  them, 
teach  a  monism  of  Will,  just  as  Hegel 
teaches  a  monism  of  thought.  Both  Hegel 
and  Schopenhauer  teach  that  the  individual 
is  tm  illusion,  the  manifestation  under 
forms  of  time  and  space  of  an  Absolute. 
Only  Schopenhauer's  Absolute  is  Will, 
Hegel's  is  the  Idea,  and  is  called  Absolute. 
Nietzsche  would  deny  that  he  believed  in 
any  Absolute.  Now  and  then  it  would 
appear  that  his  life  force  is  so  highly  con- 
centrated in  individuals,  his  theory  of  the 
world  as  a  chaos  is  so  thorough,  that  his 
individuals  have  more  reality  than  those 
of  either  Schopenhauer  or  Hegel.  Yet  on 
the  whole  his  philosophy  is  a  monism  with 


194  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

the  individual  as  the  mere  bubble  on  the 
stream  of  the  Will  to  Power. 

Nietzsche  is  not  a  pessimist  in  Schopen- 
hauer's sense;  yet  neither  is  he  an  optimist. 
His  Amor  Fati  is  a  counsel  of  despair.  In 
Schopenhauer's  view  the  world  is  evil  by 
the  very  fact  of  its  existence.  Will  is  in- 
satiable and  restless.  In  producing  the 
multifarious  world  in  order  to  satisfy  it- 
self, it  is  attempting  the  impossible.  No 
peace  for  it  is  possible,  until  it  sinks  into 
Nirvana.  On  the  whole,  then,  life  is  bad 
and  redemption  is  possible  only  by  its 
extinction.  Nietzsche  says  that  life  has 
no  meaning  nor  moral.  Therefore  we  are 
to  worship  its  ever-recurring  monstrosity. 

Let  us  pass  to  another  influence,  which 
can  be  considered  but  briefly.  Darwin 
comes  in  for  much  of  Nietzsche's  contempt 
(except  in  the  Human,  All  Too  Human 
period).  The  Darwinian  hypothesis  of  a 
struggle  for  existence  he  regards  as  ab- 
surd, arising  out  of  the  phenomenon  of 
an    overpopulated     island    like     England, 


NIETZSCHE'S  ORIGINALITY  195 

where  Darwin  and  Malthus  were  reared. 
Yet  few  writers  owed  more  to  Darwin. 
The  influence  of  Darwin  is  the  watershed 
that  divides  Schopenhauer's  system  from 
that  of  Nietzsche,  which  is  essentially  one 
of  becoming.  Nietzsche's  conception  of  the 
world  as  physiological  development  only — 
his  never-ceasing  belief  in  evolution — even 
his  belief  in  the  struggle  for  power,  as  the 
key-word  to  all  development,  are  really  only 
Darwin  with  a  difference.^  Nietzsche's  con- 
ception of  the  Will  to  Power  does  give  a 
more  plausible  account  of  natural  evolution 
than  that  of  the  struggle  for  existence.  Yet 
clearly  he  got  the  former  to  a  large  extent 
out  of  the  latter.  Moreover,  it  is  doubtful 
whether  Nietzsche  would  have  hit  on  the 
symbol  Superman,  had  not  his  imagination 
been  fired  by  the  Origin  of  Species,^   We  can 

^"Toutes  les  consequences  habituellement  tirees  du  dar- 
winisme  par  les  partisans  de  la  force,  surtout  en  Allemagne,  nous 
les  avons  vues  se  developper  chez  Nietzsche.  II  est  aristocrate 
et  ennemi  de  la  democratic  comme  tous  les  darwinistes  qui  veulent 
appliquer  purement  et  simplement  la  loi  darwinienne  a  la  societe 
humaine."    (Fouillee,  253.) 

^Nietzcshe,  Werke,  XIV,  261:  "Meine  Forderung:  Wesen 
hervorzubringen,  welche  iiber  der  ganzen  Geltung  'Mensch'  er- 
haben  dastehn;  und  diesem  Ziele  sich  und  'die  Nachsten'  zu 
opfern." 


196  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

see  how  much  at  one  time  this  school  at- 
tracted him  by  looking  at  the  writings  of 
his  second  period.  M,  Claire  Richter  has 
written  an  interesting  book  on  Nietzsche 
et  les  theories  biologiques  contemporaines, 
in  which  he  seeks  to  show  that  Nietzsche 
was  unconsciously  a  disciple  of  Lamarck 
rather  than  Darwin  in  certain  important 
aspects  of  the  doctrine  of  the  transmuta- 
tion of  species.  This  may  be  so,  without 
it  affecting  the  other  fact,  especially  since 
M.  Richter  admits  that  Nietzsche  was  un- 
conscious of  his  debt  to  Lamarck.  The 
truth  is  that,  in  regard  to  Darwin,  Nietz- 
sche went  through  his  usual  process.  He 
read  him,  was  strongly  influenced,  then  be- 
gan to  turn  round  and  criticise.  Finally  he 
poured  scorn  on  the  whole  school,  and 
would  have  denied  all  affinity  thereto.  Dar- 
win's English  quality  was  another  draw- 
back. Nietzsche  might  despise  German 
culture-Philistines,  and  go  so  far  as  to  say 
that  even  the  presence  of  a  German  retarded 
his  digestion.     Yet  he  despised  the  English 


NIETZSCHE'S  ORIGINALITY  197 

even  more  heartily,  and  identified  them 
with  a  narrow  utihtarian  commerciahsm 
and  an  equally  pedestrial  view  in  ethics. 

In  this,  as  in  many  other  ways,  Nietzsche 
merely  represented  his  own  day  in  Ger- 
many. He  was  more  German  than  he  sup- 
posed. Doctor  Georg  Brandes,  who  has 
been  called  Vinventeur  de  Nietzsche,  considers 
his  whole  system  the  translation  into  terms 
of  ethics  of  the  Bismarckian  era.  Bismarck, 
indeed,  in  his  later  years  Nietzsche  disliked 
and  thought  him  corrupted  by  the  struggle 
for  power;  while  he  declared  that  wherever 
Germany  extended  her  sway  she  ruined 
culture.^  Yet  it  is  the  Prussian  oflScer- 
corps  which  had  his  admiration.  We 
know  this  on  the  authority  alike  of  his 
friend  Deussen  and  also  his  sister.  It 
is  militarism  which  is  the  best  counter- 
poison  to  democracy.     The  next  century, 

^Nietzsche,  Werke,  XIII,  350:  " ' DeutscUand,  Deutschland 
iiber  alles'  ist  vielleicht  die  blodsinnigste  Parole,  die  je  gegeben 
worden  ist.  Warum  iiberhaupt  Deutschland,  frage  ich,  wenn  es 
nicht  Etwas  will,  vertritt,  darstellt,  das  mehr  Werth  hat,  als 
irgend  eiae  andere  bisherige  Macht  vertritt.  An  sich  nur  ein 
grosser  Staat  mehr,  eine  Albernheit  mehr  in  der  Welt." 


198  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

he  prophesied,  would  be  the  era  of  the 
great  wars,  wars  for  the  conquest  of  the 
world,  and  he  hints  not  obscurely  in  one 
of  the  passages  of  the  posthumous  works 
that  England  must  be  relieved  of  her 
colonies,  or  at  least  that  Europe  must 
come  to  an  "understanding  with  her," 
by  which  he  seems  to  mean  subjugation. 
Nietzsche's  dislike  of  any  kind  of  national- 
ism has  blinded  some  people  to  the  fact 
that  his  conception  of  the  hierarchy  of 
society  was  more  like  that  of  the  Prus- 
sian monarchy  than  of  any  other  part  of 
Europe.^     It   was   not   entirely   that,    for 


^WerJce,  XIII,  352:  "Englands  Kleingeisterei  ist  die  grosste 
Gefahr  jetzt  auf  der  Erde." 

He  appears  to  have  wished  Russia  to  have  the  hegemony  of 
Europe.  The  whole  passage  discussed  is  so  important  that  I  cite 
it  in  full. 

Werlce,  XHI,  358,  §  881 :  "  Um  aber  mit  guten  Aussichten  in  den 
Kampf  um  die  Regierung  der  Erde  einzutreten — es  liegt  auf  dem 
Stand,  gegen  wen  sich  dieser  Kampf  richten  wird — hat  Europa 
wahrscheinlich  nothig,  sich  emsthaft  mit  England  zu  ver- 
standigen;  es  bedarf  der  Colonien  Englands  zu  jenem  Kampf e 
ebenso,  wie  das  jetzige  Deutschland,  zur  Einiibung  in  seine  neue 
Vermittler-  und  Makler-RoUe,  der  Colonien  Hollands  bedarf. 
Niemand  namlich  glaubt  mehr  daran,  dass  England  selber  stark 
genug  sei,  seine  alte  Rolle  nur  noch  funfzig  Jahre  fortzuspielen; 
es  geht  an  der  Unmoglichkeit,  die  homines  novi  von  der  Regie- 
rung  auszuschliessen,  zu  Grunde,  und  man  muss  keinen  solchen 


NIETZSCHE'S  ORIGINALITY  199 

he  did  not  put  the  soldiers  first.  Nietzsche, 
Uke  Bismarck,  is  one  of  the  leaders  of  the 
reaction  against  the  ideals  of  the  French 
Revolution.  That  reaction  has  had  many 
aspects.  In  some  ways  Nietzsche's  is  the 
most  radical,  for  it  is  based  on  a  notion 
independent  of  wealth  or  political  rank 
and  regards  the  masses  as  mere  means  to 
the  man  of  true  power.  Nietzsche's  new 
order  of  rulers  are  not  to  claim,  as  in  an- 
cient aristocracies,  that  they  are  privileged 
in  virtue  of  their  services  to  the  com- 
munity. Rather  the  community  exists 
to  make  them  possible.  Their  raison  d'etre, 
however,  is  far  beyond  themselves  and 
involves  immediate  sacrifice.  They  exist 
to  raise  the  type  man,  and  with  it  to  in- 
augurate a  higher  culture. 

This  latter  function  it  is  which  indicates 

Wechsel  der  Parteien  haben,  um  solche  langwierige  Dinge  vorzu- 
bereiten;  man  muss  heute  vorerst  Soldat  sein  um  als  Kaufmann 
nicht  seinen  Kredit  zu  verlieren.  Genug:  hierin,  wie  in  anderen 
Dingen,  wird  das  nachste  Jahrhundert  in  den  Fusstapfen  Napo- 
leons zu  finden  sein,  des  ersten  und  vorwegnehmendsten  Men- 
schen  neuerer  Zeit.  Fiir  die  Aufgaben  der  nachsten  Jahrhunderte 
sind  die  Arten  Offentlichkeit  und  Parliamentarismus  die  un- 
zweckmassigsten  Organisationen." 


200  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

the  essential  difference  between  Nietzsche 
and  a  writer  by  whom  it  has  been  alleged 
he  was  deeply  influenced,  Max  Stirner. 
Max  Stirner  is  the  nom  de  guerre  of  a  cer- 
tain Karl  Schmidt  who  lived  in  the  first 
half  of  the  nineteenth  century,  dying  in 
1856.  He  wrote  a  book  on  the  History  of 
the  Reaction^  i.  e,,  the  reaction  against  the 
French  Revolution.  It  is,  however,  his 
single  work  Der  Einzige  und  sein  Eigen- 
thum,  by  which  he  is  best  known.  This 
book  was  not  very  well  known  at  the 
time,  1848.  Perhaps  it  would  never  have 
been  dug  out,  had  it  not  been  for  the 
vogue  of  Nietzsche.  Now  it  has  been 
published  in  an  American  translation  with 
a  laudatory  preface  by  Doctor  Walker, 
who  proclaims  its  difference  from,  and, 
in  his  view,  superiority  to,  Nietzsche.  I 
beheve  that  Doctor  Walker  is  right  in  the 
fact,  although  wrong  in  his  estimate.  It 
must  be  said  that  the  debt  of  Nietzsche 
to  Max  Stirner  is  believed  by  many  to  be 
great.    Much  is  made  of  it  by  M.  Fouillee 


NIETZSCHE'S  ORIGINALITY  201 

in  his  interesting  book  on  Nietzsche  et 
rimmoralisme.  One  writer.  Doctor  Paul 
Cams,  in  Nietzsche  and  other  Exponents  of 
Individualism,  goes  farther.  Not  only  in 
his  words  on  Nietzsche's  predecessor  (pp. 
74-92)  does  he  assert  the  very  strong 
direct  connection  of  the  two,  but  he  goes 
on  to  say  that  Nietzsche's  omission  to 
mention  the  fact  that  he  had  pillaged  Max 
Stirner  for  his  characteristic  ideas  is  not 
to  be  wondered  at.  It  is  no  more  than 
Nietzsche's  application  in  his  own  person 
of  the  doctrine  that  the  superman  is  be- 
yond good  and  evil,  relieved  of  the  ordinary 
obligations  of  decent  behaviour.  Nothing 
seems  to  me  less  fair  than  this  judgment. 
Nietzsche's  non-mention  of  Stirner  is  cer- 
tainly not  decisive  against  his  having  read 
him.  Even  if  he  had  not  read  him,  he 
might  have  learned  his  drift  from  some- 
body else.  He  must  have  known  about 
him,  for  Hartmann  discusses  him.  That 
he  should  have  dehberately  refrained  from 
mentioning    Stirner     in    order    to    win    a 


202  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

spurious  reputation  for  originality  is  not 
in  keeping  with  Nietzsche's  character.  Be- 
sides, if  that  were  so,  traces  of  Max  Stirner 
would  be  found  in  the  posthumous  works. 

The  reason  why  I  think  that  Nietzsche 
could  not  have  been  influenced  by  Max 
Stirner,  except  in  certain  non-essential  mat- 
ters, such  as  dislike  of  the  democratic 
ideals  of  the  French  Revolution,  is  that  the 
two  systems  are  in  reality  antagonistic, 
and  only  in  appearance  at  all  similar, 
Stirner's  doctrine  is  briefly  this:  The  one 
reality  is  the  ego,  and  he  should  aim  at 
tueating  the  world  as  mere  material  for 
his  amusement.  Max  Stirner  tries  to 
shew  that  Christianity  did  a  service  to 
mankind  in  so  far  as  it  set  them  free  from 
the  gods  of  this  world  and  proclaimed  its 
nothingness  in  comparison  with  real  satis- 
faction. Unfortunately,  it  did  this  only 
in  order  to  introduce  a  deeper  slavery  to 
abstractions  concerning  the  other  world. 
All  supernaturalism  he  condemns  just  as 
Nietzsche   does.     But  he  goes  on  to  say 


NIETZSCHE'S  ORIGINALITY  203 

that  every  kind  of  moral  ideal  is  only  Q;? 
form  of  supernaturalism,  a  ghost  or  bogiM" 
man  with  which  we  are  terrified.  The  rmk 
nature  of  religion  is  contained  in,>thfe 
fact — it  enslaves  man  to  a  principle.*  Iti 
does  not  matter  what  the  principle, is.  ilSof 
long  as  we  allow  ourselves  to  be  diil^Ct^dr 
by  it,  we  are  not  independent.  Tte.onfe 
thing  we  know  is  ourselves — aiad  me  <mtl 
fools  if  we  allow  ourselves  to  ib^Tehslaveft 
to  any  form  of  authority,  church  or  stat^) 
or  class  or  tradition  or  morale,;  iAllEfebos^i 
things  are  dodges  invented  by/ otheM  p^pfef 
in  order  that  with  their  s  help]  jtheyuiBay; 
tyrannise  over  us.  Not  Merely n this,  lii (A) 
man  is  equally  a  slave  whennliq  ds.Itto 
follower  of  an  ideal,  even  thoughgttoiJ 
ideal  be  self -chosen./ nr  Justice  iisb  absi^d, 
for  that  is  a  social  principle  ;iauifl  oun?m^ 
business  is  to  use  the:  univeHe  for/i^)jiii:f 
selves.  Truth,  asap  end,  is  no  less  i^illyi 
for  it  prevents  us  doing  what  we  rwant:  M 
the  moment.  .  Alii  ideals  which  look  to 
the  future   ar^udf  dhe.  nature  iftf  iireligio'ii 


204  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

and  are  merely  vain  imaginations,  bogies. 
The  ghostly  world  of  our  dreams  is  the 
factory  out  of  which  men  have  invented 
the  supernatural.  Afterwards  this  became 
the  ideal  world  of  moral  purposes.  Then, 
with  the  positivist  .conception  annihilat- 
ing the  supernatural  and  all  idealist  ethics, 
there  has  come  the  idea  of  Humanity.  All 
these  in  turn  are  worshipped,  and  the  last. 
Humanity,  the  principle  of  the  French  Rev- 
olution, is  not  the  less  dangerous,  because 
it  comes  in  the  form  of  enlightenment.  At 
bottom  those  who  hold  it  are  bogie- worship- 
pers, no  better  than  Christians.  Even  Free- 
dom as  an  ideal  is  ridiculous,  because  it  sets 
forth  a  principle,  which  will  interfere  with 
the  ego. 

The  doctrine  may  be  called  radical 
egoism.  It  is  an  unrelieved  individualism 
which  would  set  the  ego  to  work  his  will 
in  the  world,  treating  everything  else  as 
mere  force,  and  might  do  good  in  pro- 
tecting a  man  from  the  conventions  of 
his  own  past.     Nothing  but  a  calculation 


NIETZSCHE'S  ORIGINALITY  205 

of  probability  could  prevent  his  yielding 
to  his  immediate  impulses  at  any  moment. 
Nero  appears  to  be  admired  by  the  author, 
although  one  passage  gives  a  hint  that  he 
does  not  set  forward  a  pure  hedonism.  If 
this  be  so,  we  can  only  save  his  heart  at 
the  expense  of  his  head.  On  his  own 
theory,  absolutely  nothing  ought  to  hinder 
the  ego  at  any  moment,  and  self-realisa- 
tion is  interfered  with  when  every  imme- 
diate pleasure  is  foregone  in  the  name  of  a 
future  good. 

Max  Stirner's  protest  against  the  sen- 
timental idealism  of  his  day — the  day  of 
Mazzini — is  stringent  enough  in  all  con- 
science, and  for  the  most  part  unattrac- 
tive. As  a  criticism  it  is  acute.  Like 
Nietzsche,  Max  Stirner  detests  democracy, 
and  even  more  obviously  than  Nietzsche 
does  he  express  the  movement  of  reaction 
against  the  French  Revolution  and  the 
watchwords  Liberty,  Equality,  Fraternity. 
Like  Nietzsche,  Max  Stirner  disliked  utilita- 
rians, and,  like   Nietzsche,  he  scorned  all 


206  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

those  new  codes  of  ethics  which  are  in 
the  eyes  of  their  propounders  to  contain 
all  the  essence  of  Christianity,  divorced 
from  its  dogmas.  Like  Nietzsche,  he  sees 
the  futility  of  expecting  to  retain  the  Chris- 
tian values  in  human  life,  if  the  Christian 
faith  has  gone  by  the  board.  Like  Nietzsche 
also,  he  saw  that,  apart  from  a  Christian, 
or  at  least  an  idealist,  doctrine  of  the  in- 
dividual soul,  there  are  no  real  grounds 
for  preaching  a  doctrine  of  fellowship  or 
humanity  or  the  golden  rule,  or  whatever 
you  call  it.     Here  are  a  few  passages: 

"As  long  as  you  believe  in  the  truth, 
you  do  not  believe  in  yourself,  and  you 
are  a  servant,  a  religious  man.  You 
alone  are  the  truth,  or  rather,  you  are 
more  than  the  truth,  which  is  nothing 
at  all  before  you."  -^ 

"One  has  a  prospect  of  extirpating 
religion  down  to  the  ground  only  when 
one  antiquates  society  and  everything 
that  flows  from  this  principle."  ^ 

^  Stirner,  472.  2  md.,  413. 


NIETZSCHE'S  ORIGINALITY  207 

"The  religious  consists  in  discontent 
with  the  present  man,  i.  e.,  in  the  setting 
up  of  a  perfection  to  be  striven  for,  in 
man  'wresthng  for  his  completion'  (Ye 
therefore  should  be  perfect  as  your  father 
in  heaven  is  perfect).  It  consists  in  the 
fixation  of  an  ideal,  an  absolute.  Per- 
fection is  the  *  supreme  good,'  the  finis 
honorum;  everyone's  ideal  is  the  perfect 
man,  the  true,  the  free  man,  etc. 

"The  efforts  of  modern  times  aim  to 
set  the  ideal  of  the  'free  man.'  If  one 
could  find  it,  there  would  be  a  new  relig- 
ion, because  a  new  ideal;  there  would 
be  a  new  longing,  a  new  torment,  a  new 
devotion,  a  new  deity,  a  new  contri- 
tion." ^ 

The  question  is,  is  this  doctrine  of 
unbridled  egoism  the  same  as  that  of 
Nietzsche.^  I  cannot  think  it.  It  may 
plausibly  be  argued  that  if  it  is  not  what 
Nietzsche  meant,  it  is  what  he  ought  to 

1  Ihid.,  The  Ego  and  His  Ovm,  321. 


208  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

have  meant.     Or  it  may  be  said  that  ulti- 
mately this  is  what  Nietzsche's  principle 
would  work  out  to,  if  accepted  by  the  mass 
of  men.    It  may  be  so.    My  point  is  that 
it  is  not  what  Nietzsche  meant,  nor  any- 
thing like  what  he  meant:    that  it  is  in 
direct   opposition   to   some   of   Nietzsche's 
most  important  principles,  such  as  natural 
asceticism,  the  sacrifice  of  ages  in  order 
to  speed  the  superman,  the  raising  of  the 
type  of  man.     Stirner  protests  against  the 
whole  idea  of  the  type  of  man.    Nietzsche, 
it    is    true,    dislikes    Humanity,    and    will 
have  nothing  to  do  with  equality;    that  is 
because  he  wants  to  prepare  the  way  for 
something  better,  the  reign  of  the  super- 
man— who    would    to    Max    Stirner    have 
been  only  a  new  bogie,  worse  than  the  old. 
Here  and  there   Nietzsche  has  a  remark 
which  might  have  been  suggested  by  Max 
Stirner;   even  that  is  by  no  means  certain, 
although  we  are  not  concerned  to  deny  it. 
The  essay  of  Max  Stirner  on  The  Untrue 
Principle  in  Our  Education  in  the  volume 


NIETZSCHE'S  ORIGINALITY  209 

selections  by  Mackay  might  have  influenced 
Nietzsche  a  httle.  In  the  main,  Nietzsche's 
manner  of  presentment  is  so  different,  and 
his  doctrine  so  much  more  complex,  that  it 
is  hard  to  believe  in  any  connection — unless 
there  be  some  direct  evidence.  That  there 
is  not.  Nietzsche's  superman  is  an  ideal. 
It  is  the  quality  of  a  new  aristocracy;  no 
one  living  now  incarnates  this  higher  man. 
Good  Europeans  are  to  undergo  severe 
discipline  in  order  that  their  descendants 
may  be  supermen.  The  superman  is  sub- 
ject to  certain  principles,  which  Stirner 
would  dub  ghosts — courage  and  a  high 
heart,  heroic  endeavour,  great  sufferings, 
great  health,  the  refusal  ever  to  say  no  to 
experience.  Nietzsche  desired  a  body  of 
self-controlled  rulers  with  distinguished 
manners — every  one  of  these  qualities  em- 
bodies a  principle,  and  requires  discipline 
and  some  kind  of  faith.  Max  Stirner's 
system  may  have  some  affinity  with  that 
of  Nietzsche.  It  embodies  every  one  of 
his  worst  faults  with  vulgarity  added,  and 


210  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

would  produce  a  world  of  pretentious 
egoists.  The  superman,  as  the  creator  of 
a  high  culture,  is  a  very  different  ideal 
from  the  ego  with  all  the  world  for  his 
box  of  toys.  Whatever  Nietzsche  may 
have  thought  of  Max  Stirner,  there  can 
hardly  be  much  doubt  as  to  what  Max 
Stirner  would  have  thought  of  Nietzsche. 

"'Bah!"  he  would  have  said,  "free  air, 
pure  air.  Get  out  of  my  sight  with  your 
Gespenster,  your  will  to  power,  your  life 
with  a  capital  L,  and  your  superman — 
superghost  you  should  have  said.  You 
call  yourself  Zarathustra  the  ungodly,  the 
Antichrist,  the  creator  of  new  values,  the 
destroyer,  the  immoralist.  Go  away  !  You 
are  no  better  than  the  cobweb  spinner  of 
Konigsberg  and  his  great-aunt  the  Cate- 
gorical Imperative.  Your  eternal  recur- 
rence, and  all  your  talk  of  eternity,  the 
aim  of  all  delight,  your  belief  in  the  genii 
of  the  ring,  your  finding  eternity  in  the  mo- 
ment recalls  to  me  that  hoary  old  humbug 
of    Jena,    who    found    the    Absolute    Idea 


NIETZSCHE'S  ORIGINALITY  211 

objectified  in  the  Prussian  state.  As  to 
your  superman,  he  is  a  ghost — Hke  all 
other  ghosts,  and  your  disciples  will  be 
slaves  like  the  rest  of  their  crowd.  Ideal- 
ists, Comtists,  Liberty-loving  atheists — all 
of  you  are  no  better  than  the  Christians 
you  despise. 

*'Yes,  I  tell  you  you  are  a  Christian,  like 
all  the  others,  no  better  except  that  you 
have  added  self-deception  to  their  vices. 
You  think  you  are  new,  yet  you  are  as  much 
a  preacher  of  duty  as  Lycurgus.  Your 
Dionysos  cult  is  religion  back  one  more, 
whether  you  call  it  Dionysos  or  Christ, 
it  is  all  the  same,  if  you  are  to  fall  down  in 
reverence.  Capital  letters  are  all  idola- 
try. You  even  make  an  idol  out  of  Life. 
What  is  Life,  pray,  that  I  am  to  fall  down 
and  worship  it.^  I  reject  the  monstrous 
slavery  of  your  amor  fati.  Besides,  I  know 
nothing  about  it.  I  know  only  that  I  am 
here. 

"Poor  fellow!  You  have  tried  hard  to 
be  shocking,  and  have  succeeded  only  in 


212  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

being  silly.  You  actually  talk  of  redemp- 
tion, of  the  salvation  of  man.  Go  back 
to  your  Frau  Pastorin  and  to  Church." 


THE  CHARM  OF  NIETZSCHE 

What  is  the  secret  of  Nietzsche's  vogue  ? 
Even  if  we  were  to  adopt  the  view  of  Signor 
Papini,  that  the  secret  of  Nietzsche,  veiled 
from  us  by  a  lofty  eloquence,  is  weakness, 
we  should  still  be  far  from  explaining  the 
spell  which  he  exerts.  That  spell  is  a 
fact.  Nietzsche  has  some  conquering 
charm  in  him.  By  this  he  attracts  not 
only  Nietzscheans  pure  and  simple,  whose 
reading  of  his  doctrine  might  not  always 
be  acceptable  to  their  master,  but  many 
others.  Superior  persons,  or  those  liking 
the  pose  of  aristocracy  without  its  obliga- 
tions, young  men  and  even  more  young 
women  glad  to  be  free  of  tradition  find  in 
him  a  new-born  hope;^  some  philosophers 
who   disagree   with   him   profoundly,    and 

^  Nietzsche  made  himself  the  exponent  of  a  tendency,  and  as 
such  he  has  his  followers  among  large  masses  of  people  whom  he 
despised  as  belonging  to  the  herd. 
213 


214  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

Christians  who  are  opposed  to  his  central 
doctrine  may  be  found  to  admire  and  al- 
most to  love  the  hermit  of  Sils-Maria,  the 
prophet  of  Zarathustra,  the  singer  of  the 
Eternal  Recurrence.  Musicians  and  educa- 
tionists prize  him  for  much  that  he  says 
about  positive  as  against  negative  virtue, 
and  for  the  wide  horizons  of  culture  he 
sets  before  his  "higher  men."  "Every 
idiot  fancies  himself  an  tjbermensch''  was 
a  remark  made  once  to  me  by  an  erudite 
Bavarian.  The  pocket  edition  of  Also 
sprach  Zarathustra  marks  a  circulation  of 
close  on  140,000.  In  the  British  Museum 
there  are  to  be  found  about  one  hundred 
books  and  pamphlets  on  him  in  German 
alone;  many  in  other  languages.  M. 
Bernoulli  devotes  two  immense  volumes 
to  the  friendship  between  Nietzsche  and 
the  Swiss  historical  theologian  Overbeck. 
Even  his  personal  affairs  are  the  subject 
of  almost  a  wide  literature.  What  is  the 
meaning  of  this? 

Not  entirely,   not  mainly,  his  message. 


THE  CHARM  OF  NIETZSCHE  215 

Some  people  there  have  been  who  are  for 
treating  Nietzsche  as  neghgible  and  dis- 
missing his  criticisms  as  the  ravings  of  a 
lunatic.  That  is  not  a  wise  proceeding,  as 
M.  Seillieres  points  out  at  the  close  of  a 
work  devoted  to  severe  criticism,  Apollon  ou 
Dionysos,  Mere  insanity  would  not  have 
given  him  such  a  vogue.  Nowadays,  at 
least,  his  wide-spread  prevalence  makes 
it  impossible  to  leave  him  aside.  Let  us 
take  his  influence  as  a  fact,  and  in  this 
lecture  try  to  gain  some  notion  of  his 
charm.  In  the  next  we  can  consider  his 
importance.  How  much  of  enduring  fame 
he  will  win  no  one  can  prophesy. 

First  of  all  comes  the  fact  of  the  ex- 
traordinary personal  character  of  all  his 
writings.  We  see  in  Nietzsche,  no  less 
than  we  do  in  Newman,  the  literary  ex- 
pression of  a  soul  on  fire.  Nietzsche  will 
not  write  until  he  has  fused  his  brooding 
thought  into  a  unity  of  feeling.  When  he 
does  write,  that  unity  of  feeling  is  so  deeply 
concentrated  that  his  very   force  tends  to 


216  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

take  captive  the  reader,  almost  irrespective 
of  what  he  says.  Schellwien^  in  his  Httle 
book  on  Stirner  and  Nietzsche  pronounces 
that  he  is  so  entirely  a  dogmatist  in  his 
writing  that  one  must  always  take  him  or 
leave  him,  according  as  his  ideas  appeal 
intuitively.  Nietzsche  felt  this  himself. 
In  a  letter  to  Georg  Brandes  he  said 
that  he  had  come  to  distrust  dialectic  and 
even  all  grounds  at  all,  i,  e,,  he  must  go 
by  pure  intuition.^  This  does  not  mean 
that  he  took  up  notions  at  random;^  rather 
that  he  went  through  the  long  psychical 
process  of  weighing  and  reconsidering,  and 
then,  when    the    whole    seemed    clear,   he 


^  "Da  sonach  Nietzsche's  Denken  durch  und  durch  dogmatisch 
ist,  so  ist  es  kein  Gegenstand  fiir  Diskussion.  Wer  ebenso  glaubt 
mag  es  annehmen;  wer  es  nicht  glaubt,  braucht  sich  nicht  weiter 
dariiber  zu  beunruhigen."  (Robert  Schellwien,  Max  Stirner  und 
F.  Nietzsche,  27.) 

^  "In  der  Skala  meiner  Erlebnisse  und  Zustande,  ist  das  tlber- 
gewicht  auf  Seiten  der  seltneren,  femeren,  diinneren  Tonlagen 
gegen  die  normaleren,  mittleren,  .  .  .  Endlich — und  das  wohl 
am  meisten  macht  meine  Biicher  dunkel — es  gibt  in  mir  ein 
Misstrauen  gegen  Dialektik,  selbst  gegen  Griinde."  Nietzsche 
to  Brandes.     {Briefe,  III,  274.) 

3  Doctor  Wolf  points  this  out;  although  he  rather  underrates 
the  inconsistencies  in  Nietzsche — not  the  difference  between  the 
three  periods,  but  inconsistency  at  any  moment. 


THE  CHARM  OF  NIETZSCHE  217 

kicked  away  the  ladder,  ending  by  think- 
ing it  a  bore,  a  waste  of  time,  to  discuss 
the  grounds.  If  a  person  could  not  see 
what  he  saw,  Nietzsche  would  not  convert 
him  by  argument. 

It  is  this  power  to  write  with  blood  of 
which  he  boasts.  Nietzsche,  in  his  own 
view,  lived  more  deeply  than  other  people, 
and  therefore,  having  mastered  the  art 
of  expression,  he  was  able  to  write  with 
such  compelling  force.  The  certainty,  the 
prophetic  conviction  with  which  he  writes 
have  in  them  something  as  of  a  vision,  a 
thing  seen.^  More  and  more  this  note  of 
dogmatism  has  become  effective  in  our 
day.  It  is  notable  alike  in  philosophy,  in 
literature,  in  politics.  The  note  of  ab- 
soluteness may  do  no  more  than  express 

^Nietzsche  in  his  later  period  laments  the  fanaticism  of  his 
earlier  writings.  Yet  in  truth  he  grew  more  violent  as  he  grew 
older. 

"Als  ich  jiingst  den  Versuch  machte,  meine  alteren  Schriften, 
die  ich  vergessen  hatte,  kennen  zu  lemen,  erschrack  ich  iiber  ein 
gemeinsames  Merkmal  derselben:  sie  sprechen  die  Sprache  des 
Fanatismus.  .  .  .  Der  Fanatismus  verdirbt  den  Charakter,  den 
Geschmack,  und  zuletzt  auch  die  Gesundheit."  {Werke,  XII, 
179.) 


218  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

a  strong  personal  idiosyncrasy.  In  this 
age,  however,  unlike  some  others,  this  is 
an  advantage;  the  tentative  scientific  un- 
derstatement is  apt  to  repel.  We  can  see 
this  in  our  political  and  artistic  contro- 
versies; in  most  of  our  popular  essays  and 
in  nearly  all  modern  criticism.  It  may  be 
a  consequence  of  the  weakness  of  an  age 
which  wants  to  be  secured  against  its  own 
timidity.    But  it  is  a  fact. 

Secondly — but  this  is  largely  the  conse- 
quence of  that  personal  quality — Nietzsche 
strikes  the  imagination.  This  is  what  is 
needed  now  to  secure  any  man  an  empire. 
Whether  in  politics  or  philosophy  or  busi- 
ness, it  is  not  intellect  but  imaginative 
authority  that  wins  a  spell.  Even  if  those 
were  right  who  identified  the  teaching  of 
Nietzsche  with  that  of  Max  Stirner,  they 
would  never  be  able  to  secure  for  the 
latter  one  tithe  of  the  popularity  of  Nietz- 
sche. 

Max  Stirner  lacks  these  qualities  of  style 
and  imagination.     It  may  be  said  that  all 


THE  CHARM  OF  NIETZSCHE  219 

this  is  briefly  summed  in  the  statement  that 
Nietzsche  is  a  poet.  That  is  true.  ''Art," 
we  are  told,  "is  the  expression  of  sincere 
emotion,"  and  judged  by  that  canon 
Nietzsche  is  an  artist  of  no  mean  order. 
His  genius  is  essentially  lyrical.^  That  is 
to  say,  it  is  his  personal,  individual  feeling 
which  breaks  into  the  "lyrical  cry,"  and 
this  feeling  is  always  or  nearly  always 
measured  by  some  criticism  of  life.  Thus, 
his  poetic  quality  embodies  the  two  strands. 
It  is  not  mere  singing,  in  some  enchanted 
garden,  away  from  the  drab  dulness  of 
the  world;  it  is  not  mere  philosophy  un- 
informed by  experience;  it  is  the  fusion 
of  the  two  by  the  alembic  of  a  vivid  per- 

^  "  When  we  read  him,  we  are  moved  not  by  classic,  but  by 
romantic  art,  he  transfers  us  to  the  rococo  world,  not  to  that  of 
the  Renaissance;  he  incites  in  us  dramatic  tension  and  lyric  stress, 
while  he  lacks  epic  calm  and  exuberance.  But  he  is  a  master 
of  his  art,  and  we  might  call  him  in  a  certain  sense  the  Richard 
Wagner  of  German  prose. 

"  Long  after  his  unjust  warfare  against  Christianity,  his  con- 
tradictory theories,  which  do  violence  to  facts,  his  clumsy  re- 
constructions and  exaggerations  have  been  forgotten  he  will 
be  remembered  as  one  of  the  greatest  German  stylists — as  a 
poet  of  powerful  diction,  as  a  master  of  language  and  of  musical 
declamation  in  words."  (Kiilpe,  The  Philosophy  of  the  Present 
in  Germany,  translated  by  M.  and  O.  Patrick,  p.  129.) 


220  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

sonality,  which  gives  Nietzsche  his  charm, 
and  will  probably  continue  to  give  it. 
Take,  for  instance,  the  Night-Song  in 
Zarathustra,  This  was  one  of  Nietzsche's 
own  favourites: 

"  'Night  it  is:  now  talk  louder  all 
springing  wells.  And  my  soul  is  a 
springing  well. 

"  'Night  it  is:  only  now  all  songs  of 
the  loving  awake.  And  my  soul  is  the 
song  of  a  loving  one. 

"  'Something  never  stilled,  something 
never  to  be  stilled  is  within  me.  It 
longeth  to  give  forth  sound.  A  longing 
for  love  is  within  me,  that  itself  speaketh 
the  language  of  love. 

"  'Light  I  am:  would  that  I  were 
night!  But  it  is  my  loneliness,  to  be 
girded  round  by  light. 

"  'Oh,  that  I  were  dark  and  like  the 
night !  How  would  I  suck  at  the  breasts 
of  light ! 

And   I   would   bless   even   you,   ye 


((    6 


THE  CHARM  OF  NIETZSCHE  221 

small,  sparkling  stars  and  glowworms 
on  high — and  be  blessed  by  your  gifts 
of  light ! 

"  'But  in  mine  own  light  I  live,  back 
into  myseK  I  drink  the  flames  that 
break  forth  from  me. 

*'  'I  know  not  the  happiness  of  the 
receiver.  And  often  I  dreamt  that  steal- 
ing was  needs  much  sweeter  than  receiv- 
ing. 

"  'It  is  my  poverty  that  my  hand 
never  resteth  from  giving;  it  is  mine 
envy  that  I  see  waiting  eyes  and  the  il- 
luminated nights  of  longing. 

"'Oh,  unblessedness  of  all  givers! 
Oh,  obscuration  of  my  sun !  Oh,  long- 
ing for  longing !  Oh,  famished  voracity 
in  the  midst  of  satisfaction ! 

"  'They  take  things  from  me;  but  do 
I  touch  their  soul.^  There  is  a  gulf  be- 
tween giving  and  taking,  and  the  small- 
est gulf  is  the  most  diJBScult  to  bridge 
over. 

"  'A  hunger  waxeth  out  of  my  beauty: 


222  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

I  would  cause  pain  unto  those  whom  I 
bring  hght;  I  would  fain  bereave  those 
I  gave  my  gifts  to.  Thus  am  I  hungry 
for  wickedness. 

"  'Taking  back  my  hand  when  an- 
other hand  stretcheth  out  for  it;  hesitat- 
ing hke  the  waterfall  that  hesitateth 
when  raging  down — thus  am  I  hungry 
for  wickedness. 

"  'Such  revenge  is  invented  by  mine 
abundance;  such  insidiousness  springeth 
from  my  loneliness. 

"  'My  happiness  of  giving  died  from 
giving;  my  virtue  became  weary  of  it- 
self from  its  abundance ! 

"  'He  who  always  giveth  is  in  danger 
to  lose  his  sense  of  shame;  he  who  al- 
ways distributeth  getteth  hard  swel- 
lings on  his  hand  and  heart  from  dis- 
tributing. 

"  'Mine  eye  no  longer  floweth  over 
from  the  shame  of  the  begging  ones; 
my  hand  hath  become  too  hard  to  feel 
the  trembling  of  full  hands. 


THE  CHARM  OF  NIETZSCHE 

"  *  Whither  went  the  tear  of  mine  eye, 
and  the  down  of  my  heart?  Oh,  soh- 
tude  of  all  givers!  Oh,  silence  of  all 
hghters ! 

"  'Many  suns  circle  round  in  empty 
space:  unto  all  that  is  dark  they  speak 
with  their  light — unto  me  they  are  silent. 

"  'Oh,  that  is  the  enmity  of  light 
against  what  shineth !  Without  pity  it 
wandereth  on  its  course. 

"  'Unfair  towards  what  shineth  in 
the  heart  of  its  heart,  cold  towards 
suns,  thus  walketh  every  sun. 

"  'Like  the  storm  the  suns  fly  on  their 
courses;  that  is  their  walking.  They 
follow  their  inexorable  will;  tiiLt  is 
their  coldness. 

"  'Oh,  it  is  only  ye,  ye  dark  ones,  ye 
of  the  night  who  create  warmth  out  of 
what  shineth!  Oh,  it  is  only  ye  who 
drink  milk  and  refreshment  from  the 
udders  of  hght ! 

"  'Alas,  there  is  ice  round  me;  my 
hand  burneth  itself  when  touching  what 


224  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

is  icy!  Alas,  there  is  thirst  within  me 
that  is  thirsty  for  your  thirst ! 

"  'Night  it  is:  alas,  that  I  must  be 
a  light !  And  a  thirst  for  what  is  of  the 
night !    And  solitude ! 

"  'Night  it  is:  now,  like  a  well,  my 
longing  breaketh  forth  from  me.  I  am 
longing  for  speech. 

"  'Night  it  is:  now  talk  louder  all 
springing  wells.  And  my  soul  is  a 
springing  well. 

"  'Night  it  is:  only  now  all  songs  of 
the  loving  awake.  And  my  soul  is  the 
song  of  a  loving  one.' 

"  Thus  sang  Zarathustra."^ 

Nietzsche's  sense  of  his  own  inspiration 
finds  vent  in  a  highly  charged  passage  of 
Ecce  Homo,^  quoted  in  the  last  lecture. 
The  megalomania  of  that  piece  is  repul- 
sive. Yet,  some  of  the  analysis  is  acute. 
Zarathustra — and  that  is  Nietzsche  at  his 
highest — has  that  quality  of  inevitableness 

1  Thus  SpaJce  Zarathustra,  II,  The  Night-Song,  pp.  149-151. 

2  Ecce  Homo,  pp.  101,  106. 


THE  CHARM  OF  NIETZSCHE  225 

in  the  writing  which  belongs  to  the  highest 
art.  The  sense  of  far  distances,  of  a  trans- 
lucent atmosphere  as  though  the  Alps 
had  made  themselves  into  music,  is  with 
us  very  frequently;  also  a  certain  irides- 
cence of  changing  colours.  One  of  the 
minor  merits  of  Nietzsche  is  the  multi- 
plicity of  fresh  landscapes  and  kaleido- 
scopic variety  of  his  pictures.  As  M. 
Fouillee  remarks: 

"  Sa  poesie  est  un  lyrisme  puissant:  sa 
philosophic  a  je  ne  sais  quoi  de  pittoresque 
qui  reduit  Fimagination;  c'est  une  serie 
de  tableaux,  de  paysages,  de  visions  et  de 
reves,  un  voyage  romantique  en  un  pays 
enchante,  ou  les  scenes  terribles  succedent 
aux  scenes  joyeuses,  ou  le  burlesque  s'in- 
tercale  au  milieu  du  sublime.  Nietzsche 
est  sympathique  par  les  grands  cotes.  La 
seule  chose  antipathique  en  cette  belle 
ame  c'est  la  superbe  de  la  pensee.  Toute 
doctrine  d'aristocratie  exclusive  est  d'ail- 
leurs  une  doctrine  d'orgueil,  et  tout  or- 


226  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

gueil  n'est-il  pas  un  commencement  de 
folie?  Chez  Nietzsche  le  sentiment  aris- 
tocratique  a  quelque  chose  de  maladif."  ^ 

Probably  not  a  httle  of  his  attraction 
for  many  is  owing  to  this.  This  is  the  day 
of  flash-hght  and  electric  movement. 
Nietzsche  is  like  a  motor,  whirling  the 
occupant  through  many  countries,  giving 
at  once  the  sense  of  rapid  movement  and 
of  changeful  beauty.  His  very  inconsis- 
tencies and  the  aphoristic  habit  are  a 
help  in  this  respect.^  Many  of  his  books — 
though  not  the  best — can  be  opened  and 
read  for  a  minute  or  two  and  convey  in 
this  way  both  light  and  artistic  pleasure. 

^  Fouillee,  Avant-Propos,  VI.  The  following  passage  is  a  good 
instance  of  this. 

"  Wir  sind  die  ersten  Aristokraten  in  der  Geschichte  der  Geister 
— der  historische  Sinn  beginnt  erst  jetzt."     (Nietzsche,  XI,  217.) 

2  "Les  aphorismes  conviennent  k  un  pubUc  qui  n'a  ni  le  temps 
ni  les  moyens  de  rien  approfondir  et  qui  s'en  fie  volontiers  aux 
feuilles  sibyllines,  surtout  si  elles  sont  poetiques  au  point  de  lui 
paraitre  inspirees.  L'absence  meme  de  raisonnement  et  de  preuve 
reguliere  prete  au  dogmatisme  negateur  un  air  d'autorite  qui 
impose  a  la  foule  des  demi-instruits,  litterateurs,  poetes,  musi- 
ciens,  amateurs  de  tons  genres.  Des  paradoxes  en  apparence 
originaux  donnent  a  qui  les  accepte  I'illusion  flatteuse  de  I'ori- 
ginahte."     (Fouillee,  Avant-Propos,  IV.) 


THE  CHARM  OF  NIETZSCHE  227 

This  must  be  the  case  with  a  genius  so 
essentially  pyrotechnic,  with  rockets  and 
Roman  candles,  and  then  the  more  elabo- 
rate set  pieces,  to  attract  the  deep  ''Oh" 
of  the  crowd.  For,  although  he  despised 
the  crowd,  it  is  to  the  crowd  and  to  some 
of  the  characteristics  of  an  age  of  vulgar 
machinery  that  Nietzsche  owes  part  of 
his  popularity. 

Not  that  he  does  not  deserve  it  as  a  writer. 
He  worked  at  style.  Early  in  his  life  he 
declared  that  he  was  mastered  by  the 
Categorical  Imperative:  Thou  must  write. ^ 
Nor  must  we  call  him  a  spontaneous  artist. 
That  note  of  the  inevitable,  of  inspiration, 
is  the  end,  not  the  beginning — it  is  the 
flash  of  insight  that  comes  at  the  end  of 
long,  almost  hopeless  toil,  the  brilliant  vi- 
sion that  is  the  reward  of  torments  both 
of  body  and  spirit.  Plainly  he  declares 
that  none  but  fools  can  suppose  that  writ- 

*"Der  Kategorische  Imperativ,  *Du  sollst  und  musst  schrei- 
ben,'  hat  mich  aufgeweckt.  .  .  . 

"  Es  sei  schwer  gut  zu  schreiben,  von  Natur  habe  kein  Mensch 
ein  guten  Stil,  man  miisse  arbeiten  und  hartes  Holz  bohren,  ihn 
zu  erwerben."     {Briefe,  I,  52.) 


228  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

ing  is  easy.  He  is  right;  what  a  pity  they 
do  not  abstain  from  publishing !  Countless 
gibes  he  easts  at  the  Germans  for  their 
heavy  feet  in  literature.  Their  clumsy  and 
awkward  notion  of  style  is  a  source  to 
him  of  frequent  merriment.  No  one  who 
had  so  high  a  regard  for  French  culture 
would  be  likely  to  underrate  the  value  of 
polish.  Nietzsche,  moreover,  is  well  aware 
that  great  style  is  an  imaginative  quality, 
not  mere  statement.  Mr.  Bernard  Shaw 
has  done  much  to  popularise  Nietzsche 
by  "Man  and  Superman."  Yet  the  two 
writers  are  poles  apart.  Mr.  Shaw  may 
seem  a  poet  to  the  German  Chancellor. 
That  is  akin  to  his  other  "errors."  Some- 
where or  other  Mr.  Shaw  declared  that 
"effectiveness  of  statement  is  the  one  qual- 
ity of  good  writing."  Were  this  true, 
we  ought  all  to  go  to  school  to  that  new 
genre  in  literature — advertisement.  Nietz- 
sche saw  just  the  opposite.  Writing  is  akin 
to  music.  It  is  an  appeal  to  the  subsconcious 
more  than  to  the  logical  faculty.     Other- 


THE  CHARM  OF  NIETZSCHE  229 

wise  mathematical  treatises  would  be  the 
noblest  literature,  and  the  writer  of  an 
index  or  a  synopsis  superior  in  many  cases 
to  his  original.  Language  is  used  some- 
times, and  Mr.  Shaw  lends  colour  to  this 
view,  if  he  does  not  reach  it,  which  would 
imply  that  there  would  be  little  lost  if, 
instead  of  the  thirteenth  chapter  of  First 
Corinthians,  we  had  some  such  abstract 
as  the  following: 

Love,  described  by  St.  Paul,  characteristics  of, 
more  excellent  than  other  gifts; 
superior  to  (a)  eloquence, 
(6)  martyrdom, 
(c)  faith, 

{d)  giving  charity, 
their  worthlessness  without  love,  as  illus- 
trated by  (a)  brass  (6)  cymbals; 
its  enduring  quality; 
self -emptying; 

faith,  hope,  in  what  way  inferior; 
illustrated  by  author's  own  growth  from 
child  to  adult. 

This  dilemma,  or  something  like  it,  is 
what  hes  before  the  numerous  people  who 
regard  themselves  as  superior  to  the  style 


230  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

prejudice  and  condemn  a  work  in  propor- 
tion as  it  is  well  written.  Nietzsche,  who 
made  so  much  of  the  rhythmic  element, 
the  dance,  knew  very  well  that  language  is 
a  sacrament  of  the  soul,  and  that  style  is 
good  or  bad  in  proportion  as  it  is  able  to 
communicate  this.  He  declares  it  in  his 
love  of  musical  terms  to  be  the  communica- 
tion by  means  of  the  rhythm  and  colour  of 
words  of  a  certain  tempo — i,  e.,  the  creation 
of  a  condition  in  the  reader — emotional, 
imaginative,  and  intellectual.  In  another 
place  he  says:  "My  style  is  a  dance." 

In  the  degree  in  which  this  is  done  we 
have  really  great  writing.  Most  writing 
fails  in  this,  because  it  is  too  conventional, 
not  always  because  the  writers  do  not  feel 
greatly.  In  early  days  all  writing  tends 
to  become  a  cento  of  conventional  phrases, 
e.  g,,  children's  letters.  Only  later  on  does 
self-expression  in  any  degree  become  pos- 
sible. That  other  ideal  of  Mr.  Shaw  means 
self-expression  of  a  kind,  but  only  of  one 
kind — it  assumes  that  all  of  us  are  per- 


THE  CHARM  OF  NIETZSCHE  231 

petually  in  debate,  and  that  some  form  or 
other  of  platform  speaking  is  the  end. 
Even  here,  when  platform  speaking  reaches 
a  high  point,  it  passes  with  an  orator  into 
something  like  poetic  communication. 
Nietzsche's  interest  as  a  writer  comes 
partly  from  this  power  of  placing  discus- 
sions, apparently  academic,  in  a  setting 
of  beauty  and  imagination.  This  is  mani- 
fest in  one  of  Nietzsche's  earliest  works, 
a  course  of  lectures  delivered  at  Basle  on 
Tlie  Future  of  Our  Educational  Institutions, 
The  picture  of  the  meeting  of  the  two 
students  with  the  old  professor  and  his 
friend,  and  the  overhearing  of  their  con- 
versation provides  at  once  a  scene  into 
which  the  reader  can  enter  with  sym- 
pathy. Akin  to  this  is  another  quality, 
which  comes  of  Nietzsche's  passionate  one- 
sidedness.  Not  only  has  he  come  to  see 
everything  in  a  unity,  but  he  forces  the 
reader  to  do  so,  and  persuades  him  before 
he  is  aware.  Some  dialecticians  will  quietly 
assume  premises  which  cut  oflF  nearly  all 


£32  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

the  objections  of  their  interlocutor.  Not 
by  dialectic,  but  through  the  force  of  their 
personality  they  prevent  him  remembering 
these  objections  by  driving  all  his  energies 
to  defend  what  is  really  some  side-issue. 
Thus  they  win  an  easy  victory.  In  the 
field,  thus  artificially  limited,  they  are  right. 
Some  of  Nietzsche's  charm  is  due  to  this 
method.  In  the  Genealogy  of  Morals  or 
Antichrist  he  commonly  discerns  some 
motive  really  operative  among  certain 
people,  e,  g.,  resentment  at  weakness.  Then 
by  his  own  chosen  one-sidedness  he  isolates 
this  factor  and  by  the  force  of  his  personal- 
ity prevents  the  casual  reader  from  seeing 
any  other.  To  a  mind  at  all  trained,  his 
early  history  of  the  Jewish  people  and  of 
early  Christianity  is  a  travesty  of  the 
facts,  no  less  than  the  attempt  to  make 
our  Lord  the  preacher  of  a  Tolstoyan 
Gospel  of  Quietism.  Nietzsche  owed  to 
Tolstoy  and  to  Schopenhauer  more  than 
he  supposed.  His  account  of  the  personal- 
ity of  Christ  is  merely  a  work  of  imagina- 


THE  CHARM  OF  NIETZSCHE  233 

tion;  it  ignores  all  the  sterner  side  and 
takes  him  as  a  preacher  of  non-resistance 
pure  and  simple. 

To  take  another  instance.  The  Will  to 
Power  truly  expresses  an  important  ele- 
ment in  all  life;  nor  is  it  by  a  process  of 
far-fetched  interpretation  altogether  im- 
possible to  reduce  everything  to  scale. 
The  attempt,  on  the  whole,  is  no  whit 
different  from  that  of  the  hedonist,  whom 
Nietzsche  despised,  to  explain  all  human 
action  by  the  motive  of  pleasure-seeking. 
The  process  of  interpretation  in  each  case 
has  to  be  so  elaborate  as  to  deprive  it  of 
all  value.  In  The  Will  to  Power  the  skill 
of  Nietzsche  is  shown  not  so  much  in  the 
expression  of  his  principle,  as  in  the  pas- 
sion of  personal  faith  which  possessed 
him,  and  in  his  very  contempt  of  demons- 
trative reasoning.  The  reader  who  sees 
a  little  and  says,  ''That  is  true;  I  had  not 
seen  it  before,"  is  carried  forward  on  a 
sea  of  criticism,  epigram,  eloquence,  and 
passionate  prophecy.    Long  before  his  crit- 


234  THE  WILL  TO  FEEEDOM 

ical  faculty  is  awakened  he  may  be  swept 
into  the  current. 

All  this  springs  from  the  fact  we  spoke 
of  earlier.  Nietzsche  is  a  dogmatist  and 
a  preacher.  In  one  place  he  said  that  any 
one  born  with  an  ancestry  of  preachers 
will  tend  to  be  dogmatic,  to  a  "thus  said 
the  Lord"  method  of  discourse.  In  an- 
other he  alludes  to  his  being  descended 
from  a  line  of  Lutheran  pastors.  Cer- 
tainly his  writings  afford  evidence  of  his 
own  theory.  The  closing  passage  of  his 
early  piece  on  Wagner  reads  like  the 
peroration  of  a  sermon. 

While  he  is  dogmatic  and  abusive,  he 
does  not  claim  to  ]be  final.  Superpapal 
almost  in  his  notion  of  infallibility,  he  re- 
gards even  the  uttering  of  truth  as  an 
adventure,  and  disclaims  all  idea  of  sys- 
tem. The  desire  for  proof,  the  anxiety  of 
scientific  or  statistical  men  for  mathemat- 
ical certainty  he  declares  to  be  a  sign  of 
counting-house  blood.  Science  is  the  crea- 
tion of  fear,  while  art  comes  from  courage. 


THE  CHARM  OF  NIETZSCHE  235 

People  whose  fathers  and  grandfathers 
were  clerks  must  always  be  coming  to 
conclusions.  This  is  the  foundation,  this 
and  timidity,  of  the  passion  for  certitude 
and  for  the  mechanical  card-catalogue 
method  of  knowledge.  In  truth  nothing 
is  certain;  all  our  theories  are  thoughts 
thrown  out  at  a  great  subject;  we  must 
go  on  always  creators,  ever  ready  for  fresh 
adventures,  "never  resting  in  a  facile 
orthodoxy  of  Comte  or  Hegel  or  of  our 
own."  You  remember  the  famous  epilogue 
in  which  Walter  Pater,  writing  from  the 
opposite  standpoint,  that  of  pure  hedonism, 
declared  that  ''one  must  ever  go  on  court- 
ing new  impressions,  testing  new  opinions." 
So  Nietzsche  disclaimed  all  idea  of  dis- 
ciples, merely  repeating  his  catchwords; 
what  he  wants  is  a  new  spirit,  fresh  and 
creative  minds. 

That,  perhaps,  is  his  greatest  charm. 
He  set  men  free.  The  last  age  was  over- 
come by  the  tyranny  of  determinism. 
What  is  known  as  scientific  fatalism  had 


236  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

hold  of  it.  A  method  which  in  natural 
science  was  fruitful  was  thought  sufficient 
for  a  philosophy  of  life.  Freedom  was 
denied,  and  all  history  and  even  individual 
life  was  made  to  consist  of  links  in  a  chain 
of  inevitable  development.  Evolution  was 
treated  as  a  process  entirely  mechanical. 
Nietsche's  own  words  are  worth  citing: 

^'The  belief  in  willing.  To  believe 
that  a  thought  may  be  the  cause  of  a 
mechanical  movement  is  to  believe  in 
miracles.  The  consistency  of  science  de- 
mands that,  once  we  have  made  the 
world  thinkable  for  ourselves  by  means 
of  pictures,  we  should  also  make  the 
emotions,  the  desires,  the  will,  etc., 
thinkable — that  is  to  say,  we  should 
deny  them,  and  treat  them  as  errors  of 
the  intellect.'"'^ 

It  was  hoped  to  explain  all  events 
mathematically  and  to  deduce  the  whole 
history  of  the  world,  including  man,  from 

1  The  Will  to  Power,  II,  143. 


THE  CHARM  OF  NIETZSCHE  237 

the  inevitable  clash  of  physical  forces. 
This,  I  suppose,  was  the  faith  of  Herbert 
Spencer,  and  was  expounded  in  the  famous 
words  of  Tyndall  about  the  genius  of  a 
Shakespeare  being  potential  in  the  fires  of 
the  sun.  It  found  classical  expression  in 
the  words  of  Du  Bois-Reymond,  about 
getting  an  abstract  account  of  the  course 
of  things  in  a  few  differential  equations. 

Nowadays,  M.  Bergson  and  many  others, 
including  some  men  of  science,  have  pro- 
pounded a  theory  of  evolution  radically 
different.  We  are  told  that  it  is  essentially 
creative;  that  freedom  is  the  aim.  Freedom 
in  some  degree  pervades  the  world.  Its 
growth  is  neither  inevitable  nor  mechan- 
ical. As  to  the  future,  we  can  be  nowhere 
assured  of  aught  but  a  high  probability. 

Nietzsche  is  one  of  the  influences  which 
have  helped  in  this  direction,  and  minis- 
tered to  the  self-criticism  of  science.^    Prac- 


1  Werke,  XIII,  85,  §  213:  "Die  Entwicklung  der  mechanistisch- 
atomistischen  Denkweise  ist  sich  heute  ihres  nothwendigen  Ziels 
iminer  noch  nicht  bewusst — das  ist  mein  Eindruck  nachdem  ich 
lange  genug  ihren  Anhangern  zwischen  die  Finger  gesehen  habe. 


238  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

tically,  though  not  theoretically,  his  philos- 
ophy is  a  doctrine  of  freedom.  Doctor 
Wolf  holds  that  Nietzsche  allows  a  small 
degree  of  freedom  to  all.  But  this  is  doubt- 
ful. If  everything  be  driven  by  a  blind 
will  to  power,  how  can  there  be  any  real 
freedom  ?  It  is  the  same  with  materialism. 
Nietzsche  not  only  denies  any  metaphys- 
ical entity,  but  he  speaks  of  the  soul  as 
the  companion  and  echo  of  the  body. 
This  seems  like  pure  materialism.  Yet 
Nietzsche  denies  alike  materialism  and 
determinism.  He  does  profess  an  uncom- 
promising naturalism,  and  it  is  difficult  to 
see  how  he  can  escape  from  either  of  these 
two. 

Yet  it  is  freedom  he  cares  for.  His 
assertion  of  the  reality  of  life  leads  right 
away  from  determinism,  and  his  perpetual 
imperative  is:  Act  as  though  thou  art 
free.  Since  Nietzsche  in  his  Genealogy  of 
Morals    throws    scorn    on    the    notion    of 

Sie  wird  mit  der  Schaffung  eines  Systems  von  Zeichen  endigen: 
sie  wird  auf  Erklaren  verzichten,  sie  wird  den  Begriff,  '  Ursache 
iind  Wirkung, '  aufgeben." 


THE  CHARM  OF  NIETZSCHE  239 

moral  responsibility,  it  is  hard  to  see  how 
any  freedom  which  he  teaches  amounts 
to  much.  It  is  always  conceived  as  mere 
animal  energy,  the  butting  against  his 
fellows  by  the  splendid  blond  beast.  Yet 
it  remains  the  fact  that,  whether  con- 
sistently or  the  reverse,  Nietzsche  has  had 
to  many  the  charm  of  an  apostle  of  free- 
dom as  against  a  mechanical  conception 
of  development.  At  bottom,  as  M.  Berg- 
son  has  pointed  out,  a  world  in  which  there 
is  no  freedom,  but  everything  proceeds 
necessarily  out  of  the  chain  of  events,  is 
a  dead  world — a  clock  running  down. 
Now,  the  Eternal  Recurrence  may  seem  to 
favour  such  a  view  even  on  the  part  of 
Nietzsche.  But  at  least  its  effect  is  op- 
posite— it  is  a  sense  of  creative  activity 
in  art,  in  life,  and  in  thought.  Whatever 
be  the  defects  of  a  doctrine  of  mere  power, 
there  is  no  question  that  to  convinced 
adherents  of  the  naturalistic  view  of  the 
world,  Nietzsche  comes  as  preaching  a 
gospel  of  hope  and   deliverance,   whereas 


240  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

in  its  more  common  form  that  doctrine 
leads  to  a  chilling  fatalism.  Just  as 
Nietzsche  forward  a  positive  instead  of 
a  negative  sense  of  moral  duty,  so  he 
ministers  to  a  positive  as  against  a  negative 
and  depressed  atheism.  His  charm,  then, 
is  this:  without  any  taint  of  orthodoxy, 
free,  as  he  claims,  not  only  of  all  Christian 
but  of  all  idealist  or  moralist  tradition, 
realist  to  the  core,  he  delivers  his  disciple 
from  the  tyranny  not  only  of  the  Heaven 
above,  but  also  of  the  earth  beneath.  He 
is  to  live  as  though  nothing  were  in- 
evitable, as  master,  not  slave,  of  the  uni- 
verse, finding  in  it,  even  if  he  is  worsted,  a 
noble  foe,  ready  for  the  new,  the  unknown, 
the  exceptional,  climbing  daily  fresh  Alpine 
heights  of  danger — enslaved  neither  to 
priest  nor  to  philosopher,  nor  even  to  scien- 
tific dogmatist.  Jacob  earned  his  royal 
title  by  wrestling  with  a  supernatural 
being;  Nietzsche,  who  denies  the  super- 
natural, would  win  for  his  pupils  a  like 
principality   by   teaching   them  to  wrestle 


THE  CHARM  OF  NIETZSCHE  241 

with  natural  reality.  Rightly  or  wrongly, 
many  have  won  this  way  a  sense  of  freedom, 
of  the  worth  of  life,  and  of  trying. 

All  this  is  bound  up  with  his  attack  on 
logic.  Nietzsche  was  by  no  means  the 
first  of  the  modern  protesters  against 
hyperintellectualism.  The  vogue  of  Wil- 
liam James,  of  Henri  Bergson,  and  of 
many  others  is  proof  that  he  is  far  from 
the  last.  The  common  sense  of  the  man 
in  the  street  has  never  indeed  believed  in 
the  claim  of  mere  logic  to  decide  all  things. 
He  has  always  protested  in  the  name  of 
reality  against  rationalism,  has  beheved 
with  Lotze  that  reality  is  richer  than 
thought,  and  with  Pascal  that  the  heart 
has  its  reasons  which  the  intellect  cannot 
penetrate.  Or,  to  put  it  in  ordinary  lan- 
guage, the  instinct  of  the  normal  man 
or  woman  tells  him  how  much  greater  a 
force  is  to  be  found  in  the  subconscious 
and  inarticulate  elements  of  life  than  in 
those  which  can  be  docketed  and  defined. 
Nietzsche's  contribution  to  this  was  real. 


242  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

He  attempted  to  discover  the  origin  of 
logic,  and  to  get  behind  the  mystery  of 
language.  Probably  the  most  useful  piece 
in  all  his  psychological  work  is  this  effort 
to  shew  how  language  originates  in  the 
attempt  to  control  the  flux  of  becoming. 
(This  is  found  largely  in  the  later  works, 
especially  The  Will  to  Power,  and  also  in 
the  thirteenth  and  fourteenth  volumes, 
which  give  collected  fragments.)  After  this 
men  begin  to  hypostatise  divisions  in- 
vented with  an  object  entirely  practical. 
Then  they  go  on  to  assume  that  to  be 
fixed  which  is  eternally  changing,  and  un- 
consciously to  invent  a  whole  world  of 
substance-Being.  Nietzsche  marks  that 
revolution  which  man's  attitude  to  think- 
ing would  assume  the  moment  people 
began  seriously  to  apply  the  notion  of 
evolution  to  the  inner  world  of  thought 
and  its  outcome  in  language. 

Nor  indeed  will  in  future  even  orthodox 
theology  decline  to  admit  some  of  the 
results    of    this    change.      The    crystalline 


THE  CHARM  OF  NIETZSCHE  243 

idea  of  God  as  an  impassible  Absolute 
is  largely  responsible  for  the  popular  be- 
lief in  a  dead  God.  Christianity,  by  its 
doctrine  of  the  Trinity,  is  a  denial  of  this, 
and  pictures  God  much  more  in  the  way 
suggested  by  the  phrase  of  Aristotle:  as 
ivepyeta  aKLvr)(TCa<i}  The  changeless  life  of 
God  is  Love;  but  in  the  Christian  view 
this  is  compatible  with  racing  activity 
and  postulates  variety.  Christianity  at 
least  has  nothing  to  fear  from  the  super- 
session of  the  static  conception  of  God  to 
one  which  is  dynamic.^ 

This  tendency  may  be  just  now  exag- 
gerated, and  too  much  stress  laid  on  the 
element  of  becoming.  Yet  it  cannot  be 
denied  that  in  this  matter  Nietzsche,  so 
far  from  being  unzeitgemdsse,  was  eminently 
in  accord  with  the  evolutionary  tendencies 
of  this  age.  Some  of  what  he  says  about 
the  trend  of  science  seems  to  herald  much 
of  what  we  hear  of  in  connection  with  the 

-  Cf.  C.  p.  S.  Schiller's  essay  on  this  topic  in  Humanism  and 
Other  Essays. 

2  CJ.  Baron  von  Hiigel's  criticism  of  Bergson. 


244  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

electronic  theory  of  matter,  with  the  split- 
ting up  of  the  molecules  into  the  infinitely 
smaller  ions,  with  the  theory  that  all 
matter  is  ultimately  electricity.  Also  his 
general  standpoint  seems  to  favour  the 
claim  nowadays  put  forward,  that  science 
does  not  explain,  but  merely  describes. 
The  following  passage  affords  an  illustra- 
tion of  this: 

"Of  all  the  interpretations  of  the 
world  attempted  heretofore  the  mechan- 
ical  one  seems  to-day  to  stand  most 
prominently  in  the  front.  Apparently  it 
has  a  clean  conscience  on  its  side,  for  no 
science  believes  inwardly  in  progress  and 
success  unless  it  be  with  the  help  of  me- 
chanical procedures.  Every  one  knows 
these  procedures:  'reason'  and  'purpose' 
are  allowed  to  remain  out  of  considera- 
tion as  far  as  possible;  it  is  shown  that, 
provided  a  sufficient  amount  of  time  be 
allowed  to  elapse,  everything  can  evolve 
out  of  everything  else,   and  no  one  at- 


THE  CHARM  OF  NIETZSCHE  245 

tempts  to  suppress  his  malicious  satis- 
faction when  the  'apparent  design  in  the 
fate'  of  a  plan  or  of  the  yolk  of  an  egg 
may  be  traced  to  stress  and  thrust — in 
short,  people  are  heartily  glad  to  pay 
respect  to  this  principle  of  profoundest 
stupidity,  if  I  may  be  allowed  to  pass  a 
playful  remark  concerning  these  serious 
matters.  Meanwhile,  among  the  most 
select  intellects  to  be  found  in  this 
movement,  some  presentiment  of  evil, 
some  anxiety  is  noticeable,  as  if  the 
theory  had  a  rent  in  it,  which  sooner  or 
later  might  be  its  last:  I  mean  the  sort 
of  rent  which  denotes  the  end  of  all  bal- 
loons inflated  with  such  theories. 

"Stress  and  thrust  themselves  can- 
not be  'explained';  one  cannot  get  rid 
of  the  actio  in  distans.  The  belief  even 
in  the  ability  to  explain  is  now  lost, 
and  people  peevishly  admit  that  one 
can  only  describe,  not  explain,  that  the 
dynamic  interpretation  of  the  world, 
with  its  denial  of  'empty  space,'  and  its 


246  THE  WELL  TO  FREEDOM 

little  agglomerations  of  atoms,  will  soon 
get  the  better  of  physicists:  although 
in  this  way  Dynamic  is  certainly  granted 
an  inner  quality."  ^ 

Other  factors  in  Nietzsche's  success  are 
to  be  considered.  With  the  decay  of 
rhetoric  and  the  period,  men  have  come 
to  like  the  electric  style.  Nietzsche  knew 
this,  and  is  for  ever  switching  on  bright 
lights.  There  is  no  repose  in  it,  no  majesty, 
little  balance.  A  French  critic^  is  hardly 
unjust  when  he  declares: 

"En  somme,  un  style  mele,  baroque, 
inegal,  riche  et  meme  somptueux  en 
images,  passionne  hors  de  mesure  dans 
I'expression,  toujours  courant  apres  Tex- 
cessif,  Finedit,  I'ineprouve,  toujours  "par 
dela,  un  style  merveilleusement  'ondoyant 
et  divers'  comme  Fhomme  meme  dont  il 
nous  restitut  la  singuliere  et  vivante 
image." 

1  The  Will  to  Power,  U,  109.  ^Paflar^s,  151. 


THE  CHARM  OF  NIETZSCHE  247 

This  style  recalls  the  Greeks  as  little 
as  it  does  Cicero.  It  is  an  amalgam  of 
thrills,  of  sudden  changes,  of  strange  fire — 
all  as  in  a  very  pure  air.  There  is  little  or 
no  humour,  unless  we  think  this  is  humor- 
ous: 

"Once  Spirit  was  God;  then  it  be- 
came man,  now  it  is  mob." 

"Concubinage  has  been  corrupted  by 
marriage." 

"It  is  a  curious  thing  that  God  learned 
Greek  when  He  wished  to  turn  author, 
and  that  he  did  not  learn  it  better." 

"The  great  moments  of  our  life  are 
at  the  points  when  we  gain  courage  to 
rebaptise  our  badness  as  the  best  in 
us." 

He  has  a  great  gift  of  epigram.  But  his 
style,  though  brilliant,  has  no  repose,  and 
is  fatiguing  to  read  for  long.  Strings  of 
aphorisms  are  rarely  attractive.  La  Roche- 
foucauld had  an  ill  influence  on  Nietzsche. 
He  hoped  to  be  a  sort  of  super-Roche- 


248  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

foucauld.  But  he  lacked  the  essential 
quality.  He  was  not  a  man  of  the  world. 
That  is  what  distinguishes  him  alike  from 
La  Rochefoucauld  and  from  Stendhal.  His 
paradoxes  and  even  his  blasphemies  are 
the  difficult  effort  of  a  child  trying  to  be 
naughty.  He  is  not  selfish  enough  to  be 
profoundly  cynical.  There  is  always  some- 
thing of  the  eternal  undergraduate  about 
Nietzsche.  The  undergraduate  is  not  in- 
sincere. But  he  honestly  believes  himself 
more  shocking  than  he  is.  He  is  astounded 
alike  at  his  cleverness,  his  melancholy, 
and  his  profundity.  A  little  later  he 
learns  that  all  clever  young  men  go  through 
this  phase.  But  as  compared  with  his 
French  models  Nietzsche  is  always  too 
much  of  a  preacher,  too  profoundly  moral 
even  in  his  immoralism. 

Yet  he  has  great  qualities.  He  lights 
up  the  bypaths  of  history  and  criticism. 
To  glance  through  a  volume  of  Nietzsche 
is  to  obtain  a  number  of  apergus  on  ev- 
erything   under   the    sun,   for    nothing  in 


THE  CHARM  OF  NIETZSCHE  249 

heaven  or  earth  but  bears  somehow  upon 
the  main  theme — the  future  of  culture. 
"Europe  is  necessary  to  me  as  a  culture- 
museum,"  he  said  to  hi^  sister,  when  she 
wanted  him  to  go  and  live  in  Paraguay. 
Nietzsche  himself  was  a  culture-museum. 
All  peoples,  nations,  and  languages  he  lays 
under  contribution.  In  a  few  pages  we 
come  upon  bits  of  criticism  about  music, 
about  philosophy,  from  Buddha  to  Avena- 
rius,  about  poetry  from  the  Vedas  to 
Leopardi,  about  the  theory  of  art,  the 
goal  of  world  politics,  or  the  bearing  of 
digestion  upon  authorship.  His  books  are 
bright  with  many  memories.  Reading 
Nietzsche  conveys  a  pleasing  sense  of 
familiarity  with  all  that  can  be  called  cul- 
ture. That  is  as  far  as  many  people  want 
to  go. 

Probably  it  is  the  apocalyptic  prophecy 
of  a  new  age  that  wins  him  disciples,  as 
distinct  from  admirers.  He  is,  as  we  saw, 
essentially  a  prophet,  a  seer.  People  had 
got  tired  of  the  nineteenth  century  before 


250  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

it  closed.  At  the  outset  of  the  twentieth 
they  wanted  not  so  much  to  be  as  to  feel 
new.  Nietzsche  gave  them  this  feeling. 
He  is  the  John  of  the  Baptism  of  the  new 
kingdom. 

"Repent,"  he  might  cry,  "of  your  absurd 
morality.  Rend  all  your  garments,  and 
live  naked  to  the  real  wind.  Rid  your- 
self of  shams;  away  with  your  conven- 
tional lies,  your  worship  of  comfort,  your 
domestic  pettiness,  and  above  all  your 
wallowing  in  pity.  Be  something.  Look 
down,  down  on  the  herd,  which  you  dis- 
own. Kill  all  this  sentimental  culture, 
this  passion  of  the  past,  and  join  in  the 
great  gamble  for  the  future,  when  every 
valley  shall  be  a  gulf,  and  every  hiU  a 
Himalaya;  when  the  crooked  shall  be 
twisted  round,  and  the  rough  places  be- 
come rocks.  For  Man,  Man  alone,  shall 
be  exalted  in  that  day — ^for  the  Superman 
Cometh,  he  cometh  to  judge  the  world, 
and  with  violence  shall  he  rule  the  world 


THE  CHARM  OF  NIETZSCHE  251 

and  reprove  with  terror  for  the  proud  of 
the  earth." 

This  note  of  appeal  to  the  will,  this 
sense  that  mankind  is  in  the  making, 
ushered  in  the  twentieth  century.  The 
spirit  of  scepticism,  of  decadence  had 
hold  of  many,  or  else  a  mere  conservatism. 
Nietzsche  was  like  the  wild  northeaster, 
and  he  was,  in  his  own  words,  "the  voice 
of  the  day  after  to-morrow."^ 

On  one  side  of  its  culture,  the  nineteenth 
century  was  pre-eminently  the  age  of  his- 
torical sentiment.  This  sentiment,  the 
passion  of  the  "past,  is  a  noble  thing.  It  is 
not  really  a  hopeful  thing  to  try  to  throw 
away  the  achievements  of  the  race.  Yet 
historical  interest  may  be  overdone.  Either 
it  becomes  mere  sentimentalism,  or  culture 
becomes  a  jumble  of  memories.  This  is 
indicated  by  Nietzsche  in  a  passage  of 
Beyond  Good  and  Evil: 


^  "Ich  wlirde  den  hartesten  Despotismus  (als  Schule  fiir  die 
Geschmeidigkeit  des  Geistes)  noch  eher  gut  heissen,  als  die 
feuchte,  laue  Luft  eines  '  pressf reien '  Zeitalters,  in  dem  aller 
Geist  bequem  und  dumm  wird,  und  die  Glieder  streckt." 
(Nietzsche,  Werke,  XIV,  397.) 


252  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

"This  historical  sense  which  we  Euro- 
peans claim  as  our  speciality  has  come 
to  us  in  the  train  of  the  enchanting  and 
mad  semibarbarity  into  which  Europe  has 
been  plunged  by  the  democratic  mingling 
of  classes  and  races — it  is  only  the  nine- 
teenth century  that  has  recognised  this 
faculty  as  its  sixth  sense.  Owing  to  this 
mingling,  the  past  of  every  form  and 
mode  of  life,  and  of  cultures  which  were 
formerly  closely  contiguous  and  superim- 
posed on  one  another,  flows  forth  into  us 
modern  souls;  our  instincts  now  run  back 
in  all  directions,  we  ourselves  are  a  kind 
of  chaos;  in  the  end,  as  we  have  said,  the 
spirit  perceives  its  advantage  therein. 
By  means  of  our  semibarbarity  in  body 
and  in  desire  we  have  secret  access  every- 
where, such  as  a  noble  age  never  had;  we 
have  access,  above  all,  to  the  labyrinth 
of  imperfect  civilisations  and  to  every 
form  of  semibarbarity  that  has  at  any 
time  existed  on  earth;  and  in  so  far  as 
the    most   considerable   part   of    human 


THE  CHARM  OF  NIETZSCHE  253 

civilisation  hitherto  has  just  been  'semi- 
barbarity,'    the   historical   sense  implies 
almost  the  sense  and  instinct  for  every- 
thing, the  taste  and  tongue  for  every- 
thing; whereby  it  immediately  proves  it- 
self to  be  an  ignoble  sense.  .  .  .     Let  us 
finally  confess  it,  that  what  is  most  diffi- 
cult for  us  men  of  the  'historical  sense' 
to  grasp,  feel,  taste,  and  love,  what  finds 
us  fundamentally  prejudiced  and  almost 
hostile,   is  precisely  the  perfection  and 
ultimate  maturity  in  every  culture  and 
art,  the  essentially  noble  in  works  and 
men,  their  moment  of  smooth  sea  and 
halcyon    self-sufficiency,    the   goldenness 
and  coldness  which  all  things  show  which 
have  perfected  themselves."  ^ 

This  ministers  to  the  turning  away  from 
first-hand  experience,  and  applies  to  all 
who  look  on  life  merely  as  spectators,  like 
the  Lady  of  Shalott,  seeing  only  shadows 
in  the  mirror.     The  sense  of  this  danger 

1  Beyond  Good  and  Evil,  167,  169. 


254  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

was  ever  present  with  Nietzsche.  It  is 
expressed  in  the  finest  of  the  Essays  Out 
of  Season^  and  may  be  found  also  in  the 
chapter  of  Zarathustra  on  "The  Country 
of  Culture."  Further,  an  overgrowth  of 
historical  sentiment  may  lead  to  a  throt- 
tling conservatism,  and  a  refusal  to  cut 
new  lines  when  they  are  needed,  the  at- 
tempt to  solve  problems  essentially  new 
by  an  appeal  to  precedent.  Nietzsche  re- 
fused, and  by  refusing  strengthened  the 
tendency  to  resist  this.  The  present  gen- 
eration is  nervously  anxious  not  to  re- 
semble its  parents.  Thus  it  has  found 
refreshment  in  Nietzsche's  call  to  new 
adventure,  and  his  effort  to  sum  up  the 
religion  and  culture  of  several  millenniums. 
He  gives  the  impression  that  we  are  now 
done  with  the  era  that  began  with  Socrates, 
flowered  into  Christianity,  and  culminated 
in  the  French  Revolution;  that  a  new  age 
of  human  culture  is  to  begin,  and  that  it 
is  ours  to  make. 

To  this  end  courage  is  needed,  and  a 


THE  CHARM  OF  NIETZSCHE  ^55 

great  soul;  the  sense  that  will  is  omnip- 
otent, that  pain  is  irrelevant  and  indeed 
a  tonic,  and  that  we  are  tied  to  nothing. 
This  appeal  to  the  heroic,  taking  a  thousand 
forms,  and  proclaimed  with  prophetic  ur- 
gency came  with  force  to  an  age,  which 
believed  itself  only  at  the  beginning  of 
the  conquest  of  the  material  world  and 
sighed  for  the  open  air.  It  is  an  appeal 
essentially  romantic,  nor,  if  properly  ex- 
plained, is  it  other  than  wholesome. 

Yet  though  it  be  romantic,  it  is  or 
claims  to  be  reahst.  That  gives  its  force 
to  Nietzsche's  call  to  recognise  morahty 
for  what  it  is,  to  look  below  the  screen  of 
language  which  conceals  reality,  to  blow 
off  with  the  wind  of  criticism  the  haze  of 
sentiment,  in  which  men  disguise  their 
egotism,  to  take  account  of  force.  This 
call  came  like  a  trumpet-call  to  an  age 
dominated  by  Realpolitik^  or  else  by  an 
economic  struggle,  which  is  the  same  thing 
under  the  protection  of  the  police.  The 
fact  that  Nietzsche  repudiated  ahke  the 


256  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

economist's  ideal  and  the  statesman's  only 
gave  him  a  greater  leverage.  The  Will  to 
Power  in  its  natural  meaning  has  the  sim- 
plicity and  also  the  demerits  of  all  purely 
cynical  estimates.  But  it  came  as  a  re- 
lief to  the  languor  induced  by  the  moral 
scepticism  of  the  fin  de  siecle.  It  assured 
many  of  the  worth  of  life  and  courage 
without  any  taint  of  other-worldly  idealism. 
Nietzsche  appealed  to  a  very  powerful  mo- 
tive, the  sense  of  distinction.  He  addresses 
himself  to  the  Higher  Men. 

"Here  is  little  of  man;  therefore  women 
try  to  make  themselves  manly.  For  only 
he  who  is  enough  of  a  man  will  save  the 
woman  in  woman."  ^ 

As  we  saw  eariier,  this  notion  of  dis- 
tinction, so  far  from  being  denied,  is  in 
reality  enhanced  by  the  Christian  doctrine 
of  individual  worth.  Any  writer  is  sure  of 
a  hearing  who  claims  for  his  adherents 
the  few,  the  rare  spirits — ^just  as  a  hotel 

^  Thus  Syake  Zarathustra,  248. 


THE  CHARM  OF  NIETZSCHE  257 

may  win  the  multitude  by  calling  itself 
"the  select  hotel."  Browning  and  Mere- 
dith owed  something  of  their  vogue  to  this 
form  of  snobbishness,  and  it  frequently 
makes  the  fortune  of  some  outrageous 
artist.  Many  people  bought  Browning 
not  because  to  them  he  was  delightful, 
but  because  to  others  he  was  difficult. 
Nietzsche  owed  much  of  his  vogue  to  this 
desire  to  be  thought  superior,  although 
neither  in  his  nor  in  the  other  cases  is  it 
any  measure  of  real  worth.  Most  of  his 
more  clamorous  disciples  would  disgust 
him,  no  less  than  the  Browning  Society 
disgusted  the  poet.  For  all  that,  intellec- 
tual and  sesthetic  coxcombry  has  found 
much  on  which  to  preen  itself  in  Zarathus- 
tra.  Neither  riches  nor  birth  in  the  usual 
sense  are  needed  for  Nietzsche's  Higher 
Man.  Any  one,  therefore,  who  feels  so 
disposed,  can  claim  that  he  has  the  char- 
acteristics of  the  future  lords  of  the  world. 
The  following  passages  serve  to  illustrate 
this: 


258  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

*'Such  accusers  of  life — they  are  over- 
come by  life  with  a  blinking  of  the  eye. 
'Thou  lovest  me  ? '  saith  the  impudent  one. 
*  Wait  a  little;  I  have  no  time  yet  for  thee.' 

"Man  is  the  cruellest  animal  towards 
himself.  And  in  all  who  call  themselves 
'sinners'  and  'bearers  of  the  cross'  and 
'penitents/  ye  shall  not  fail  to  hear  the 
lust  contained  in  that  complaining  and 
accusing ! 

"And  myself.^ — will  I  thereby  be  the 
accuser  of  man.^  Alas,  mine  animals, 
that  alone  I  have  learnt  hitherto,  that 
the  wickedest  in  man  is  necessary  for 
the  best  in  him;  that  all  that  is  wicked, 
is  his  best  power  and  the  hardest  stone 
unto  the  highest  creator;  and  that  man 
must  become  better  and  more  wicked. 

"Not  unto  that  stake  of  torture  was 
I  fixed,  that  I  know:  man  is  wicked. 
But  I  cried,  as  no  one  hath  ever  cried: 
'Alas,  that  his  wickedest  is  so  very  small ! 
Alas,  that  his  best  is  so  very  small ! ' 

"The  great  loathing  of  man — it  choked 


THE  CHARM  OF  NIETZSCHE  259 

me,  it  had  crept  into  my  throat,  and 
what  the  fortune-teller  foretold:  'All  is 
equal,  nothing  is  worth  while,  knowledge 
choketh.' 

''A  long  dawn  Hmped  in  front  of  me, 
a  sadness  weary  unto  death,  drunken 
from  death,  and  speaking  with  a  yawn- 
ing mouth. 

*' Eternally  he  recurreth,  man,  of  whom 
thou  weariest,  the  small  man.  Thus 
yawned  my  sadness  and  dragged  its 
foot  and  could  not  fall  asleep."  ^ 

*'  'Of  the  convicts  guilty  of  riches, 
who  collect  their  profit  out  of  all  rub- 
bish heaps,  with  cool  eyes  and  volup- 
tuous thoughts— of  that  rabble  that 
stinketh  unto  heaven, 

"*0f  that  gilded-over,  falsified  mob, 
whose  fathers  were  thieves  or  birds  of 
carrion,  or  rag-gatherers  with  wives  com- 
plaisant, voluptuous,  and  forgetful  (for 
none  of  them  hath  a  far  way  to  go  to 
become  a  whore); 

1  Ibid.,  p.  326. 


260  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

"'Mob  at  the  top,  mob  below !  What 
are  to-day  "poor"  and  "rich"?  This 
distinction  have  I  unlearnt.  Then  I 
fled  away,  further,  ever  further,  until 
I  came  unto  these  cows.' 

""Thus  spake  the  peaceful  one^  and 
snuffed  himself,  and  perspired  over  his 
words,  so  that  the  cows  wondered  again. 
But  Zarathustra,  all  the  time  the  man 
was  speaking  so  bitterly,  gazed  with  a 
smile  into  his  face,  and  silently  shook 
his  head. 

"  'Thou  dost  violence  unto  thyself, 
thou  mount-preacher,  in  using  such  bitter 
words.  For  such  bitterness  neither  thy 
mouth  nor  thine  eye  was  made. 

"  'Nor,  methinketh,  even  thy  stomach. 
Unto  it  all  such  anger  and  hatred  and 
overflowing  are  repugnant.  Thy  stomach 
desireth  gentler  things.  Thou  art  not  a 
butcher. 

"  'Thou  rather  seemest  unto  me  to 
be  an  eater  of  plants  and  roots.  Perhaps 
thou  grindest  corn.     But  certainly  thou 


THE  CHARM  OF  NIETZSCHE  261 

art    averse    from    the    pleasures    of    the 
flesh  and  thou  lovest  honey.'  "^ 

Immorahsm  is  always  attractive.  Free- 
dom from  dependence  on  any  kind  of  au- 
thority has  charm  for  many.  The  Nietzsche 
worshipper  is  peculiarly  happy.  Not  only 
is  he  at  liberty  to  bait  Christians^ — a  com- 
mon pastime  for  the  intellectual — but  he 
can  pour  scorn  on  the  solemn  academic 
moralists  who  have  often  supposed  them- 
selves to  be  new,  because  they  are  infidels. 
Nietzsche  laughs  at  them  and  says  that 
they  are  Christians  without  the  excuse  of 
faith,  and  condemns  all  under  the  rubric 
of  the  spirit  of  gravity.  What  he  says 
about  the  spirit  of  gravity  is  true.  Pious 
folk  would  do  well  to  note  this. 

That  charm  as  of  naughtiness,  the  toy- 
smashing  child,  stands  for  much.     But  it 

1  Ibid.,  p.  401. 

2  "II  est  permis  de  penser  que  son  antichristianisme  en  morale 
fut  Tun  des  auxiliaires  les  plus  precieux  de  la  renommee  tardive 
du  philosophe  qui  intitule  a  Tantichretien  sa  derniere  production 
litteraire.  La  morale  chretienne  com  me  les  choses  tres  anciennes 
et  tres  melees  a  la  vie  a  tant  d'ennemis  conscients  ou  inconscients. 
Les  tendances  ne  furent  pas  6trangeres  sans  doute  a  I'interven- 
tion  de  M.  Brandes."     (Seillieres,  Apollon  ou  Dionysos,  210.) 


THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

is  not  all.  Many  persons  had  been  direct- 
ing their  lives  to  ends  deliberately  anti- 
Christian.  Such  men  were  rejoiced  when 
a  writer  of  power  and  passion  expressed 
their  feelings.  Others  were  pleased  with 
his  attacks  on  priests.  They  have  a  pleasur- 
able malice  in  this  superior  form  of  amuse- 
ment known  in  Paris  as  epater  le  bourgeois. 
Others,  without  sharing  their  convictions 
are  stimulated.  Indeed,  the  thrill  of 
Nietzsche  is  possible  to  many  who  have 
no  mind  for  his  philosophy. 

What  that  thrill  precisely  is  it  is  hard 
to  say.  It  is  not  mere  poetry;  nor  proph- 
ecy; nor  his  terrific  sincerity;  nor  his  vi- 
sion; nor  his  acuteness  of  criticism,  his 
amazing  variety;  nor  his  iridescent  epi- 
gram. Probably  it  is  something  personal. 
His  bewildering  changes,  the  kaleidoscopic 
quality  adds  to  that  sense  of  exhilaration, 
as  of  drinking  champagne,  with  which  he 
is  read.  True,  his  nerves  are  naked.  But 
nowadays  people  like  naked  nerves. 

Dionysos   is   his   own   word   for   it — the 


THE  CHARM  OF  NIETZSCHE  263 

spirit  of  the  dancer.  I  could  not  believe, 
he  said,  in  a  God  who  could  not  dance. 
In  this  once  more  he  is  nearer  to  Chris- 
tianity than  he  knew.  There  is  an  interest- 
ing mediaeval  poem  in  which  the  whole 
plan  of  salvation  is  entitled  ''The  general 
dance."  It  is  as  the  tight-rope  dancer 
living  dangerously  on  a  line  strung  be- 
tween precipices  amid  eternal  snows  that 
Nietzsche  is  so  much  of  a  "wonder,  a 
beauty,  and  a  terror."  In  a  new  age,  very 
childlike,  he  calls  to  all  with  the  spirit  of 
youth,  to  try  all  experiments,  to  shrink 
back  neither  for  fear  nor  for  love,  neither 
for  God  nor  for  man,  neither  for  good  nor 
for  evil.  This  call,  together  with  his 
strange,  mystical  sense  of  the  eternal  in 
the  transient  and,  therefore,  the  value  of 
the  moment;  this  paradox  of  the  ungodly 
who  yet  worships,  of  the  immoralist  who 
preaches  self-control,  of  the  Antichrist 
who  could  mount  the  Cross,  the  icono- 
clast who  could  yet  set  up  a  religion,  this 
it  is  which  gives  to  Friedrich  Nietzsche  a 


264  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

charm  that  will  outlast  all  the  febrile 
puerilities  of  his  attack  on  Christianity 
and  all  the  superficial  snobbery  of  his 
contempt  for  the  common  man.  One  of 
the  best  illustrations  will  be  found  in  the 
''Song  of  the  Seven  Seals": 

"If  I  myseK  am  a  grain  of  that  re- 
deeming salt  that  maketh  all  things  mix 
well  in  the  vessel  of  mixture; 

"(For  there  is  a  salt  that  bringeth 
together  what  is  good  and  what  is  evil; 
and  even  the  wickedest  is  worthy  of 
serving  as  seasoning  and  as  a  means  for 
the  last  foaming-over.) 

"Oh !  how  could  I  fail  to  be  eager  for 
eternity  and  for  the  marriage  ring  of 
rings,  the  ring  of  recurrence  ? 

"Never  yet  have  I  found  the  woman 
by  whom  I  should  have  hked  to  have 
children,  unless  it  be  this  woman  I  love. 
For  I  love  thee,  O  Eternity! 

''For  I  love  thee,  0  Eternity  ! 

"If  I  am  fond  of  the  sea,  and  of  all 


THE  CHARM  OF  NIETZSCHE  265 

that  is  of  the  sea's  kin,  and  if  I  am 
fondest  if  it  contradicteth  me  angrily; 

"If  that  seeking  lust  is  within  me 
that  driveth  the  sails  after  the  undis- 
covered; if  there  is  a  sailor's  lust  in  my 
lust; 

"If  my  rejoicing  hath  ever  cried:  'The 
shore  hath  disappeared !  Now  the  last 
chain  hath  fallen  down  from  me ! 

' ' '  The  limitless  roareth  round  me !  Far, 
far  away  shine  unto  me  space  and  time ! 
Up  !  upward,  old  heart !' 

"Oh !  how  could  I  fail  to  be  eager  for 
eternity  and  for  the  marriage  ring  of 
rings,  the  ring  of  recurrence? 

"Never  yet  have  I  found  the  woman 
by  whom  I  should  have  liked  to  have 
children,  unless  it  be  this  woman  I  love. 
For  I  love  thee,  O  Eternity ! 

"For  I  love  thee,  0  Eternity T'^ 

Uhid.,  p.  344. 


VI 

THE  DANGER  AND  THE  SIGNIFICANCE 
OF  NIETZSCHE 

Certain  dangers  attach  to  the  doctrine 
of  Nietzsche.  Whether  or  no  the  writer 
intended  them  is  irrelevant.  They  arise 
naturally  out  of  his  teaching,  provided 
men  are  found  to  take  in  earnest  his  claim 
to  be  a  moral  revolutionary.  Every  teacher 
must  be  held  responsible  for  the  natural 
consequences  of  his  teaching,  however 
little  he  intended  all  of  them.  Some  of 
these  consequences  Nietzsche  did  intend. 
Others  he  did  not.  In  any  case  Nietzsche 
is  guilty  of  them  unless  he  took  pains  to 
avoid  them.  Moreover  it  is  not  certain 
that  the  more  extreme  interpretation  of 
his  doctrine  is  wrong.  In  his  work  on 
The  Quintessence  of  Nietzsche^  Mr.  J.  M. 
Kennedy  propounds  the  following  genial 
suggestion  for  the  treatment  of  the  poor: 

266 


THE  DANGER  OF  NIETZSCHE  267 

"It  will  in  time  inevitably  be  recog- 
nised that  the  distinction  between  mas- 
ters and  slaves  must  be  made  more 
apparent,  must  be  more  generally  ad- 
mitted than  it  now  is.  Instead  of  the 
lowest  classes  in  society  receiving  wages 
and  keeping  up  their  pseudo-indepen- 
dence, they  must  he  trained  to  submit 
themselves  as  property,''^ 

The  two  completed  plays  of  the  late 
John  Davidson's  Mammon  Trilogy  are  even 
surer  evidence.  Mr.  Davidson  thought  that 
Nietzsche  did  not  go  far  enough.  Still, 
of  the  source  of  his  doctrine  of  triumphant 
power  reintroducing  the  rack  there  can  be 
no  question.  Much  of  Nietzsche  can  be 
interpreted  in  a  less  barbarous  way.  But 
his  own  professed  disciples  afford  evi- 
dence that  for  the  most  part  this  interpre- 
tation is  non-natural.  A  German,  Doctor 
Brahm,  has  written  this  year  a  pamphlet 
to  prove  that  the  Germans,  and  more  espe- 

1  Kennedy,  The  Quintessence  of  Nietzsche,  347. 


268  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

cially  Hindenburg,  have  full  right  to  the 
privileges  of  the  superman.^ 

Some  of  the  dangers  lurking  in  his  doc- 
trine Nietzsche  seems  to  have  felt.  Hence 
his  oft-repeated  assertion  that  his  writings 
(in  the  final  period)  are  directed  solely  to 
the  master  class  of  the  future.  That 
proviso  cannot  help  him.  Since  this  class 
is  to  be  recruited  from  all  higher  men 
irrespective  of  existing  social  arrangements, 
any  one  may  deem  himself  a  higher  man, 
''beyond  good  and  evil." 

The  first  danger  is  an  unbridled  in- 
dividualism. Nietzsche's  assertion  that 
morality  is  due  to  the  herd  instinct  is 
coupled  with  the  view  that  the  higher 
man,  and  still  more  the  superman  of  the 
future,  is  by  the  law  of  his  being  released 

1 "  Wie  der  Genius  alle  Kultur  rechtfertigt,  so  ist  es  denn  schliess- 
lich  auch  die  letzte  Form  der  Heiligung  der  Kriegesclasse  ohne 
die  der  militarische  Genius  nicht  geschaffen  wurde.  Wenn  ge- 
rade  in  den  Zeiten  des  Krieges  so  haufig  auffallt  dass  ein  Mann 
wie  Hindenburg  dahin  gegangen  ware,  ohne  seine  letzten  Quali- 
taten  zum  Ausdruck  gebracht  zu  haben,  ware  der  Krieg  nicht 
gekommen,  so  meint  Nietzsche  genau  das  Gleiche  wenn  er  den 
Krieg  schon  daraus  rechtfertigt,  dass  er  dem  militarischen  Genius 
die  Moglichkeit  der'  Entfaltung  gibt."  (Brahm.  Friedrich 
Nietzsches  Meinungen.) 


THE  DANGER  OF  NIETZSCHE  269 

from  all  these  restrictions.  This  doctrine 
forms  and  is  bound  to  form  an  incentive 
to  oppression.  Every  little  poetaster  may 
fancy  himself  one  of  the  select.  An  able 
man  may  justify  almost  any  breach  of 
social  obligation  by  an  appeal  to  Nietzsche. 
Speaking  once  of  a  certain  course  of  con- 
duct pursued  by  an  able  man  as  base,  I 
was  met  by  the  rejoinder:  "I  think 
Nietzsche  would  have  approved  of  it." 
The  temptations  to  men  of  talent  to  win 
success  by  crooked  methods  are  strong. 
In  all  ages  many  give  way  to  them. 
Hitherto  such  lapses  have  been  blamed. 
Now  they  can  be  justified  by  the  authority 
of  a  great  name.  Nietzsche  admitted  that 
according  to  all  existing  standards  his  su- 
perman is  a  criminal. 

True,  Nietzsche  made  clear  that  he  did 
not  teach  what  in  the  narrower  sense  is 
called  license.  Yet  the  Christian  ideal 
of  chastity  he  treats  with  scorn.  His 
disciples  may  claim  to  be  excused,  if  they 
go   somewhat   farther   than   their    master. 


270  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

Once  teach  that  all  moral  restraints  are 
without  meaning  save  for  the  herd,  and 
it  is  no  wonder  if  men  place  upon  this  a 
sinister  application.  Gabriele  d'Annunzio 
is  a  professed  follower  of  Nietzsche.  The 
ideal  which  is  stated  or  implied  in  his 
works  needs  no  description.  Nietzsche 
may  not  himself  be  guilty  of  aflSrming  such 
perversity.  Yet  he  can  hardly  be  acquitted 
of  having  furthered  it. 

Let  us  pass  on  to  consequences,  which 
are  more  direct.  Egoism  he  admits  to 
be  a  quality  of  greatness.  Even  this  is 
susceptible  of  a  decent  meaning,  if  we 
understand  by  it  that  an  individual  has 
his  own  end  and  is  something  more  than 
a  cog  in  the  social  machine.  Altruism  with- 
out qualification  is  ultimately  destruc- 
tive of  individuality.  Yet  this  minimis- 
ing interpretation  is  far  from  obvious. 
Nietzsche's  own  admiration  of  Napoleon,^ 

^  The  author  of  the  pamphlet  mentioned  before  makes  a  not 
unfair  use  of  this  fact  to  justify  his  identification  of  Hindenburg 
with  the  superman: 

"Alexfider  den  Grossen,  Casar,  Napoleon,  spater  auch  Bis- 
marck, zitiert  '^r  wohl  ofter  als  Shakespeare  und  Goethe." 
(Brahm,  Friedrich  Nietzsckes  Meinungen  iiber  Staate  und  Kriege.) 


THE  DANGER  OF  NIETZSCHE  271 

and  still  more  of  Machiavelli's  hero,  Cesare 
Borgia,  does  not  favour  such  a  gloss.  His 
teaching  appears  to  justify  the  utmost 
ruthlessness  and  treachery,  if  only  it  be 
displayed  by  the  strong.  Nietzsche  de- 
spised the  Philistine  ideal  of  riches.  Yet 
the  question  as  to  who  is  the  superman  or 
the  forerunner  of  the  superman  is  a  ques- 
tion of  fact.  Even  the  Pope  does  not 
claim  to  be  infallible  in  matters  of  fact. 
The  point  is  not,  who  is  the  superman?  but 
what  may  the  person  do  who  has  reason 
to  think  himself  such.^  Once  Nietzsche's 
moral  of  the  exploitation  of  the  weak  by 
the  strong  is  accepted  as  a  principle,  any 
individual  or  group  of  individuals  may 
say:  "I,  or  at  least  my  children,  will  be 
supermen.  We  therefore  are  beyond  good 
and  evil.  Greatness,  according  to  our 
Master,  always  goes  along  with  social 
wickedness.  Any  means  are  right,  if  they 
lead  to  the  supreme  end.  Therefore  we 
are  benefiting  society,  or  at  least  ages  to 
come,  if  we  treat  the  mass  of  men  with 


272  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

contempt  and  throw  to  the  winds  all 
thoughts  of  pity  or  honesty."  The  non- 
moral  company  promoter,  who  achieves 
eminence  in  riches,  by  eminence  in  lying, 
the  organisers  of  the  slave  trade,  the  op- 
pressors of  native  races,  the  promoters  of 
the  Putumayo  atrocities,  all  these  might 
be  condemned  by  Nietzsche  himself.  Yet 
they  would  find  excuse  in  his  principles: 

"The  way  in  which  one  has  to  treat 
raw  savages  and  the  impossibility  of 
dispensing  with  barbarous  methods  be- 
comes obvious  in  practice  when  one 
is  transplanted,  with  all  one's  European 
pampering,  to  a  spot  such  as  the  Congo, 
or  anywhere  else  where  it  is  necessary 
to  maintain  one's  mastery  over  bar- 
barians. 

'^  Warlike  and  peaceful  people. — ^Art 
thou  a  man  who  has  the  instincts  of  a 
warrior  in  thy  blood  .^  If  this  be  so, 
another  question  must  be  put.  Do  thy 
instincts    impel    thee    to    attack    or    to 


THE  DANGER  OF  NIETZSCHE  273 

defend?    The  rest  of  mankind,  all  those 
whose  instincts  are  not  warlike,   desire 
peace,  concord,  'freedom,'  'equal  rights': 
these   things   are  but  names   and   steps 
for  one  and  the  same  thing.     Such  men 
only  wish  to  go  where  it  is  not  neces- 
sary for  them  to   defend  themselves— 
such  men  become  discontented  with  them- 
selves  when   they   are   obUged   to   offer 
resistance;   they  would   fain  create   cir- 
cumstances in  which  war  is  no  longer 
necessary.     If   the   worst   came   to   the 
worst,    they    would    resign    themselves, 
obey,  and  submit;    all  these  things  are 
better  than  waging  war— thus  does  the 
Christian's  instinct,  for  instance,  whisper 
to  him.    In  the  born  warrior's  character 
there  is  something  of  armour,  likewise 
in  the  choice  of  his  circumstances  and 
in  the  development  of  every  one  of  his 
qualities:    weapons  are  best  evolved  by 
the  latter  type,  shields  are  best  devised 
by  the  former. 

''What  expedients   and   what  virtues 


274  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

do  the  unarmed  and  the  undefended 
require  in  order  to  survive,  and  even  to 
conquer  ? " ^ 

Instead  of  the  humanisation  of  society, 
the  getting  rid  of  the  habit  of  treating  men 
as  tools,  ''hands,"  we  shall  have  all  these 
evils  enhanced  a  thousandfold — except  in 
so  far  as  they  reduce  the  quantum  of 
production.  That  this  is  so  is  shewn  by 
the  passage  quoted  above  about  the  lower 
classes  becoming  mere  property — ^perhaps 
the  basest  of  all  political  ideals.  It  ipso 
facto  denies  them  the  quality  of  men. 
Worse  dangers  attach  to  Nietzsche's  doc- 
trine. It  may  seem  commonplace  to  quote 
his  words  to  warriors.  But  his  words  about 
loving  peace  "as  a  means  to  new  wars" 
and  "a  good  war  justifying  any  cause "^ 
are  not  so  easily  susceptible  of  a  spiritual 

1  The  Will  to  Power,  11,  342. 

2  "  Ye  shall  love  peace  as  a  means  to  new  wars,  and  the  short 
peace  better  than  the  long. 

"  I  do  not  advise  you  to  work,  but  to  fight.  I  do  not  advise  you 
to  conclude  peace,  but  to  conquer.  Let  your  work  be  a  fight  and 
your  peace  a  victory. 

"  Ye  say  a  good  cause  will  hallow  even  war  ?  I  say  unto  you  a 
good  war  halloweth  every  cause."     Zarathustra,  p.  60. 


THE  DANGER  OF  NIETZSCHE 


275 


interpretation  as  the  defenders  of  Nietzsche 
suppose.  Even  if  they  do  refer  to  war- 
fare of  ideas,  it  is  fair  to  say  that  when 
ideas  get  embodied  in  societies  this  war- 
fare will  be  something  more  barbaric  than 
mere  debate.^  Moreover,  we  must  take 
also  into  account  what  he  says  elsewhere: 


"Our  psychologists,  whose  glance 
dwells  involuntarily  upon  the  symptoms 
of  decadence,  lead  us  to  mistrust  in- 
tellect ever  more  and  more.  People 
persist  in  seeing  only  the  weakening, 
pampering,  and  sickening  effects  of  in- 
tellect, but  there  are  now  going  to  ap- 
pear: 


New 
barbarians 


'  Cynics 
Experimen- 
talists, 
Conquerors : 


The  union  of 
intellectual 
superiority 
and  of  an 
overflow  of 
strength. 


*  The  following  passage  seems  to  favour  the  view  that  Nietz- 
sche might  be  referring  to  the  warfare  of  ideas: 

"Neue  Form  der  Gemeinschaft:  sich  kriegerisch  behauptend. 
Sonst  wild  der  Geist  matt.     Keine  'Garten'  und  blosses  Aus- 


276  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

"I  point  to  something  new:  certainly 
for  such  a  democratic  community  there 
is  a  danger  of  barbarians;  but  these 
are  sought  only  down  below.  There  is 
also  another  hind  of  barbarians  who  come 
from  the  heights:  a  kind  of  conquering 
and  ruling  natures,  which  are  in  search 
of  material  that  they  can  mould.  Prome- 
theus was  a  barbarian  of  this  stamp. 

''Principal  standpoint:  one  should  not 
suppose  the  mission  of  a  higher  species 
to  be  the  leading  of  inferior  men  (as 
Comte  does,  for  instance);  but  the  in- 
ferior should  be  regarded  as  the  founda- 
tion upon  which  a  higher  species  may 
live  their  higher  life — upon  which  alone 
they  can  stand,''  ^ 

''We  must  understand  the  fundamental 
artistic  phenomenon Vhich  is  called  'Life' 
— the  formative   spirit,    which   contracts 

weichen  vor  den  Massen.  Krieg  (aber  ohne  Pulver) !  zwisclien 
verschiedenen  Gedanken !  und  deren  Heeren. 

"Neuer  Adel,  durch  Zuchtung.  Die  Griindungs-Feste  von 
Familien. 

"Der  Tag  neu  eingetheilt:  die  korperlichen  Ubungen  fiir  aller 
Lebensalter.     Der  Wettkampf  als  Princip."     {Werke,  XII,  368.) 

1  The  Will  to  Power,  329. 


THE  DANGER  OF  NIETZSCHE  277 

under  the  most  unfavourable  circum- 
stances: and  in  the  slowest  manner 
possible.  The  proof  of  all  its  combina- 
tions must  first  be  given  afresh:  it  main- 
tains itself, 

*' Sexuality,  lust  of  dominion,  the  plea- 
sure derived  from  appearance  and  decep- 
tion, great  and  joyful  gratitude  to  Life 
and  its  typical  conditions — these  things 
are  essential  to  all  Paganism,  and  it 
has  a  good  conscience  on  its  side.  That 
which  is  hostile  to  Nature  (already  in 
Greek  antiquity)  combats  Paganism  in 
the  form  of  morality  and  dialectics. 

"An  antimetaphysical  view  of  the 
world — ^yes,  but  an  artistic  one. 

'' Apollo's  misapprehension:  the  eter- 
nity of  beautiful  forms,  the  aristocratic 
prescription,  '  Thus  shall  it  ever  be  I ' 

^'Dionysos:  Sensuality  and  cruelty. 
The  perishable  nature  of  existence  might 
be  interpreted  as  the  joy  of  procreative 
and  destructive  force,  as  unremitting 
creation  J^^ 

1  Ibid.,  415. 


278  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

''Such  men  as  Napoleon  must  always 
return  and  always  settle  our  belief  in 
the  self -glory  of  the  individual  afresh: 
he  himself,  however,  was  corrupted  by 
the  means  he  had  to  stoop  to,  and  had 
lost  noblesse  of  character.  If  he  had  had 
to  prevail  among  another  kind  of  men, 
he  could  have  availed  himself  of  other 
means;  and  thus  it  would  not  seem 
necessary  that  a  Csesar  must  become  bad, 

"Man  is  a  combination  of  the  beast 
and  the  superbeast;  higher  man  a  com- 
bination of  the  monster  and  the  super- 
man;^ these  opposites  belong  to  each 
other.  With  every  degree  of  a  man's 
growth  towards  greatness  and  loftiness 
he  also  grows  downward  into  the  depths 
and  into  the  terrible:  we  should  not 
desire  the  one  without  the  other;  or, 
better  still,  the  more  fundamentally  we 
desire  the  one,  the  more  completely  we 
shall  achieve  the  other. 

*The  play  on  the  German  words,  "Unthier"  and  "Uberthier," 
"TJnmensch"  and  **,tlbermensch,"  is  unfortunately  not  translat- 
able.—Tr. 


THE  DANGER  OF  NIETZSCHE  279 

"Terribleness  belongs  to  greatness:  let 
us  not  deceive  ourselves. 

"I  have  taught  the  knowledge  of  such 
terrible  things  that  all  'Epicurean  con- 
tentment' is  impossible  concerning  them. 
Dionysian  pleasure  is  the  only  adequate 
kind  here:  I  was  the  first  to  discover  the 
tragic.  Thanks  to  their  superficiality 
in  ethics,  the  Greeks  misunderstood  it. 
Resignation  is  not  the  lesson  of  tragedy, 
but  only  the  misunderstanding  of  it! 
The  yearning  for  nonentity  is  the  denial 
of  tragic  wisdom,  its  opposite !"  ^ 

If  we  add  to  this  that  he  seems  to  at- 
tribute to  this  new,  or  rather  old,  god  Diony- 
sos  the  qualities  of  barbarism  and  sensual- 
ity, we  may  anticipate  a  fine  crop  of  hor- 
rors if  any  persons  or  group  of  persons  gets 
hold  of  the  notion  that  he  is  Ubermensch, 
or  ijbervolk.  Si  monumentum  quceris,  cir- 
cumspice.  That  person  or  group  might, 
in  Nietzsche's  own  judgment,  be  far  from 

1  Ibid.,  405. 


280  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

qualifying  for  the  title.  None  the  less 
could  he  excuse  on  Nietzsche's  principles 
any  ruse  and  every  ruthless  act. 

Nietzsche  said,  when  attacking  Christian- 
ity, that  its  evil  quality  was  not  of  necessity 
tied  to  that  other  worldly  faith  which  he 
denied.  That  might  be  harmless  enough, 
if  only  Christianity  had  not  reversed  the 
natural  order  of  values  and  denied  rank. 
Nietzsche's  own  principles  should  be  ap- 
plied here.  Nominal  Christians  may  be 
found  who  try  to  adapt  their  faith  to  the 
notion  of  a  conquering  race,  which  is  in 
all  but  name  the  same  as  that  of  Nietzsche. 
Houston  Stewart  Chamberlain  in  the  Foun- 
dations of  the  Nineteenth  Century  affords  a 
cardinal  instance  of  this.  That  work  de- 
nies that  humanity  means  anything  at 
all,  declaring  all  truth  to  lie  in  race-tyranny. 
He  prophesies  a  new  triumph  for  a  reju- 
venated Christianity,  embodying  the  idea 
of  a  race-superiority.  The  import  of  Cham- 
berlain's Nietzscheanised  Christianity  has 
recently    become    plain.      Chamberlain    is 


THE  DANGER  OF  NIETZSCHE  281 

not  himself  an  admirer  of  Nietzsche.    That 
does  not  affect  the  argument. 

To  take  one  more  instance.  Nietzsche 
was  no  lover  of  any  existing  state;  still 
less  of  any  form  of  nationalism.  He  de- 
clared the  modern  state  to  be  that  in  which 
the  slow  suicide  of  all  is  called  life.  He 
regarded  it  as  the  refuge  of  the  much  too 
many,  a  dangerous  means  for  helping  the 
weak  at  the  expense  of  the  strong,  thereby 
retarding  that  cosmopolitan  Paradise  in 
which  the  good  European  should  be  master, 
supported  in  a  life  of  virtue,  free  from 
moralic  acid,  resting  on  a  pyramid  of 
slaves.  What  he  says  of  the  state  in  Zara- 
thustra  may  be  cited. 

"What  I  call  the  state  is  where  all 
are  poison-drinkers,  the  good  and  the 
evil  alike.  What  I  call  the  state  is  where 
all  lose  themselves,  the  good  and  the 
evil  alike.  What  I  call  the  state  is  where 
the  slow  suicide  of  all  is  called  ^life.'"^ 

1  Zarathustra,  64. 


282  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

Yet,  on  the  other  hand,  his  root  principle 
is  the  will  to  power.  Elsewhere  he  defines 
the  state. 

"The  state,  or  unmorality  organised, 
is  from  within — the  police,  the  penal 
code,  status,  conunerce,  and  the  family; 
and  from  without,  the  will  to  war,  to 
power,  to  conquest,  and  revenge. 

"A  multitude  will  do  things  an  in- 
dividual will  not,  because  of  the  division 
of  responsibility,  of  command,  and  exe- 
cution; because  the  virtues  of  obedience, 
duty,  patriotism,  and  local  sentiment 
are  all  introduced;  because  feelings  of 
pride,  severity,  strength,  hate,  and  re- 
venge— in  short,  all  typical  traits  are 
upheld,  and  these  are  characteristics 
utterly  alien  to  the  herd-man."  ^ 

"The  maintenance  of  the  mihtary 
state  is  the  last  means  of  adhering  to 
the  great  tradition  of  the  past,  or,  where 
it  has  been  lost,  to  revive  it.  By  means 
of  it  the  superior  or  strong  type  of  man 

»  The  Will  to  Power,  184. 


THE  DANGER  OF  NIETZSCHE  283 

is  preserved,  and  all  institutions  and 
ideas  which  perpetuate  enmity  and  order 
of  rank  in  states,  such  as  national  feel- 
ing, protective  tariffs,  etc.,  may  on  that 
account  seem  justified."^ 

Further,  in  politics,  according  to  Nietz- 
sche, perfection  is  to  be  found  only  on  purely 
Machiavellian  principles.  He  definitely 
prophesied  the  coming  of  that  savagery 
so  well  named  by  M.  Cambon  ''La  barharie 
pedanteJ'  ^ 

Is  it  not,  then,  obvious  what  is  likely  to 
happen  if  any  state  or  nation  adopts  his 
views  .^  It  can  assert  that  the  State  is 
Power,  nothing  else  but  Power.  It  can 
believe  with  Nietzsche  that  power  is  the 
one  end  of  life.  It  may  go  on  to  proclaim 
itseff  free  from  all  restraints  in  dealing 
with  enemies  and  from  every  kind  of 
limitation  in  dealing  with   its  subjects  or 

^  Ibid.,  189.  "Die  allgemelne  Militarpflichtigkeit  ist  schon 
heute  das  sonderbare  Gegengift  gegen  die  Weichlichkeit  der  de- 
mokratischen  Ideen."     (Nietzsche.  Nachtrag,  8,  497.) 

2  "Ein  Zeitalter  der  Barbarei  beginnt,  die  Wissenschaften  wer- 
den  ihm  dienen."     (Werke,  XII,  334.) 


284  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

with  religious  and  economic  groups.  Such 
was  the  inspiring  motive  of  Napoleon, 
Nietzsche's  ideal,  the  most  gigantic  egotist 
whom  the  world  has  ever  known. 

What  we  need  to  bear  in  mind  is  this: 
The  question  of  fact  as  to  where  the  germ 
of  supermanity  resides  is  one  thing,  and 
will  be  decided  by  each  individual  or 
group  in  accordance  with  its  own  wishes. 
If  that  question  be  decided  in  the  affirma- 
tive, Nietzsche's  ethic  gives  him  a  right  to 
despise  any  kind  of  restraint,  to  claim 
everything  as  his  due;  to  perpetrate  bar- 
barities and  treacheries;  to  exploit  the  rest 
of  the  world  as  tools.  On  this  ground  it  is 
hardly  unfair  to  say  that  Nietzsche's  doc- 
trine is  one  of  grave  practical  danger, 
however  deeply  Nietzsche  might  have 
despised  those  who  would  put  it  to  the 
proof.  Nietzsche's  doctrine  is  a  spirit 
rather  than  a  code.  Despite  all  qualifica- 
tions, it  is  the  spirit  of  pride  in  mere  power, 
which  believes  that  for  powerful  individuals 
or  classes,  and  for  these  alone,  "nothing  is 


THE  DANGER  OF  NIETZSCHE  285 

true,  all  things  are  permitted" ;  which  would 
deny  all  inherent  reality  to  other  persons 
or  groups,  treating  them  as  things,  as  in- 
deed on  the  naturalistic  hypothesis  they  are. 
Barbarism,  however,  is  not  the  greatest 
danger  of  Nietzsche.  His  attack  on  mere 
peaceful  domesticity  is  a  reaction  against 
a  sophisticated  culture.  It  may  be  claimed, 
even  if  it  cannot  be  proved,  that  he  is 
merely  advocating  a  tragic  view  of  life, 
with  its  due  place  for  austerity.  Alike  in 
education  and  the  state,  a  certain  process 
of  hardening  is  needful  to  manhood.  His 
fear  lest  Europe  should  become  a  sort  of 
China  is  not  ignoble.  How  dull  and 
Philistine  appear  to  us  the  ideals  of  the 
mid-century  utilitarians  with  their  "bag- 
man's Paradise"!  Nietzsche  represents  the 
reaction  against  that.  We  need  not  alto- 
gether blame  him  if  he  expressed  himself 
with  misleading  violence.  Even  his  at- 
tack on  pity  is  intended  mainly  as  a  rebuke 
to  that  sentimentalism  in  regard  to  pain 
which    has    tended    to    ruin    discipline    in 


286  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

home,  school,  and  state  and  to  produce 
certain  propaganda,  such  as  vegetarianism 
on  humanitarian  grounds,  or  the  more  dan- 
gerous forms  of  Pacifism.  Nietzsche,  as 
we  have  said,  agrees  with  Christianity  in 
holding  that  fulness  of  life  is  the  true  aim, 
and  that  is  never  reached  without  suffering 
and,  indeed,  is  sometimes  stimulated  by 
pain. 

Nietzsche's  danger  is  deeper  than  any 
apparent  barbarism.  It  hes  in  the  cult  of 
pride,  which  he  tends  to  stimulate.  The 
young  gentleman  at  college  who  prides 
himself  on  true  culture  will  easily  believe 
himself  to  be  of  the  "artist-rulers."  Among 
all  men  of  gifts  there  is  a  tendency,  only 
with  difficulty  kept  down,  to  despise  the 
mass  of  men.  This  tendency  can  be  re- 
strained only  by  much  intercourse  with 
those  whose  gifts  are  real  but  different. 
As  life  goes  on,  men  tend  more  and  more 
to  associate  with  those  of  a  like  calling, 
artists,  the  professions,  politics,  writing, 
warfare,  and  so  forth.    This  check  is  then 


THE  DANGER  OF  NIETZSCHE  287 

removed.  The  real  danger  of  a  philosophy 
of  pride  becomes  apparent,  and  it  can  be 
seen  to-day  in  the  tone  of  contempt  adopted 
by  many  modern  critics  towards  any 
fashion  in  art  and  literature  and  philosophy 
which  they  do  not  happen  to  like.  Nietzsche 
has  stimulated  all  this  by  encouraging  the 
individual  with  gifts  to  set  himself  against 
all  authority.  Probably  he  did  not  in- 
tend it,  yet  the  undoubted  effect  of  his 
influence  is  to  stimulate  excessive  individ- 
ualism in  regard  to  all  the  higher  things  of 
the  mind.  Indeed,  to  many  Nietzsche 
stands  for  such  individualism,  and  for  noth- 
ing else.  Yet  it  was  French  culture  with  its 
genius  for  order  which  he  admired  most. 

The  main  evil  is,  as  was  said  in  an  earlier 
lecture,  that  Nietzsche,  Prussian^  most  cer- 
tainly in  this  respect,  insists  on  concen- 
trating attention  on  Power.  However 
much  of  interpretation  we  may  put  upon 

^  "Diese  Harte  gegen  sich,  diese  Unterordnung  unter  die  Auf- 
gabe,  ist  sie  nicht  preussisch-deutscher  Geist?  Hat  man  nicht 
Nietzsches  geistiges  Milieurecht  das  geistige  Potsdam  genamit?" 
(Brahm,  26.) 


288  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

his  writings,  we  cannot  do  away  with  the 
radical  distinction  between  a  gospel  of 
Power  and  a  gospel  of  Freedom.  The  fact 
that  some  think  Nietzsche's  gospel  is  to 
be  understood  "in  a  spiritual  sense,"  so 
far  from  mitigating,  only  deepens  the  evil. 
A  gospel  of  Power  must  lead  on  the  part 
either  of  the  individual  or  the  class  to  a 
theory  of  egoism,  of  pride,  and  of  tyranny. 
It  is  in  its  essence  exclusive.  A  gospel  of 
Freedom,  must  equally  of  course  lead  to 
a  doctrine  of  tolerance,  of  humility;  for 
freedom  implies  the  recognition  of  others — 
power  pure  and  simple  is  satisfied  to  use 
them  as  tools.  The  ideal  of  the  one  is 
embodied  in  the  Roman  conception  of  the 
Imperium  in  the  head  of  the  state,  and  of 
the  absolute  power  over  life  and  limb  of 
the  individual  master  over  his  ''familia." 
The  ideal  of  the  other  is  for  ever  incarnate 
in  the  Christian  doctrine  of  the  State, 
as  made  up  of  more  than  one  authority, 
of  which  each  must  respect  the  other  be- 
cause each  is  Divine,  and  in  the  Christian 


THE  DANGER  OF  NIETZSCHE  289 

conception  of  the  individual,  as  having  a 
limited  freedom  and  bound  by  the  golden 
rule,  because  "one  is  your  Father  and  all 
ye  are  brethren."  The  one  doctrine  sepa- 
rates the  man  or  class  or  state  in  whom  Power 
is  vested  from  all  others,  and  superimposes 
it  on  the  rest.  The  other  recognises  head- 
ship and  inequality  and  rule,  but  all  as 
a  part  of  the  membership  "one  of  an- 
other," which  is  the  essence  alike  of  true 
citizenship  and  real  churchmanship.  Noth- 
ing can  relieve  Nietzsche  from  the  stain 
of  having  stimulated  the  tendencies,  al- 
ready sufficiently  strong,  towards  that  es- 
sential evil  of  Paganism  which  we  see 
at  its  worst  in  Nero  and  at  its  best  in 
Diocletian.  The  Italian  tyrants  of  the 
Renaissance,  refined  and  cruel,  are  the 
true  comment  on  this  doctrine.  It  is  not 
an  otiose  point  that  it  is  in  such  men  that 
Nietzsche  found  the  nearest  approach  to 
his  ideal. ^     It  is  no  defence  to  say  that  he 

^  He  does  in  one  place  seem  to  imply  that  his  master-class  may 
live  as  careless  Epicurean  gods: 

"Es  j^t  dm-chaus  nicht  das  Ziel  die  letzteren  als  die  Herren 


290  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

did  not  approve  the  material  tortures,  and 
that  the  "splendid  blond  beast"  he  only 
honoured  in  the  past.  For  it  is  clear  that,  if 
he  honoured  the  qualities  displayed  by 
these,  he  was  deeper  in  his  worship  of  them 
than  one  who  only  admired  their  power. 
The  Mammon  of  John  Davidson  gives  us 
the  measure. 

Nietzsche  is  a  good  tonic,  but  a  bad 
food.  Let  us,  finally,  try  to  estimate  the 
significance  of  Nietzsche.  What  will  be 
his  place  in  the  history  of  European  culture 
we  cannot  at  this  date  predict.  Some 
things,  however,  are  certain.  His  im- 
portance lies  in  the  fact  that  he  heralded 
the  break-up  of  the  nineteenth  century. 
He  prophesied  and  partly  produced  the 
shattering  of  those  ideals  which  seemed 
almost  self-evident  in  that  great  move- 
ment which  culminated  in  the  Exhibition 
of  1851;  Tennyson  was  the  creature  of 
his  age,  and  spoke  of  the  time: 

der  ersteren  aufzufassen,  sondern  es  sollte  zwei  Arten  neben- 
einander  bestehen — moglichst  getrennt,  die  eine  wie  die  epi- 
kurischen  Gotter  sich  um  die  andre  nicht  kiimmernd." 


THE  DANGER  OF  NIETZSCHE  291 

When  the   war-drum   throbbed  no    longer,    and 

the  battle-flag  was  furled 
In  the  Parliament  of  Man,  the  Federation  of 

the  world, 

Tennyson,  himself  (and  many  others)  be- 
came disillusioned.  In  "Locksley  Hall," 
sixty  years  after,  he  left  the  record  of 
this.  All  those  ideals  have  exhibited  their 
emptiness.  Men  have  seen,  as  Carlyle 
and  Ruskin  said  they  would,  that  mere 
competition  for  money  is  no  security  for 
the  higher  goods  of  human  culture.  The 
problem  of  the  poor,  so  far  from  being 
solved  by  the  grant  of  the  vote,  is  seen  to 
be  more  terrific  than  ever.  We  contrast 
with  the  modern  proletariat  the  happier 
lot  of  the  feudal  serf  of  the  Middle  Ages, 
who  had  his  land,  and  by  Magna  Charta 
was  secured  in  his  "wainage."  This  dis- 
illusion has  taken  in  many  the  form  of 
socialism.  In  others  it  has  become  a  sad 
conservatism,  quite  unlike  the  joyous  tory- 
ism  of  old,  which  harked  back  to  feudal 
ideals: — we  see  this  sceptical  disillusion 
in  writers  like  Sir  Henry  Maine.    Nietzsche 


292  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

expressed  this  disillusion,  but  he  went 
beyond  it.  His  gift  to  the  world  is  a  gospel 
of  hope.^  He  allows  many  people  to  hope, 
who,  having  given  up  the  supernatural, 
would  otherwise  have  sunk  into  gloom. 
War,  also,  it  has  been  thought,  would  be 
shown  to  be  a  chimera,  because  it  is  so 
expensive.  A  rationalist  world  would  settle 
down  to  eternal  mutton-chops.  Nietzsche 
saw  through  this  falsity.  So  far  from  all 
grounds  of  quarrel  coming  to  an  end  with 
the  growth  of  great  aggregations,  they  have 
increased.  Now  there  has  dawned  upon 
men's  minds  the  prospect  of  world-domin- 
ion.   Here  Nietzsche  was  prophetic.^ 

"  The  time  for  petty  politics  is  past;  the 
next  century  will  bring  the  struggle  for  the 


^  "TJnd  nun  nachdem  wir  lange  dergestalt  unterwege  waren, 
wir  Argonauten  des  Ideals,  muthiger  vielleicht  als  klug  ist,  und 
oft  genug  schiffbriichig  und  zu  Schaden  gekommen,  aber  wie 
gesagt,  gesunder  als  man  es  uns  erlauben  mochte,  gefahrlich- 
gesund — immer  wieder  gesund — will  es  uns  scheinen,  als  ob  wir, 
zum  Lohn  dafiir,  ein  noch  unentdecktes  Land  vor  uns  haben, 
dessen  Grenzen  noch  Niemand  abgesehen  hat,  ein  Jenseits  aller 
bisherigen  Lander  und  Winkel  des  Ideals,  eine  Welt  so  iiberreich 
an  Schonem,  Fremdem,  Fragwurdigem,  Furchtbarem  und  Gott- 
lichem,  dass  unsere  Neugierde,  sowohl  als  unser  Besitzdurst 
ausser  sich  gerathen  sind — ach,  dass  wir  nun  durch  Nichts  mehr 
zu  ersattigen  sind."     {Lehen,  II,  450.) 

2  Beyond  Good  and  Evil,  14G. 


THE  DANGER  OF  NIETZSCHE 

dominion  of  the  world — the  compulsion  to 
great  politics." 

Nor  is  it  easy  to  suppose,  that  words 
like  this  have  been  without  eflPect  in  stim- 
ulating this  desire  for  world-hegemony. 

Nietzsche  will  occupy  a  place  in  the 
history  of  political  ideals.  Mr.  Carlyle 
in  the  first  chapter  of  his  History  of  Political 
Theory  in  the  West,  describees  the  change 
that  came  over  political  thought  between 
Aristotle  and  Cicero.  Partly  as  a  result 
of  the  conquests  of  Alexander  and  the 
Hellenisation  of  Asia  and  Egypt,  partly 
from  the  beginnings  of  the  Roman  Empire, 
men  had  begun  to  believe  in  a  cosmopoli- 
tan world-citizenship,  based  on  that  funda- 
mental likeness  between  man  and  man  of 
which  Stoic  and  Christian  ideals  were  the 
expression.  This  notion  was  at  the  back  of 
the  minds  of  the  great  Roman  lawyers,  who 
always  asserted  that  slavery  was  a  thing 
of  convention  and  opposed  to  the  law  of 
nature.  That  belief  held  Europe  until 
the  French  Revolution.     It  had  much  to 


294  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

do  with  the  feudal  system,  for  in  theory 
the  serf  differs  toto  coelo  from  the  slave. 
The  church,  which  was  opposed  to  slavery, 
had  no  objection  to  serfdom.  There  was 
nothing  un-Christian  in  the  feudal  theory 
of  the  peasant.  With  the  revived  study 
of  Roman  law  in  the  Middle  Ages  and 
the  Renaissance,  the  old  evil  reappeared, 
for  lawyers  began  to  work  out  logically 
the  statements  of  the  Code  and  the  Digest. 
Since  the  serf  was  unfree,  he  was  to  be 
denied  personality  and  treated  as  purely 
a  chattel.  That  condition  was  partly 
the  cause  of  the  Peasants'  Revolt  in  Eng- 
land, and  later  on  of  the  Peasant  War  in 
Germany.  There,  as  a  result  of  Luther's 
influence,  the  lot  of  the  peasant  became 
worse  for  three  centuries.  Yet  he  was 
not  denied  altogether  the  rights  of  human- 
ity. "Eh,  Nangis,  ce  sont  des  hommes," 
was  the  reply  even  of  an  autocrat  like 
Louis  XIV  when  one  of  his  dukes  asked 
him  why  he  did  not  execute  all  deserters. 
Despite  many  inconsistencies,  that  senti- 
ment remained  unchanged.     It  helped  to 


THE  DANGER  OF  NIETZSCHE  295 

produce  the  French  Revolution;    it  ended 
the  slave-trade,  and  ultimately  slavery. 

Precisely  at  the  moment  of  its  triumph, 
this  movement  suffered  a  setback.  Mod- 
ern capitalism  shewed  the  evils  of  an  ex- 
ploited proletariat.  Men  began  to  ask 
in  what  way,  save  the  name  of  freedom, 
the  modern  wage-slave  was  better  oflf  than 
his  predecessor,  the  chattel.  Some  would 
end  this  by  a  revolution.  Others  were 
willing  to  accept  its  essential  fact,  the 
exploitation  of  the  many  for  the  higher 
life  of  the  few.  Possibilities  of  Empire 
over  black  and  yellow  races  raised  once 
more  the  problem  of  racial  differences. 
Darwin,  too,  and  belief  in  heredity  helped 
in  the  same  direction.  It  was  seen  that 
nations  could  not  be  held  together  without 
authority,  and  that  breed  was  a  fact. 
Democracy  in  so  far  as  it  implies  an  ab- 
solute individualism,  irrespective  of  blood, 
is  not  justified  on  the  principles  of  evolu- 
tion and  heredity.  The  political  fact  of 
the  consolidation  of  modern  Germany  by  a 
military  monarchy  was  a  further  stimulus^ 


296  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

Nietzsche  is  important  in  that  he  ex- 
presses and  sums  up  a  new  critical  atti- 
tude and  calls  men  back  to  doctrines  of 
the  natural  inequality  of  man.  Doubt- 
less, he  owed  much  to  his  admired  Gobi- 
neau  and  his  work  on  The  Inequality  of 
Races,  The  tendency  nowadays  is  to  re- 
gard not  the  individual,  but  the  group,  as 
the  social  unit.  This  in  itself  is  not  con- 
trary to  Christianity,  which  never  taught 
an  absolute  individualism  and  lays  stress 
on  the  family.  Nor  is  it  even  contrary  to 
the  present  direction  of  social  reform, 
which  more  and  more  tends  to  pay  regard 
to  the  numerous  groups  which  make  up 
the  nation,  and  to  treat  men  as  members  of 
such  bodies.  It  is  easy  to  connect  it  with 
eugenics  and  the  effort  to  limit  the  multi- 
plication of  those  whom  Nietzsche  ridicules 
as  "Xhe  botched  and  bungled."  This 
may  be  done  without  that  violence  of 
pride  and  selfishness  which  Nietzsche  ap- 
plauds. Whether  this  tendency  be  right 
or  wrong,  it  exists.     Nietzsche  is  among 


THE  DANGER  OF  NIETZSCHE  297 

the  most  important  influences  which  have 
developed  it. 

Another  point  is  of  even  more  note, 
although  it  is  less  obvious.  Mere  freedom 
without  any  restrictions  is  not  possible 
in  any  society.  The  anarchy  of  the  purely 
individualist  ideal  of  the  last  century  is 
becoming  apparent  in  moral,  intellectual, 
and  artistic  matters,  and  in  social  and 
political  spheres  it  affords  no  pleasing 
prospect.  Nietzsche's  task,  we  must  ever 
remember,  was  not  ignoble.  The  raising 
of  the  type  man,  the  winning  of  the  highest 
culture,  is  an  inspiring  aim.  Nietzsche 
saw  that  this  would  never  be  under  the 
ideals  then  prevalent  of  comfort,  money- 
getting,  Christianity  sunk  into  mere  eu- 
dsemonism,  elementary  education,  and  the 
rule  of  the  newspapers.  He  places  in  con- 
trast the  aristocratic  ideals  of  courage  and 
distinction.  He  asks  the  question,  Who  is 
to  rule.^  As  he  points  out,  "Society  seeks 
a  commander." 

Once  more,  in  fact,  he  raises  the  ques- 


298  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

tion,  "What  is  the  nature  of  Authority?" 
This  question  is  one  of  increasing  im- 
portance. People  will  be  forced  to  an- 
swer it  with  more  care  than  they  have 
done  recently.  In  all  practical  affairs, 
the  common  answer  is:  "Authority  is 
what  I  like."  Nietzsche's  answer  is  that 
in  the  rare  person:  "Authority  is  what  I 
command."  He  moves  right  away  from 
the  prevailing  notion  that  every  one's 
opinion  is  equally  valuable.  Creighton 
used  to  complain  of  "the  appalling  levity  " 
with  which  people  pronounced  judgments 
on  topics  they  have  never  studied.  This 
evil  is  real.  It  is  well  that  we  should 
recognise  it,  while  avoiding  the  opposite 
danger  of  the  tyranny  of  the  expert  who 
cannot  see  the  wood  for  the  trees.  In  any 
case,  the  question  which  Nietzsche  puts, 
or  rather  the  problem  which  determined 
the  direction  of  his  thoughts,  is  one  of 
capital  importance.  In  the  intellectual 
and  religious  no  less  than  in  political  and 
artistic   realms  it   will  have  its   inifluence. 


THE  DANGER  OF  NIETZSCHE  299 

Whatever  be  the  true  answer,  it  must 
take  into  account  the  imaginative  and 
subconscious  elements  in  human  nature, 
no  less  than  the  logical  and  articulate. 
The  least  reasonable  of  all  replies  is  that 
negation  of  authority  which  we  call  ab- 
solute individualism.  Hardly  less  so  is 
that  concentration  of  authority  which  in 
the  State  we  call  despotism,  in  the  Church 
Infallibilism.  Mankind  has  nowhere  yet 
achieved  success  in  this  matter.  Nowhere 
has  it  arrived  at  that  form  of  political  or 
even  ecclesiastical  development  which  shall 
secure  a  perfect  balance,  which  shall  allow 
to  each  individual  his  true  place  as  a 
creator,  i,  ^.,  as  an  authority-making  per- 
son, while,  on  the  other  hand,  it  insures  to 
him  the  discipline  from  outside  in  the 
form  of  group-authority  which  shall  guard 
against  his  own  caprice.  Nietzsche  hoped 
that  he  had  effected  this  by  his  new  as- 
ceticism, by  his  Jesuitry  of  the  new  order 
for  his  race  of  ruling  philosophers.  Un- 
luckily,   he    ended    there.      For    the    vast 


300  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

majority  of  men  he  leaves  no  place  at  all, 
except  to  obey,  to  display  the  herd-virtues, 
while  he  assigns  to  them  the  part  of  mere 
tools  to  the  higher  man. 

No  system  can  endure  that  does  that. 
It  rests  on  a  lie.  Owing  to  existing  dif- 
ferences, it  may  last  for  a  time,  like  slavery. 
Here  only  would  I  emphasise  this  fact. 
Nietzsche's  criticism  of  democracy,  as  he 
understood  it,  i,  e.,  as  a  theory  of  com- 
fortable Philistines  idealising  sympathy  and 
devoid  of  the  austere  virtues,  was  indeed 
one-sided  and  violent;  but  it  had  this 
merit — it  posed  the  problem  of  the  pres- 
ent age:  How  is  society  to  be  held  to- 
gether without  rule.^  What  are  the  true 
grounds  of  such  rule?  In  other  words, 
what  is  the  basis  of  political  and  still 
more  of  intellectual  and  artistic  obliga- 
tion .^^  Despite  many  volumes  and  much 
talk,  this  problem  still  exists.  Nietzsche 
was  right  in  saying,  that  it  could  not  be 
solved  merely  by  an  appeal  to  logic  or  by 
giving  free  hand  to  the  scientific  expert. 


THE  DANGER  OF  NIETZSCHE  301 

We  need  not  discuss  again  Nietzsche's 
criticism  of  rationalist  ideals.  His  im- 
portance in  this  respect  is  obvious.  In 
an  age  in  which  M.  Bergson's  is  a  name  to 
conjure  with,  the  connection  of  Nietzsche 
with  a  genuine  movement  away  from  the 
Aufkldrung  need  not  further  be  emphasised. 

Lastly,  it  remains  to  ask,  what  lessons 
we  can  draw  from  Nietzsche  in  the  domain 
of  Christian  apologetics. 

First  of  all,  we  must  recognise  the  re- 
crudescence of  pagan  morality.  No  longer 
is  there  any  excuse  for  saying  that  moral- 
ity can  be  taken  for  granted,  or  that  it 
does  not  matter  what  a  man  believes. 
Very  early  Nietzsche  saw  that  it  was 
hopeless  to  maintain  the  Christian  stand- 
ards apart  from  the  Christian  Faith.  The 
novels  of  George  Eliot  were  remarkable 
for  one  such  attempt.  Acton  thought 
that  th  ir  distinctive  merit  was  this  that, 
while  thi  writer's  standpoint  was  that  of 
pure    atneism,    she    yet    maintained    the 


302  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

Christian  ideal  of  human  Hfe.  Nietzsche 
observed  the  same  fact,  but  regarded  it 
as  a  demerit. 

Nietzsche  has  for  ever  shattered  the 
old  claim  of  the  infidel  that  he  waged  no 
war  against  Christian  ideals  of  living,  but 
was  concerned  only  to  deny  the  puerilities 
of  a  supernatural  creed.  Whereas  Gam- 
betta  said,  "Le  clericalisme  c'est  I'ennemi," 
Nietzsche  says:  "Le  moralisme  c'est  I'en- 
nemi."  Nietzsche  knew  very  well  how 
vain  was  the  hope  of  the  Tubingen  school 
to  destroy  Christianity  by  criticism.  So 
long  as  people  went  on  admiring  Christ, 
they  would  find  means  of  remaining  Chris- 
tians. A  few  might  give  up  the  creed. 
The  majority,  however,  seeing  that  creeds 
were  integral  to  the  moral  ideal,  would  in- 
sist on  keeping  both.  Nietzsche  has  proved 
right.  People  who  want  to  believe  are 
no  longer  disturbed  by  the  presuppositions 
of  intellectualism.  Nietzsche  himself  helped 
to  break  them  down.  He  did  more  service 
to  the  faith  than  he  knew.    Confident  that 


THE  DANGER  OF  NIETZSCHE  303 

the  Christian  Spirit  is  the  truth,  many 
are  content  to  wait  even  in  the  quagmire 
until  criticism  and  thought  have  sifted 
the  grain  from  the  chaff. 

Secondly,  Nietzsche  forces  us  to  face  one 
great  fact — hatred.  We  have  now  before 
us  the  enmity  of  many  men  who  give  up 
the  Christian  Faith,  not  because  they 
cannot  believe  it,  but  because  they  hate 
Christ.  This  hostility,  though  more  bitter, 
is  less  hopeless  than  the  cold  contempt  of 
the  superior  person.  Nietzsche  is  a  nobler 
foe,  and  his  blows  are  direct,  not  like  those 
of  certain  nominal  Christians  who  under 
the  dominion  of  ideas  essentially  natural- 
istic would  have  us  surrender  all  that 
makes  Christianity  attractive.  Christian 
morality  is  on  its  trial.  More  and  more 
will  it  be  openly  attacked  by  those  who 
worship  'Hhe  lust  of  the  flesh,  the  lust  of 
the  eyes,  and  the  pride  of  life."  Should 
these  elements  attain  predominance  as  an 
ideal,  a  new  outbreak  of  persecution  is 
certain,  and  it  will  be  as  much  more  fiendish 


304  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

than  the  old  as  the  present  war  is  more 
barbarous  than  those  of  the  eighteenth 
century.  Anything  Hke  tolerance  is  ab- 
sent from  these  people.  When  his  friend 
Romundt  thought  of  becoming  a  priest, 
Nietzsche  took  it  as  a  personal  insult,  the 
end  of  all  friendship.  Nietzsche  himself 
deprecated  persecution.  Were  his  disciples, 
who  have  none  of  his  charm,  to  get  hold  of 
the  tiller,  nothing  can  be  more  certain  than 
that  they  would  persecute.  Nietzsche's 
philosophy  is  a  repetition  of  the  old  com- 
plaint that  Christians  are  hostes  humani 
generis.  Any  general  belief  in  it  would 
produce  the  old  cry,  Christiani  ad  leones. 
His  dislike  of  Christianity  is  indeed  to 
many  people  his  chief  recommendation. 

In  another  respect,  Nietzsche  is  fruitful. 
Many  amiable  persons,  some  of  them 
erudite,  seem  to  discuss  the  problem  of 
Christianity  as  though  it  were  merely  an 
intellectual  amusement.^     To  others,  again, 

^  Leben,  II,  133:  "Bis  heute  ist  mir  nichts  fremder  und  unver- 
wandter  als  die  ganze  europaische  und  amerikanische  Spezies 
von  'libres  penseurs'  .  .  .  sie  glauben  allesammt  noch  ans 
Ideal — *Ich  bin  der  erste  Immoralist.'  " 


THE  DANGER  OF  NIETZSCHE  305 

the  whole  matter  seems  capable  of  solu- 
tion on  grounds  of  historical  criticism,  in 
which  are  inherent  presuppositions  which 
they  accept  without  inquiry.  Before  people 
begin  to  discuss  the  historical  problem,  they 
must  have  answered  the  old  question. 
What  is  the  chief  end  of  Man?  Much 
even  of  ultra-modernist  or  liberal  writing 
seems  to  take  for  granted  the  Christian 
ideal,  and  merely  to  ask  how  to  commend 
it.  The  real  question  is:  "What  think 
ye  of  Christ.^"  Is  the  Christian  ideal 
decadent  or  is  it  noble  .^  Is  it  true,  as  St. 
Paul  said  in  one  of  Creighton's  favourite 
texts  to  ordinands,  "that  the  weakness  of 
God  is  stronger  than  men,"  or  is  Nietzsche's 
apotheosis  of  force  the  only  truth  .^^  Many 
books  are  written  now  which  ignore  the 
fact  that  there  can  be  any  doubt  about 
ethical  ideals.  The  writer  is  occupied  with 
the  question  as  to  which  bit  of  the  Creed 
he  can  throw  as  a  sop  to  Cerberus,  hoping 
thus  to  win  the  educated  man.  Nietzsche 
is  a   standing  witness   that,   even   if  you 


306  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

throw  over  the  whole  Creed,  you  are  no 
nearer  to  your  end;  you  will  have  made 
ridiculous  what  was  always  hateful.  That 
is  all.  Vhomme  moyen  sensuel  is  not  and 
never  will  be  Christian  in  his  aims;  now 
that  he  is  educated  and  free  he  will  say 
so.  The  very  last  thing  that  will  attract 
is  a  Christianity  with  the  supernatural 
left  out,  and  all  the  old  moral  ideals  intact. 
Such  a  man  needs  a  change  of  heart  be- 
fore he  wants  Christ.  When  he  does, 
except  for  one  or  two  details,  he  will  not 
be  troubled  by  the  Creed.  "Except  ye 
repent,  and  become  as  little  children,  ye 
cannot  enter  into  the  kingdom  of  heaven." 
Nietzsche's  call  to  reality  is  a  lesson  to 
all  Christians.  He  saw  that  many  men 
disguise  their  egotism  under  the  mask  of 
a  high  moral  ideal;  that  even  sympathy 
may  be  a  cloak  of  self-indulgence  and  the 
love  of  power,  and  that  pity  in  some  matters 
is  but  the  expression  of  cowardice.  He 
summoned  men  to  go  out  into  the  wilder- 
ness away  from  all  hothouses,  and  predicted 


THE  DANGER  OF  NIETZSCHE  307 

treasures  for  all  who  treat  life  as  a  great 
adventure.  Christians  profess  to  do  that. 
Via  Crucis  via  lucis  is  their  motto.  In 
face  of  Nietzsche's  attacks  and  those  of 
others,  a  Christianity  which  is  what  Mr. 
Wells  called  "muffled"  will  have  no  ap- 
peal. Are  there  not  many  who  act  as 
though  St.  Paul  had  said  that  the  love  of 
money  was  a  root  of  all  good,  instead  of 
evil.?  Few  Christians  attain  so  high  a 
standard  as  did  Nietzsche. 

Christians,  again,  in  contradistinction 
to  Nietzsche  assert  the  will  to  freedom. 
They  beheve  that  we  are  all  "members 
one  of  another."  Yet  do  all  of  them  Hve, 
or  even  try  to  live,  as  though  they  be- 
lieved this.?  Christians  may  agree  with 
Nietzsche  in  the  doctrine  of  differences  be- 
tween men  conditioned  by  natural  gifts  and 
inheritance.  They  are  bound  to  differ 
from  him  when  he  bids  them  to  treat 
large  classes  of  men  as  mere  things,  the 
conditions  of  the  higher  life  for  themselves. 
But  do  they  not  sometimes  hve  as  though 


308  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

that  were  the  truth?  No  baser  cynicism, 
as  WiUiam  Morris  once  said,  can  exist 
than  that  of  the  man  of  culture  content 
to  enjoy  all  the  treasures  of  humanity 
without  contributing  anything.  Yet  with- 
out precisely  intending  it,  many  devout 
Christians  are  little  better.  They  look  upon 
the  great  mass  of  men  as  of  a  different 
order,  and  at  every  attempt  to  better 
their  condition  they  set  up  a  panic  outcry 
that  their  dividends  are  in  danger.  That 
cry  will  nowadays  unite  many  who  differ 
in  every  other  behef.  Nietzsche  is  signif- 
icant, not  because  he  does  not,  but  because 
he  does,  express  the  spirit  of  his  time. 
All  he  did  was  to  make  it  more  articulate 
and  to  accept  without  glozing  the  fact, 
all  too  patent,  of  the  servitude  of  the  many 
for  the  comfort  of  the  few.  The  tempta- 
tion— expressed  in  the  extreme  in  the 
culte  du  moi — to  treat  the  whole  crowd 
as  mere  instruments  of  my  pleasure  is 
a  temptation  as  old  as  human  nature. 
It  is    better    indeed,  for    the    most    part. 


THE  DANGER  OF  NIETZSCHE  309 

that,  even  if  men  do  these  things,  they 
should  acknowledge  a  higher  standard. 
Nietzsche  has  at  least  the  merit  of  honesty. 
The  more  his  writings  are  read,  the  more 
difficult  will  it  be  for  Christians  to  go  on 
trying  to  serve  both  God  and  Mammon. 
They  cannot  go  on  for  ever  halting  be- 
tween two  opinions,  directing  their  lives 
by  one  standard  and  professing  lip  service 
to  another.  They  will  have  to  come  out 
and  no  longer  be  of  those  Limbo-spirits, 
''neither  for  God  nor  for  his  enemies." 

Nietzsche  is  one  of  the  many  influences 
that  will  deepen  the  cleavage  between 
the  Church  and  the  world  in  the  future. 
All  compromises  will  be  less  and  less  to 
the  taste  of  the  succeeding  age.  Much  of 
Nietzsche  is,  indeed,  of  direct  service  to 
the  Christian,  and  is  far  less  antagonistic 
than  he  supposed.  Even,  however,  with 
these  reservations,  there  is  a  gulf  fixed. 

Nietzsche  is  a  portent,  as  he  said.  His 
attitude  of  neo-pagan  revolt  against  Chris- 


310  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

tian  and  humane  values  is  a  symptom. 
Nietzsche  claimed  to  be  reviving  the  heroic 
prephilosophic  spirit  of  Greece  and  Rome. 
The  use  to  which  he  put  classical  culture  is 
not  new.  We  see  it  in  some  of  the  Renais- 
sance princes  or  in  our  own  Tiptoft. 

Classical  antiquity  had  many  aspects. 
One  such  can  be  seen  in  that  movement 
which  steered  by  Plato's  star.  This  move- 
ment developed  ethical  doctrines  which 
resembled  the  Christian,  and  a  sense  of 
religious  need  which  was  fulfilled  only  in 
the  Catholic  Church.  Friends  and  foes 
alike  now  recognise  the  greatness  of  this 
proBparatio  evangelica,  not  only  in  strictly 
philosophical  thought,  but  also  in  ethics. 
Nietzsche  was  well  aware  of  it,  but  he  hated 
it,  and  Socrates  to  him  spelled  decadence. 
In  later  ages  classical  studies  have  often 
formed  a  propaedeutic  to  Christian  theol- 
ogy. Works  like  Fenelon's  Telemaque,  and 
indeed  all  the  most  characteristic  literature 
of  the  seventeenth  century  shew  the  blend- 
ing of  the  two  streams  of  classical  tradition 


THE  DANGER  OF  NIETZSCHE  311 

and  Christian  feeling.  One  eminent  critic 
holds  that  the  special  note  of  the  French 
genius  is  this  blending^of  the  two  antiqui- 
ties, and  for  that  reason  he  sets  Bossuet  at 
its  summit.  Until  recently  this  has  been 
the  spirit  of  classical  culture  in  England. 

Nietzsche  also  drew  his  inspiration  from 
the  classics,  but  it  was  an  inspiration  to- 
tally contrary.  He  went  back  to  the  pa- 
gan prephilosophic  side  of  Hellenism,  to 
Rome  conquering  and  proud,  not  humane, 
as  in  Cicero.  To  him  the  Greek  spirit  was 
essentially  this-worldly,  outward,  and  bar- 
baric. In  Christianity  he  found  the  most 
dangerous  enemy,  for  it  had  sucked  the 
sap  from  the  ancient  tree  and  supplanted 
this  grand,  aristocratic  immoralism. 

There  can  be  little  doubt  that  Nietzsche 
was  right  in  his  facts.  True  Paganism  is 
seen  in  the  spirit  of  the  Melian  dialogue  or 
of  the  Roman  slave  system,  not  in  the  re- 
fined ethics  of  Cicero  or  the  meditative 
melancholy  of  Marcus  Aurelius.  This  real 
Paganism  is  the  sworn  foe  of  Christianity 


312  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

and  of  all  ideals  which  believe  in  human 
brotherhood.  Nietzsche  drank  deeply  of 
this  spirit  and  helped  to  make  it  operative. 
Many  traces  of  this  baleful  side  in  classical 
culture  may  be  seen  to-day.  We  must  face 
it.  Christians  have  to  meet  an  attack 
which  owes  its  origin  not  to  scientific  in- 
quiry or  philosophic  scepticism,  but  to  the 
glamour  of  Athens  and  to  the  grandeur  of 
Rome. 

If  in  this  respect  Nietzsche  is  a  foe,  in 
another  he  is  a  friend.  Nietzsche  knew  the 
tragedy  of  things.  He  never  thought  that 
evil  was  only  an  appearance,  nor  was  suf- 
fering to  him  merely  the  creases  in  the 
eternal  smile  of  the  Absolute.  No  facile 
optimism,  whether  of  Hegel  or  of  Rousseau, 
no  blind  faith  in  the  idol  of  automatic 
progress,  no  romantic  idealisation  of  nine- 
teenth-century enlightenment  marred  the 
clearness  of  his  vision.  He  knew  that  life 
is  tragic,  and  that  man  needs  redemption. 
He  knew,  too,  that  the  cost  of  any  redemp- 
tion that  is  worth  having  must  be  terrific. 


THE  DANGER  OF  NIETZSCHE  313 

The  price  for  the  worid's  ransom  must  be 
paid  in  blood.  The  worid  would  not  be 
worth  redeeming  could  it  be  paid  in  any 
lower  coinage.  In  this  sense  Nietzsche  is 
at  one  with  all  that  is  best  in  Christianity, 
although  he  was  opposed  to  much  that 
masqueraded  under  that  august  title. 
Modern  civilisation  is  the  apotheosis  of 
vulgarity — or  was.  In  its  gaudy  and  clam- 
orous prosperity,  with  every  shop-window 
shouting,  men  have  mistaken  all  their 
values  and  mixed  the  colours  of  the  world. 
In  religion  an  idol  has  been  made  of  easy 
amiability,  and  for  the  enthralling  specta- 
cle of  God  as  Father  men  have  substituted 
a  pretty  picture  of  the  eternal  grandmother. 
The  "splendour  of  God"  had  become  a 
tawdry  oleograph,  and  a  milk-and-water 
sentimentalism  had  usurped  the  once  aus- 
tere name  of  Christian  piety.  The  reac- 
tion against  Puritanism  had  led  to  a  reli- 
gion of  weak  good  nature  and  the  refusal 
of  all  austerity.  It  was  against  this  that 
Nietzsche  tilted  when  he  attacked  Strauss 


314  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

and  denounced  the  shallowness  of  free- 
thinking  optimists.  He  was  right.  This, 
at  least,  we  in  our  generation  may  learn. 
We  learn  it  at  the  cost  either  of  our  own 
service  or  the  loss  of  many  friends — of 
whom  we  only  dare  hope  that  we  may  be 
not  all  unworthy.  The  world  is  once  more 
revealed  to  us  as  a  place  "of  true,  marvel- 
lous, inextricable  courage  and  power,  a 
question-chamber  of  torture  by  rack  and 
fire,  with  no  sleep  among  the  demon  ques- 
tioners, none  among  the  angel  watchers, 
none  among  the  men  who  stand  or  fall  be- 
side these  hosts  of  God."  This  does  not 
make  faith  easy.  It  makes  it  strong. 
Deafened  by  the  thunder  of  the  guns  and 
dazed  by  the  spectacle  of  a  world  in  ruins, 
many  a  man  and  woman  have  lost  all  faith 
in  a  God  who  is  Love.  Those  who  keep 
their  faith  keep  it  with  a  difference.  No 
more  will  they  cavil  at  the  Master's  like- 
ness of  His  Father  to  an  austere  landowner. 
No  more  will  they  find  it  hard  to  believe 
that  Love,  because  it  is  perfect,  will  send 


THE  DANGER  OF  NIETZSCHE  315 

not  peace  but  a  sword.  Love  is  known 
for  what  it  is,  no  sentimental  wish  for 
another's  pleasure,  which  will  be  changed 
by  a  show  of  tears,  but  a  resolute  will  for 
his  true  good — ready  to  purchase  that  good 
at  any  cost  in  pain,  not  only  to  himself  but 
also  to  the  loved  one.  "There  is  nothing 
so  merciless  as  the  mercy  of  God."  Not  all 
men  will  have  religion  now  or  at  any  time. 
But  one  great  quality  will  come  back  to 
all  religion  that  is  real — the  awe  of  God. 
Men  have  dreamed  that  they  could  love 
God  yet  cease  altogether  to  fear  Him. 
They  have  found  that  to  love  God  without 
a  holy  fear  is  not  possible.  In  the  long 
run  Love  goes,  ^too,  and  self  reigns  alone. 
Nietzsche  felt  this  in  a  dim  way.  He  got 
out  of  the  difficulty  by  denying  God  alto- 
gether. But  he  kept  the  sense  of  the  tragic 
and  tremendous  greatness  of  life.  This,  he 
said,  we  are  to  recognise,  to  embrace,  and 
even  to  adore — if  we  would  rise  to  the 
height  of  freedom.  Courage  and  a  face 
always  smiling,  with  pain  not  merely  braved 


316  THE  WILL  TO  FREEDOM 

but  transmuted,  joy  amid  a  universe  which 
is  a  chamber  of  horrors,  and  hfe  best  felt 
as  Hfe  with  death  lurking  at  every  footfall, 
these  were  the  maxims  which  he  preached. 
All  honour  to  him  that  he  preached  them 
with  no  hope  of  any  reward,  no  gleam  from 
any  light  behind  the  hill.  We  shall  do  well 
if  we  take  from  this  bitter  tonic  its  good- 
ness, the  sense  of  the  greatness  of  things, 
the  need  of  courage  and  a  free  soul,  the 
worth  of  discipline,  the  futility  of  mere 
comfort-worship,  and  the  vanity  of  all 
security  that  has  any  other  anchor  than 
our  own  soul.  We  Christians  are  the  hap- 
pier that  we  can  see  a  reason  for  all  this 
where  Nietzsche  saw  none,  and  can  say 
with  the  ancient  sage:  ''The  fear  of  the 
Lord  is  the  beginning  of  wisdom;  and  to 
depart  from  evil,  that  is  understanding." 


INDEX 


Adam  Smith,  S. 

Antichrist.  6,  42,  106-110,  176, 

232. 
Apollinian  art,  22,  277. 
Asceticism,     306-7;      Oriental 

and  Christian,  122-4. 
Authority,  Nietzsche's  view  of, 

297-300. 

Basle,  10,  18,  20,  21,  35,  231. 

Bayreuth,  30,  31. 

Benthamism,  Nietzche's  atti- 
tude to,  72,  112,  197,  285. 

Bergson,  75,  154,  185,  237, 
239,  241. 

Bernard  Shaw,  228. 

Beyle  (Henri),  19,  53. 

Beyond  Good  and  Evil,  42,  141, 
176,  252,  292. 

Birth  of  Tragedy,  22,  25,  171, 
174,  175. 

Bismarck,  18,  27,  197. 

Bonn  (University  of),  15. 

Brahm,  Dr.,  267. 

Brandes,  Georg,  56,  150,  197. 
216. 

Burckhardt,  22. 

Carlyle,  92. 

Cams,  Dr.  Paul,  201. 

Case  of  Wagner,  The,  42, 43, 176. 

Cesare  Borgia,  81,  87,  137, 
149-150,  169,  271. 

Chamberlain,  Houston  Stew- 
art, 117,  280. 


Christ,  Nietzche's  estimate  of, 

116,  146-7,  303,  305-6. 
Comtism,  2,  129,  211,  235, 
Conscience,    origin    according 

to  Nietzsche,  110-1,  144. 
Critique   of   the   Pure  Reason, 

188. 
Culture,  24,  113,  199,  249,  254, 

310;    and  history,  28,  251; 

and    Christ'lanity,    131; 

Nietzsche's  contribution  to, 

290  £F. 

Darwin,  86, 175,  295;  influence 

on  Nietzsche,  194-6. 
Davidson,  John,  267,  290. 
Dawn  of  Day,  The,^\,  159,  175. 
Democracy,  293-5;    Nietzsche 

a  reaction  from,  296,  300. 
Determinism,  235-8. 
Deussen,  Dr.  Paul,  13   15,  41, 

197. 
Dionysian,  art,  22;    "AiSBrma- 

tion  of  W,orld,"  69;  ideal, 

90,  162,  211,  262,  277,   279. 
"Distinction,"    88,    136,    138, 

144,      256;       of     Christian 

Church,  125-6,  135,  137. 

Ecce  Homo,  7, 42, 43, 58, 103-5, 
159-162,  169,  176,  224. 

Einzige  und  sein  Eigenthum, 
Der,  174,  200,  206,  207. 

Essays  Out  of  Season,  24,  27, 
93,  171,  175,  254. 


317 


318 


INDEX 


Eternal  Recurrence,  19,  62, 
69-70,  93-101;  place  of  in 
Nietzsche's  philosophy,  97-8; 
and  freedom,  239. 

Fischer,  22. 
Forster-Nietzsche,    Frau.    See 

Elizabeth  Nietzsche. 
Fouillee,    172,    195,    200;     on 

Nietzsche's  style,  225. 
Foundations   of  19th   Century , 

117,  280. 
Freedom,    235-8;    Nietzsche's 

doctrine  of,  238;    gospel  of, 

288. 
Future     of    Our     Educational 

Institutions,  174,  231. 

Gabriele  d'Annunzio,  270. 
Gast,  Peter,  11,  32,  36,  150. 
Genealogy  of  Morals,  42,  176, 

232,  238. 
George  Eliot,  301. 
Gobineau,  296. 
Gould,  Dr.,  17. 

Hartmann,  24,  192,  201. 
Hedonism,  72,  233,  235. 
Hegel,  193,  235,  312. 
Human,  All  Too  Human,  41, 
175,  194. 

Joyful  Wisdom,  The,  36,  63, 
175. 

Kant,  141,  184;  Nietzsche's 
contempt  for,  177;  Nietz- 
sche's debt  to,  178,  185-9. 

La  Rochefoucauld,  Nietzsche's 

imitation  of,  41,  169,  247. 
Leben  Jesu,  48. 


Leipzig,  15,  40. 

Lou-Salome,  Fraulein,  36,  37, 
63,  94. 

Lower  classes,  Neitzsche's  atti- 
tude towards,  24,  259;  re- 
lation to  supe'rman,  81  ff.; 
character  of,  113. 

Machiavelli,  141,  169,  283. 

Malwida  von  Meysenburg,  35, 
36,  37. 

Meyer,  Dr.  Richard,  25,  72. 

Middle  classes,  120,  153. 

Mill,  J.  S.,  3. 

Morality,  3,  4;  inconsistency 
of  Nietzsche's  attacks  on,  79; 
slave,  83,  113;  Nietzsche 
and  ascetic.  111;  the  "idi- 
osyncrasy of  the  decadent," 
115,  119;  of  Nietzsche's 
followers,  266  ff.;  Christian, 
on  trial,  303. 

Napoleon,  81,  87,  127,  149, 
270,  284. 

Naumburg,  12,  13;  its  influ- 
ence on  Nietzsche,  51,  52, 
134. 

Nemesis  of  Nations,  151. 

Nietzsche,  Elizabeth,  11,  12, 
37;  marriage,  38;  goes  to 
Paraguay,  39;  returns  to 
Nietzsche,  45. 

Nietzsche's  father,  11;  mother, 
11,  12,  44;  grandmother,  11, 
12. 

Old  Faith  and  the  New,  The,  23, 
24-5. 

Paganism,  4.  23,  28,  85,  289; 
* '  corrupted ' '     by     Socrates 


INDEX 


319 


and  Plato,  117,  310;  con- 
quered by  Church,  119; 
of  Renaissance,  149,  289; 
Nietzsche's  revival  of,  301-2, 
311-2. 

Pallares,  Dr..  34,  57;  on 
Nietzsche's  style,  246. 

Taneth,  Dr.,  32,  40. 

Paterson,  151. 

Pessimism,  123,  144. 

Pforta,  13,  15. 

Phillips,  L.  March,  132. 

Political  Theory  in  the  West, 
History  of,  293. 

Prussia,  10;  and  culture,  26, 
47.  196,  198. 

Quintessence  of  Nietzsche,  266. 

Redemption,  Nietzsche  and, 
61. 

Ree,  Dr.  Paul,  36,  37,  52, 
175. 

Richter.  Claire,  196. 

Ritschl,  15,  16,  19. 

Rocken,  10. 

Rohde,  Erwin,  17,  40. 

Romanticism,  Nietzsche's  atti- 
tude to,  28,  55,  168,  255; 
and  Wagner.  34. 

Romundt,  304. 

Ruling  Class,  The,  88, 112, 153, 
199;  conquered  by  morality, 
113-5. 

Schmidt,  Karl.     See  Stirner. 

Schopenhauer,  16,  19,  33,  51, 
52,  195;  Nietzsche's  essay 
on,  29;  and  Christianity, 
121-4,  130;  Nietzsche's  debt 
to,  189-194. 

Sils-Maria,  36,  39,  57. 


Slave  world,  llS-5.  117.  See 
lower  classes. 

Socialism,  135,  296. 

Stirner,  Max,  Nietzsche's  debt 
to,  174,  200-1,  207-210; 
comparison  with  Nietzsche, 
202-6;  style  of,  218. 

Strauss,  David,  23,  24,  27, 141, 
143,  313. 

Suffering,  value  of,  67,  91,  145, 
286. 

Superman,  6,  19,  52,  79  ff., 
145,  168,  176,  195,  276; 
morality  of,  82-3,  209,  268, 
284;  vagueness  of,  86;  in- 
dividual or  class?,  87,  89; 
restraints  of,  138-9. 

Tennyson,  Alfred,  4,  290-1. 
Tolstoy,  232. 
Tonnies,  Dr.,  148. 
Triebschen,  22,  30,  176. 
Turin,  43,  44,  57. 
Twilight  of  the  Idols,  159. 

"Vomehmheit."  See  Distinc- 
tion. 

Wagner,  16,  19,  55;  influence 
on  Nietzsche, .  22,  30,  171; 
and  culture,  26;  Nietzsche's 
essay  on,  30,  234;  goes  to 
Bayreuth,  30;  quarrel  with 
Nietzsche,  31-5;  Nietz- 
sche's reaction  from,  176. 

Wagner,  Frau  Cosima,  22,  30, 
34. 

Warrior  class,  120,  272-4. 

Weimar,  45. 

Will  to  Live,  67-9,  75,  109. 

Will  to  Power,  20,  21,  78  ff.. 


320  INDEX 

92-3,    112,    154,    195,    288;  Zarathustra,  6,  9,  40,  41,  42, 

of    the    slave    world,     113;  48,  49,  54,  94-5,  153,  158, 

expression    in    architecture,  163-7,  169,  176,  256;   popu- 

132.  larity  of,  214,  257;    "Night 

Will  to  Power,  15,  42,  47,  68,  Song,"  220-4;    "Country  of 

73-4,     75-7,     95-7,     176,  Culture,"    254;     "Song    of 

180-4,  233,  236,  244-6,  256.  Seven   Seals,"  264;    on  the 

272-4,  275-9.  State,  281-3. 


Princeton  Theological  Semmary-Speer  Library 
Illillllllllll 


1    1012  01145  7571 


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